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Re-reading Rousseau, using cognate works by de Man, Althusser and Derrida, this 
thesis hopes to destabilise the convention of reading 'confessional' texts in terms of 
authorial intention. 
Chapter One undermines critical responses to Rousseau's work, tracing a tradition of 
reading which rejects his oeuvre, not due to a rigorous reading of his texts, but 
through an ad hominem attack. We establish de Man, Althusser and Derrida as 
writers who lie outside this tradition. 
Chapter Two examines the intellectual debate surrounding the revelation of Paul de 
Man's wartime journalism, concentrating on this journalism's power to contaminate 
his oeuvre. We unsettle the terms of this debate, revealing its reliance upon a crypto-
biographical reading of the author irito the text. We account for the problematic 
nature of de Man's deconstructive stance differently when we read de Man's texts as a 
conscious type or copy of Rousseau's texts. 
Chapter Three studies the anti-Althusserian polemic which attacked"his 'theoretical' 
Marxism with reference to insanity and murder. Again, a reading which might have 
located a resistance to theory within theory itself instead favours a reductive, 
biographical reading. We trace a reading of Rousseau in Althusser's work in order to 
destabilise this debate. 
Chapter Four looks at the concepts of scandal and slander and their current usage in 
both legal and literary contexts. Our aim here is to unite our authors in the shared aim 
of re-synonimising the two terms so as to reveal biography as necessarily fictional. 
Rousseau's Confessions is re-read as an instance where the concepts of slander and 
scandal are equated. 
Chapter Five upsets a traditional theory of the archive when it reads Althusser's 
autobiography as a deliberate copy of Rousseau's Confessions. 
Finally, Chapter Six unites all our writers in a discussion of the necessarily fictive 
nature of a re-iterable autobiography. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
AN ABERRANT TRADITION: TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF 
ROUSSEAU CRITIQUE 
Nul ne peut ecrire la vie d'un homme que lui-meme. Sa manihe d'etre interieure, sa 
veritable vie n'est connue que de lui. 
Rousseau, "Neuchatel Preface", 17641 
1.0. Introduction 
This thesis examines a tradition of literary criticism intent on censuring the texts of 
certain authors, not through any rigorous reading of those texts but rather through an 
ad hominem attack on the author's private life which is then read 'into' the texts. I 
trace this cryp~o-biographical approach, this reliance on the availability of authorial 
intention within the text, back to the reception of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's work over 
two centuries ago. From Rousseau I turn to a series of controversial writers.who have 
undergone a similar type of 'literary trial'. My main protagonists will be Paul de 
Man, Louis Althusser and Jacques Derrida, chosen - not only because of the similar 
fates that they have suffered in academic circles - but because their books demonstrate 
a reliance upon a re-reading of Rousseau which works to unsettle the terms of the 
critical debates they are faced with. This re-reading of Rousseau's texts, along with 
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their continued re-reading of each other's work, establishes the priority of re-iteration, 
stereotype and repetition - hence fiction - in theoretical and autobiographical or 
confessional narratives. This textual reflexivity, which is a dominant feature of their 
work, not only unsettles a tradition of criticism which depends on a type of 'literary 
detective work', it also has far-reaching implications for contemporary literary, legal 
and archive theories, all of which are seen to depend upon a naIve view of what 
autobiography is. So that while I will examine the literary 'scandals' which surround 
these four writers, I will attempt to destabilise the very notions of scandal or slander, 
to re-define the archive and to re-situate the autobiographical subject, thus 
undermining any attempt to establish a meta-text. 
This first chapter, then, examines a tradition of critical responses to Rousseau's work, 
prioritising the reception of his autobiographical work, The Confessions. It also 
works to establish de Man, Althusser and Derrida as writers who lie outside this 
tradition. 
1.I.Setting the scene 
There is only one school of thought when it comes to interpreting Rousseau and then 
there is what lies outside of this school - less than a handful of men whose fate must 
be regarded as highly ironic if one is not to succumb to a belief in destiny. This 
chapter will set the scene. It will examine over two centuries of Rousseau criticism -
a task simplified by the homogeneous nature of Rousseau's reader response over the 
last two hundred years - dividing an orthodox school of interpretation into three 
branches which, nonetheless, proceed organically from the same, deep-rooted trunk. 
The first school will encompass eighteenth and nineteenth century religious and 
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political responses, the second, early twentieth century psychoanalytic readings and 
the third, stylistic readings of Rousseau. Sheltered under a common canopy, these 
three variants upon the one theme will be contrasted to more recent, if less prolific, 
interpretations of Rousseau. Importantly, I will reveal a tremendous -body of work 
directed against Rousseau's oeuvre through an ad hominem assault on Rousseau "the 
author." This anti-Rousseauian polemic will be shown to be intent on constructing a 
specific type of negative reader-response to Rousseau's work geared towards 
terminating the need for any further reading of his texts. I will also examine the 
questionable use of morality in a debate which appears to be fundamentally controlled 
by distorted principles of responsibility based on ideas of mental and physical health 
or cleanliness. Opposing this negative trend in treatments of Rousseau, I hope to 
account for a small group of writers who have attempted to counter this truly massive 
and entrenched critical body by offering new interpretations. I refer here to Paul de 
Man, Jacques Derrida and Louis Althusser whose alternative responses to Rousseau 
struggle through the mire of author-centred and crypto-biographical debates by 
preferring instead to look to the text itself to resolve textual problems. 
1.2.Reader Responses 
Eighteenth and nineteenth century reader responses 
Despite the truly astounding efforts of Bernard Gagnebin to consign all the available 
archival documentation surrounding the event, one cannot possibly appreciate the 
degree of anticipation with which people allover Europe awaited the publication of 
Rousseau's Confessions.2 What I here propose is that there were, in effect, .. two types 
of contemporary response to Rousseau's Confessions: one public, another private. 
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Of course, Rousseau was quite a cause celebre: he was renowned allover Europe for 
the controversy that his work always entailed. As early as 1754 Rousseau had had 
difficulties with the authorities. In that year his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality 
was banned by the Vatican in Rome. In 1762 his Emile was condemned by the 
Sorbonne and the Parliament of Paris and in Geneva the book was actually burnt. 3 
The Social Contract, parts of which were written concurrently with Emile, was also 
publicly burnt and a total ban was placed on any further publication in Europe save 
England.4 A warrant for Rousseau's arrest was issued and Rousseau, ostracised by the 
authorities, began what was to be a lifelong exile.s From 1762 onwards, ad hominem 
attacks in Jansenist, Jesuit and philosophical journals threatened Rousseau.6 Chased 
off mainland Europe towards England; archives show how Rousseau was accused of 
lycanthropy, deist heresy and even, by the general public, of being the anti-Christ.' 
The effect of the authorities' reactions on public opinion was probably extremely 
injurious. Court proceedings, published for all to read, attacked not only Rousseau's 
texts but their author aswell.8 Rousseau was physically persecuted from 1762, 
culminating three years later, on September 61\1765, when his house iri Motiers was 
stoned.9 , 
And yet the arrival of Rousseau's Confessions in the shops was met with avaricious' 
book buying, that is, where stocks were not already depleted by· advance orders. 
Rousseau had a huge literary following all over Eu~ope and his public's reaction to 
the Confessions mimicked their earlier reception of his Nouvelle Heloise: 
The contemporary writer and editor of Rousseau's works, Louis-Sebastien Mercier, points 
out that in Paris the rent for the best-selling novellil Nouvelle Htlol"se, supplies of which ran 
short, was twelve sous for sixty minutes per volume,lo 
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There were many, many people who genuinely, if privately, respected both Rousseau 
and his work. Indeed, both the Kings of France and England had offered him their 
patronage - his refusal to accept, however, did little to endear him to them. But La 
Nouvelle Heloise had gained him a tremendous following, especially among the 
female population, and Emile did 'give a new direction to education'.l1 The diversity 
of reader reactions will always be impossible to quantify but it does seem that 
Rousseau's Confessions did find much sympathy privately. It is important to note that 
The Confessions were published four years after Rousseau's death and that in those 
four years, demand for the book had grown so rapidly that, despite Rousseau's wish 
that the book's publication be postponed until the death of his widow, Therese 
Lavasseur, and indeed the deaths of all those mentioned in its pages who might find 
cause to blush, it arrived in the shops when Mme. Lavasseur and many others 
mentioned, could still purchase an edition.12 
According to the Oeuvres Posthumes, 'Paris s'agita, on cria au scandale'.13 It is 
perhaps true that delicate Parisian sensibilities were offended but this is most likely 
because Rousseau's wishes had been ignored and, in publishing his Confessions too 
soon, the memoir tradition of concealing character's identities had been' broken. Yet 
it was the impatience of the public which led to its early publication and so the public, 
. if indeed they were affronted, had only themselves to blame.14 Du Peyrou, 
Rousseau's friend and editor, had supposedly pestered Girardin, the secretive guardian' 
of Rousseau's Confessions, to publish because of public demand. Girardin initially 
denied possession of the manuscripts replying: 
Tout que je scais [sic] par lui-meme [Rousseau], c'est que son voeu particulier etoit [ ... ] que 
ses Confessions ne fussent imprimes autant que faire se pourroit que longtems [sic] apres sa 
mort et celIe des personnes interesses.1S 
5 
Chapter 1 
Any criticism which targets Rousseau's abomination of the memorialist tradition 
should bear this in mind. Certainly, some might have thought it improper that 
Rousseau write a memoir at all and especially one that included descriptions of the 
banalities of early childhood development and embarrassing scenes 'of adolescent 
sexuality. 16 However, even if it might seem that Rousseau's social status as a 
bourgeois Genevan should preclude him from the privilege of authoring such a text, 
his was certainly not an endeavour without precedent. So that whilst it is true that 
Mme. de Boufflers complained in a letter to King Gustave III (May 1st, 1782)17, that 
such a book, filled with the banal quotidian actions of a low born Genevan citizen, 
was grotesque, it is similarly true that there were many people who wanted to read 
about Rousseau despite, or even because of, his low status, just as they had read books 
by and about other people of ignoble birth before. So while it was certainly the 
accepted norm that historical memoirs would concern people of a certain social 
standing, it was in no way unusual to read books where the author, if not himself or 
herself a person of high birth, was at least as well connected as Rousseau undoubtedly 
was. Rousseau was certainly privy to the rich and aristocratic members of the French 
court and, as part of this social scene, joined the likes of Rose Delauney, a 
contemporary author and woman of low birth with high connections and tales of 
injustice1B• 
So what exactly did shock Rousseau's contemporaries? Well, obviously some of· 
them were not shocked at all. Some people found Rousseau's Confessions delightful 
as is evidenced by the huge amounts of supportive mail sent to the editors de Peyrou, 
Moultou, and Girardin after the publication. Indeed, in 1782, the Confessions became 
the most sought after of Rousseau's Oeuvres Completes. One must obviously try to 
discern different types of reader response. The public could be supportive but there 
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were notable religious and political figures whose position had to be maintained and 
these 'critics' tried to make it difficult for Rousseau's supporters to voice their 
opinions safely. A prior reading of Rousseau's overtly political texts and an 
appreciation of the need to react against their content in order to preserve the status 
quo, shaped the response of the philosophes, politicians, Jansenists, Jesuits, Calvinists, 
Genevans and members of the Court to his autobiographical work. Certainly, 
Rousseau had often felt that there was an organised conspiracy against him -
originating among those who gathered at the French court and the Sorbonne - and a 
fickle public reaction seems to confirm this. He believed that he was being constantly 
spied upon, 'les planches sous lesquels je suis ont des yeux, les murs qui m' entourent 
ont des oreilles' .19 This is not so far-fetched considering he was seen as such a great 
threat to the status quo. Rousseau had many enemies in high places who, always and 
already antagonistic, regarded The Confessions as merely another text which might be 
used to build the pyre of Rousseau's public, if figurative, execution. 
Immediately following upon the publication of The Confessions two major journals of 
the time, the Catholic Annee Litteraire and the Correspondence Litteraire, denounced 
both text and author whilst choosing the terms which would delineate Rousseau 
criticisms for the next two centuries: 
What becomes apparent in the two centuries of Rousseau criticism is that the phenomenon of 
reader-reaction to Rousseau is surprisingly consistent, [,',] and reflects, to a greater or lesser 
extent, the remarks made by Rousseau's frrst critics.20 
Both periodicals admitted to the beauty of The Confessions but condemned this same 
beauty as the product of a 'demented, asocial individual' .21 Grimm - perhaps 
Rousseau's greatest enemy - Freron and Meister all used contemporary publications to 
attack the public's impression of just who Rousseau was.22 Indeed, the criticisms 
levelled against Rousseau. seem so consistent as to constitute a manifesto. Freron, in 
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the Annee Litteraire of July, 1782, criticised Rousseau's lack of remorse and his 
perversion of the confessional genre alleging that Rousseau reveals his crimes but 
does not regret them. Despite the title The Confessions, according to Freron, do not 
constitute a Christian apologetics. For Freron then, Rousseau is not contrite and, 
though he might assume a sort of responsibility for his actions, this is not a Christian 
responsibility but is more akin to a legal vindication of his actions. What is 
interesting is that most academic eighteenth century criticisms objected to the detail in 
The Confessions. All in all, there was an embarrassing surplus of description where 
less would have sufficed, an abundance of anecdotal evidence where discretion might 
have been less shameful. Such a tendency to dwell on detail, itself a strategy in 
Rousseau's conceptualisation of responsibility, discredited the text and its contents in 
the eyes of the Church and the philosophers. Meister complained, 'ces memoires sont 
remplis de disparates, d'extravagances, de minuties, de platitudes, si vous voulez 
meme de faussetes'.23 
Too many details, it would seem, add up to a lie. The truth, by contrast, is simple. 
Meister is perhaps the first in a long line to claim that, in order to write such trivia, 
Rousseau must have suffered from insanity or, as he puts it, 'une triste folie'.24 
Another contemporary, Servan, offered the same analysis: 'on voit clairement ce 
germe de folie se developper des son jeune age, en extravagances, en bizarreries' .25, 
The list of detractors is long and marks the beginning of an orthodox tradition of 
Rousseauian critique, where the style and the content of the text can incriminate the 
author of that text. Somewhere, it is accused, "behind" or "beyond" the plethora of 
detail, Rousseau must be hiding something else - here called the truth. In its 
Simplicity the truth is as obvious as the Christian message emanating from the beatific 
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face of a silent statue of Christ. By contrast, Rousseau's logodaedaly - his verbal 
legerdemain - evidences both an insanity and a dishonest desire to deceive the reader. 
Those in authority, who had always detracted against Rousseau's work, could now 
attack his style as further evidence of either insanity or heresy. 
If it is right to say that responses to Rousseau's autobiography depended largely on 
the social position of the reader - and on whether that response was a public or a 
private one - then Catherine Beaudry is only partially correct in Writing 'when 
Rousseau's Confessions were published in 1782 his readers were stunned, [ ... they] 
found that The Confessions were outside their experience of historical memoirs and 
Christian apologetics' .26 
One might not be able to agree with the extremity of her. first sentiment but the 
contention upon which it is based is not without foundation: Rousseau did secularise 
the confessional model. What is important to note is that the press reacted as if the 
first sentiment were true when we have little proof of such public oUf!age, especially 
when we consider, as I have already noted, that Rousseau was hardly the first person 
of low birth to write his memoirs. Yet both the literary and the religious press 
attacked the text and assumed a high moral tone which persists in present day analyses 
such as Beaudry's. To this extent, the potential diversity of private responses to 
Rousseau's Confessions are, at least archivally, lost. Compared to the preservation of 
eighteenth and nineteenth century literature written against his autobiography very 
little can be read about the reactions of a public who had come to expect that memoirs 
would be punctuated by influences from the then popular picaresque novels and who 
relished the opportunity to read anything which might divulge so-called 'facts' about 
those in power. 
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Thus it is a necessary blindness towards the true nature of the response to The 
Confessions which can lead and has indeed led to the strict delimitation of possible 
interpretations. Since its publication,' orthodox responses to the text are straight-
jacketed into observing three cardinal rules: they must criticise Rousseau's rhetorical 
skills, they must propose the likelihood that Rousseau was mentally and/or physically 
abnormal, and they should question the motivation behind a text which secularises the 
Christian apologetic and, in so doing, abnegates the idea of a Christian concept of 
responsibility. 
Early twentieth century responses and the psychoanalytic school 
With the vogue of Freudian thought and the beginnings of what could be called a 
school of thought in the tradition of Freud, it is right to point out that Rousseau's 
Confessions came to be read within this interpretative field. Perhaps the first such 
treatment was Laforgue's study in the Revue Franraise de Psychoanalyse in 1927.27 
Laforgue trivialised The Confessions, hastily reading the text in order to quickly move 
away from it, beyond it, to a conjectured 'flesh and blood' Rousseau. The literary 
persona is here mistaken by Laforgue for a "real" Rousseau and the autobiography 
then becomes no-more than a clinical case study. When Meister and Servan declared 
Rousseau mad it was because he said too much. Later, it would not be the amount of 
text which offended the critic, but its content. In the 1950's Ellrich would reiterate 
Laforgue's. symptomatic treatment.28, He condemned the text and' dismissed its 
cultural significance, claiming that Rousseau suffered from a psychological illness. 
EUrich explained Rousseau's rhetorical strategy of including the reader within the text 
as 'essential to the sado-masochistic syndrome with which Rousseau is here supposed 
to have been afflicted' .29 
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On purely anecdotal evidence collated from, by then, nearly two centuries of 
Rousseau studies, the author could, without fear of opposition, read Rousseau only by 
taking into account his presumed psychological shortcomings. The Confessions then 
became nothing more than evidence to support something "already known" - the fact 
that Rousseau was mentally ill. Thus, for EHrich, the text is merely 'symptomatic of . 
the author's personality disorder' .30 
Many other early psychoanalytic treatments of Rousseau persisted in interpreting the 
text as a symptom of its author's moral and physical degeneration. J.M. Cohen read 
Rousseau's Confessions as the product of a 'persecution-mania' /1 reducing the text to 
a delirious aberration: an insane product of dementia and paranoia. Because of the 
fact that late eighteenth century critics chose to ignore any tangible evidence of 
Rousseau's very real persecution and despite the referential evidence in the form of 
published court proceedings and journalistic accounts, a contradictory fact emerges 
and prevails in order to protect the powers of the State apparatus. This 'fact' states 
that Rousseau suffered from paranoid delusions. So it is that over a century after 
those rust psychobiographical readings, at the beginning of the twentieth century, it 
was even easie~, to dismiss Rousseau's Confessions, within a psychoanalytic school, 
because of this by now familiar logic of a psychobiographical approach. A reading of 
Rousseau which once existed alongside its potential deconstruction - a parallel 
appreciative reading amongst a supportive public - emerges unchallenged over a 
century later and strengthens itself within a school of thought intent on reducing the 
text to a symptom. In the 1960's and the 1970's,' notably Starobinski,32 but also 
Borel,33 Benoussan34 and Blanchard,35 would psychoanalyse Rousseau. Starobinski 
wrote'that 'every artist leaves mortal remains, but we can never discover his art by 
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inspecting them' ,36 a citation which perhaps encapsulates the leitmotif of the 
psychoanalytic school. Starobinski is thwarted because mortality cannot reveal art. 
The reverse is surely truer and more significant. Every artist leaves artistic products, 
but we cannot discover the artist by inspecting those artistic products. Yet the 
psychobiographical reading of the text continually seeks evidence of the man, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, within an artistic product we here call a text. This school of critics 
always exhibits a certain impatience with the text which they seek to resolve through 
psychoanalysis and the reliability of a clinical diagnosis. The result. is arresting, 
literally, because, quite simply, such a reading tenninates the need for any further 
dialogue with or on the text. 
Other critics within this tradition of (mis)reading which is such a feature of the 
1950's, the 1960's and even the 1970's, are Lester Crocker37 and Jakob Huizinga.38 
Both these so called 'literary' critics condemn Rousseau's decision to give his 
children away to an orphanage and write extensively about Rousseau's psychiatric 
illnesses, dwelling particularly on his paranoid delusions about plots against his life. 
Charles Rabant's reading targets Rousseau's possible mental disorders.39 William 
Boyd's reading ascribes to Rousseau 'the penalty of madness,4o and Nicolson, despite 
the fact that Rousseau fathered at least three children, writes: 'I incline to the theory 
that Rousseau was sexually impotent, or at least abnonnal. ,41 
William Mead, in the same tradition, writes of the 'disgust' which the text of La 
Nouvelle Heloise inspires within the reader, and implicates Rousseau, as author of the 
text, in provoking the 'right reader's repulsion' .42 
In all the above cases, the literariness of Rousseau's text is overlooked in favour of a 
"realistic" approach. As recently as 1991, still within this tradition of reading, 
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Catherine Beaudry also insists that Rousseau's style was the product of dysfunction. 
Rousseau, it would seem, despised his contemporaries. This leads Beaudry to two 
conclusions: frrstly, that Rousseau demanded from his readers the love and attention 
which he was 'incapable of experiencing at the appropriate moment with the women 
in his life' ,43 and secondly, that this alienation among his peers led Rousseau to write 
his Confessions for a future audience. Without dismantling Beaudry's argument too 
easily by pointing out the obvious fact that all books are written for a future reader, 
the implications of Beaudry's interpretation are clear - she criminalises Rousseau by 
turning his writing into the product of petty revenges and she justifies her reading 
above all others. She becomes this chosen reader of the future, elected over a 
contemporary audience which, however hostile, however misguided, surely could 
never have desecrated the text as much as the twentieth century reader has done. At 
least in the eighteenth century this type of reaction to Rousseau's work had been 
sparked by a genuine fear. We must not forget that Rousseau had offered a new 
theory of the nature of mankind which upset many people. Rousseau was convinced 
that Man was naturally good and here he broke with the Calvinism of Geneva and 
with both the Jesuits and the Jansenists by saying that if man was bad, society had 
made him SO.44 H;e had also angered the philosophes by contrasting their materialism 
with his belief in a co-ordinating self at all stages of life. So that the "secret" behind 
Meister's, Freron' s or any other prominent eighteenth century reading of a madness 
into the text, is probably this fear motivated by the potential of political ~nrest. It was 
of paramount importance that Rousseau's texts be left unread and undiscussed. It was 
important that his work be discredited and by far the easiest approach when seeking to 
discredit a rigorously written text is to attack its author. It was this fear which fuelled 
'. the contemporary extremist attack on Rousseau's oeuvre but this "secret"- the political 
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impetus behind the ad hominem attacks - was suppressed in later criticisms which 
reiterated Rousseau's physical and mental ill-health until, by the twentieth century, 
psychoanalysis had a ready made specimen on its couch. 
The Rhetoric of a Romantic 
The second reaction to Rousseau is the first's bedfellow and is summed up in the 
charge of eloquence. Eighteenth and nineteenth century critics rallied against 
verbosity as a sign of degeneracy. For Rousseau's contemporaries the idea of strict 
documentation was unknown and unexpected. The idea of demonstration or 
evidencing is one whose time came later in our history and to this extent Rousseau 
was a pioneer in his attempt to do the impossible: to write everything. So that whilst 
his attention to detail was criticised by his contemporaries, it could not be attacked in 
later years because it was expected. Thus, later critics would translate the previous 
attack against detail into an argument against Rousseau's style. Where his 
contemporaries expected the use of rhetoric, the twentieth century critic would 
denounce rhetoricism as evidence of insincerity. In both cases the charge is against 
Rousseau's use of language but couched in terms best suited to the critical context. 
Rousseau's contemporaries had incriminated him because of his verbosity, two 
hundred years later the charge remains: 
Rousseau claims that the reader is as responsible for hislher reading as the' author is for the 
writing of the story. His exposition, however, is never as innocent as he would have us 
believe. Rousseau's autobiographical language, as Voisine has pointed out, is <replete with 
oratorical, rhetorical, literary, didactic and conversational techniques {which} persuade the 
audience '.45 
Beaudry's recent and anachronistic criticism of Rousseau's rhetorical strategies 
ignores' the eighteenth century reliance upon rhetorical techniques of address. More 
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importantly perhaps, she overlooks the very obvious feature of all Rousseau's work, 
the fact that he continually alerts the reader to the effects of his rhetorical techniques. 
However, her reading stands - Rousseau's is not an innocent text, whatever that might 
be, because it is guilty of persuasion. Beaudry here tacitly agrees with Voisine: 
'Rousseau est un plaidoyer pro donw, leur auteur est un avocat de la defense rompu 
aux traditions d'eloquence du pretoire.,46 
Alongside EHrich's criticism of Rousseau's rhetoricism, this reading allies itself to the 
psychoanalytic tradition. Rousseau is deceitful because he knows how to use words. 
Starobinski is probably the leading voice in this type of attack. In 1982 Starobinski 
reiterated his suspicion of Rousseau's rhetoric in a text which recalls at least two of 
his previous articles.47 Starobinski knowingly implicates himself within a particular 
tradition of anti-Rousseauian thought which centres itself in an attack on Rousseau as 
a dangerous rhetorician. Whist he understands that Rousseau deliberately and 
painstakingly alerted his readers to the potential effects of his rhetoric, Starobinski 
believes that Rousseau's eloquence forgets itself ('se fait oublier,).48 Somehow then, 
Rousseau's is at once an eloquence which both advertises and conceals itself. 
Starobinski, ignoring the consequences of his own argument, believes that eloquence 
is no longer for ~''us'' what it was to an eighteenth century audience - a genre. Yet 
surely, it is our problem if we forget the context within which Rousseau wrote and it 
is unprofessional if we criticise an eighteenth century text for failing to meet twentieth 
century criteria. Stubbornly, Starobinski insists that Rousseau's use' of eighteenth 
century rhetorical devices incriminates him, writing, 'les choses sont plus melees: 
c'est de maniere eloquente que Rousseau prend l'eloquence pour l'objet de son propos 
theoretique ou de son argumentation defensive' .49 
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Even when the object of enquiry is his own eloquence, Rousseau is gUilty of tackling 
the subject eloquently. Indeed, as far as Starobinski is concerned, Rousseau uses 
eloquence to seduce his reader in one of two ways: either to provoke nostalgia for a 
lost happiness and/or to seduce the reader into a belief in the possibility of its 
reparation. Rousseau substitutes 'un valeur d'authenticite' with 'une qualite d'art' .50 
Significantly, it is this text of Starobinski's which encapsulates a tradition of post-war 
readings which have allied Rousseau with totalitarianism: with an authenticity 
replaced with artifice. In this reading then, Rousseau's text is not as rhetorically 
complex or paradoxical as he would like us to believe because ultimately, he holds the 
pen and writes these complexities into the text in order to conceal his all-controlling 
figure. The text is, therefore, no more than 'la peinture fidele de celui qui tient la 
plume' ,51 and later: 
Le mythe d'un 'monde id~al' peupl~ d'initi~s, dont Jean-Jacques Rousseau fait partie de 
naissance, pose comme une donne de nature (mais reserv~e a une ~lite limit~e) la possibilit~ 
d'une communication parfaite, allante du coeur au coeur sans distortion du message, sans 
partie d'energie affective.S2 
This accusation - that Rousseau wrote of a desired Utopia populated by an 'elect' race 
able to 'evidence' itself through some sort of perfect and natural language' - was 
voiced by Starobinski for over two decades, culminating in the above statement at a 
lecture series at ·Cambridge University in 1982 where it remained unchallenged. 
Starobinski's Rousseau accuses everyone else of having fallen from grace whilst he 
remains in possession of an identity, an image of nature here called authenticity. To 
convince us of this Rousseau supposedly manipulates his self image using words: the 
pen, then, is Rousseau's secret, 'peut-etre est-ce la, Ie secret de l'efficacite toujours 
agissante de l'eloquence de Rousseau' .53 
16 
Chapter 1 
Only a subversive and dishonest use of language enables Rousseau to establish 
himself as the natural leader of men. This type of reading, which focuses on 
Rousseau's absolutism, his totalitarianism and his mental illness, has been very 
prominent in post-war Europe. Charles Rabant has used Emile to argue this point. 
Citing out of context, Rabant quotes Emile's tutor at the moment where he alerts the 
reader to the potential abuses of his position: 'There is no subjugation so perfect as 
that which has the appearance of liberty.'S4 
Rabant uses this passage to prove that Rousseau supported such a devious method of 
thought-control. Likewise, Berman and Crocker55 situate their readings of Rousseau's 
La Nouvelle Heloise within the context of totalitarianism. Similarly, William Mead 
writes of the 'disgust' that the text inspires in the reader and Marshall Berman writes 
that, though the text is the work of a geni~s, that genius is 'perverted' .56 Isaiah Berlin, 
within the same tradition, suggests that Rousseau believed in the community as larger 
than the individual. Discussing the 'permissable limits of coercion' ,57 Berlin situates 
Rousseau's thought within a school of 'positive freedom' which believes in a self at 
once both rational and irrational. Our rational self is equated with a "higher" self and, 
in tum, this "higher" self can be represented as something larger than the. individual. 
Berlin's Rousseau identifies the "true" self with the social "whole" and therefore 
thinks it right that the community should impose its "'organic", single will upon its 
recalcitrant "members" [to achieve] its own, and, their, "higher freedom'" .58 
Berlin's Rousseau is one who, unquestioningly, looks 'upon society as a design 
Constructed according to the rational laws of the wiselawgiver,.59 Similarly, Harold 
Nicolson links Rousseau's very specific, if vague, abnormality to Nazism and ~ school 
emerges which allies Rousseau's conjectured psychological and physical maladies to a 
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will to power made manifest in a rhetoricism no longer appreciated in the twentieth 
century. For Nicolson The Social Contract, Emile and La Nouvelle Heloise evidence 
Rousseau's totalitarian bent. Nicolson here takes a previous partial reading of 
Rousseau's oeuvre to substantiate his own parallel misreading which is now given a 
post-war gloss: 'In my own youth there survived some sentimentalists (generally of 
German nationality) who, when visiting the woods at Clarens, would have tears in 
their eyes. ,60 
More recent critics continue to use terms established by post-war readers of Rousseau. 
In a reiteration of Nicolson, Thomas Kavanagh claims that Rousseau's 'ideal' society 
of Clarins in La Nouvelle Heloi'se is only possible through the presence of a 
beneficent, yet perverted paternal presence which must be read as Rousseau.61 The 
possibility of Clarens, according to Kavanagh, depends upon a praxis of intervention 
characterised by the ability to efface all traces of itself as constraint. Nature, the 
SymbOlic, the Father and the Law are everywhere in the text and their name is 
Rousseau. 
Another recent critic, Alessandro Ferrara, claims that the theme of authenticity in 
philosophy unfolds within a tradition whose origin lies with Rousseau.62 Yet Ferrara 
is too liberal with this notion of authenticity, believing that Rousseau used the term 
unambiguously within his texts. Ferrara's Rousseau opposes the possibility of 
deconstructing the concept of authenticity: 
Deconstructionists avoid using the term authenticity because to their sensibilities it conveys 
the illusory myth of a totalising, harmonious, unitary self, which they seek to replace with the 
image of a fragmented, plural, centerless and irreconcilably split subjectivity.63 
The implication is clear, Rousseau managed to achieve an authenticity "desp~te" the 
self: an authenticity played on the register of the sublime. Importantly, Ferrara's 
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Rousseau believed himself to be the only truly authentic subject. This takes the reader 
back to Starobinski's previously cited belief that Rousseau created 'une valeur 
d'authenticite' through 'une qualite d'art', that is, writing somehow provided the 
means for Rousseau to create a unitary, harmonious self and, more significantly, this 
writing enabled Rousseau to establish himself as a natural leader of men. Perhaps it is 
significant that this view has been most strongly voiced in post-war English speaking 
countries. Sadly, this vindictive, accusatory attitude inverts Rousseau's own position 
and thus, 'as a result, [Rousseau] has often been, not so much an object of study, 
investigation or understanding, as a scapegoat or a whipping-boy,.64 
1.3. The responsibility of responding: autobiography and obligation 
A third type of response to Rousseau emerges in the twentieth century. This is the 
response which responds for Rousseau's own perceived lack of response, that is, his 
lack of respons-ibility. I have already noted that for eighteenth century readers of 
Rousseau what stood out clearly was how his Confessions differed from orthodox 
Christian apologetics. Rousseau was not traditionally contrite and what was obvious 
was that he had overtly borrowed literary techniques to write his autobiography. To a 
large extent, dissatisfaction with this adoption of fictional references still fuels 
criticisms of Rousseau's autobiography. There is a majority of readers who hold the 
opinion that autobiography must provide a factual account of a life which can then be 
proven via a cross referencing with other documentation or non-textual types of 
evidence. That Rousseau's Confessions does not stand up to this test is made obvious 
in the vast amounts of historical research written to prove the discrepancies between 
Rousseau's account of his life and other contradictory archival evidence. A typical 
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example of such literary 'detective' work can be found in Cohen's preface to his 
translation of Rousseau's Confessions: 
The details of his memories may often be inaccurate. It is exceedingly difficult, for instance, 
to ascribe his early journeys to their defmite dates. Occasionally, where a check is possible, 
as of the length of his stay at the hospice in Turin before his abjuration of Protestantism, he 
may well prove to have exaggerated weeks into months.6S 
and later, 'Rousseau's memory may have betrayed him over facts' .66 Cohen goes on 
to attack Rousseau's 'flagrant errors of memory' ,67 thus transforming the possibility of 
memory loss into a very deliberate policy to misinform. For further information on 
the discrepancies between The Confessions and the 'probable facts' of Rousseau's life 
Cohen recommends the 'excellent, though slightly hostile' biography by C. E. 
VUlliamy,68 thus endorsing biographical readings of Rousseau's texts which pursue 
this type of detective work. 
Elizabeth Bruss's Autobiographical Actl9 discusses this need for the autobiography 
to be verifiable. The autobiography, according to Bruss, must be consistent with 
other 'evidence'. To determine its veracity we should be able to compare the 
autobiographical text to other documents that describe the same events. Therefore, 
the truth-value of autobiography depends upon its ability to refer convincingly to 
things outside of itself: things which are here taken by Bruss to be other texts. Thus, 
Bruss' belief in autobiographical referentiality is perhaps little more than a belief in 
intertextuality. However, she believes that two mutually agreeing intertexts can 
somehow add up to an extra-textual truth. So that, when two textual givens coincide 
they constitute a truth beyond textual confines. For Bruss, autobiography is about 
responsibility.70 Her criteria are problematic when applied to Rousseau because he is 
frequently unaccountable. His texts often contradict themselves or are inco,:?-sistent 
with other 'evidence'. Such a lack of internal coherence within an oeuvre consistently 
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undermines the archivists' attempt to 'discover' Rousseau either behind or beyond the 
confines of the text. Bruss refuses to examine the implications of such textual 
inconsistencies for the genre of literary biography. Rather, such inconsistencies 
within Rousseau's texts merely uphold Bruss's view that textual contradictions 
constitute lies. Bruss cannot believe in a responsible Rousseau within a contradictory 
text. Gita May similarly writes against Rousseau's use of novelistic techniques where 
he might be expected to document "facts". For May, Rousseau uses 'l'invention 
propre au domaine fictif .71 Catherine Beaudry agrees: 
Violations of a wide range of linguistic rules, permissible in fictional texts (because they are 
resolved by the end of the narrative), produce misrepresentations and misunderstandings in 
autobiography. Rousseau's 'omement indiff~rent' in the preamble immediately places the 
truth-value of he text under suspicion. In [Rousseau's] autobiography, violations of the rules 
of language are most often left unresolved.72 
If the author of an autobiography has certain obligations towards his reader, Rousseau 
does not uphold them. Paradox and hyperbole are counterproductive when it comes 
to truth-telling. Like the psychoanalytic school of literary analysis which she 
supposedly writes against when she attacks its dependence upon crypt~biographical 
interpretations of Rousseau's work, Beaudry believes that the text holds the key with 
which to unlock secrets about the man. The text poses a challenge: 'to find th~ thread 
and a way out of his labyrinth,.73 
The text then represents no more than a voyage of discovery - it is tenacity rewarded, 
confusion overcome, contradiction resolved and, ultimately, harmony restored. 
Where could this thread lead us if not out of the labyrinth to deposit us, ever so 
humbly, at the feet of Jean-Jacques himself? This response to the text repeats 
previous responses which look outside the text to explain its structure rather than look 
to the universal structure of the textual process and the inevitably literary conceit of 
ones own textual self. 
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1.4. Autobiography as a fiction 
In the 1970's something started to change. Perhaps it commenced with Lejeune's 
L'Autobiographie en France (1971), or with his later Le Pacte Autob.iographique 
(1975). Or perhaps the catalyst was Demorais' 1975 study of the first person novel. 
Certainly it is only since these works that theorists have been willing to consider 
Rousseau's Confessions as a necessarily literary text. 
In 1971 Phillipe Lejeune discussed autobiography as a genre separate from the 
memoir novel. Concluding that there was no way of distinguishing an autobiography 
from a fust-person novel if one considered only the text, he wrote: 
Si ron reste sur Ie plan de l'analyse interne du texte, il n'a aucune difference. Tous Ies 
procedes que l' autobiographie emploi pour nous convaincre de l' authenticite de son recit, Ie 
roman peut Ies imiter, et Ies a souvent imites ,'4 
With this statement Lejeune offered a radical possibility: that one might examine the 
text of an autobiography as one would a novel rather than attempt to look beyond the 
text to a real signified. Demorais espoused a similar theory, writing: 
Dans IDle existence, if n'y a donc peut-etre pas de continuite reelle qui justifie Ie recit; if y a 
du moins cette continuite imaginaire que Ie heros, bien avant d' ecrire, veut donner a sa vie et 
qui est Ia grille a travers Iaquelle if entend Ia dechiffrer. Cette intention de continuite fait que 
Ie personnage se trouve devant sa vie dans IDle position assez analogue a celle que connait l' 
ecrivain en train de bfttir une fiction.'oS 
The writer of the autobiography, faced with the predicament of memory loss, is in an 
analogous position to the novelist who must not only fill in these lacunae or elaborate 
a plausible plot, but must construct an entire fiction from the imagination. Lejeune's 
Pacte Autobiographique, written in the same year, examined the concept of the 
Proper Name. This name, according to Lejeune, establishes a pact between the reader 
and the author who uses this name. For Lejeune, the name used determines reader 
expecta~ions. So that, if an author with a literary following uses his name, the book 
will be read as a literary text This nominal determinism, where the name governs 'Ie 
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mode de lecture du texte', is, according to Lejeune, the real subject of 
autobiography.76 It is only because we recognise the proper name of the central 
character in an autobiography, due to a prior "reading" of that name, that we presume 
this name capable of referring to the extra-textual signified. Rather, as Lejeune points 
out, the name should be read as an indication that this text is also fictional. Lejeune's 
interpretation of autobiographical structures, for all its novelty, still held on to certain 
trends from the orthodox school of Rousseauian critique. Whilst Lejeune might have 
wanted to avoid any definition of autobiography which might rely upon extra-textual 
criteria, he still interpreted key scenes of The Confessions, such as the breaking of 
Mlle Lambercier's comb, in terms of paternal absence and other extra-textual, 
psycho bio graphical speculations.77 
Must we all bum our fingers holding on to that elusive thread leading out of the 
labyrinth? Perhaps not. It is possible to find an alternative response to the texts of 
Rousseau, a response which values a close reading of the work itself. Louis 
Althusser's essay The Discrepancies was fust tested in a series of lectures delivered at 
the Ecole Normale Superieure between 1965 and 1966. In this, his most sustained 
theoretical treatment of Rousseau, Althusser offers a rigorous reading of the 
theoretical discrepancies in Rousseau's Social Contract. Opposing a tradition which 
has always sought to point out the inconsistencies within Rousseau's writing, 
Althusser uses the terms of this debate only to tum them back against this same 
school. His rust conclusion - that Rousseau was well aware of the . discrepancies 
Within his work and deliberately sign-posted them - and, perhaps more importantly, 
his second conclusion - that all writing, not just Rousseau's, functions because of the 
necessary existence of discrepancies and that, to this extent, all writing is fictional -
Signal a new approach to Rousseau's work. 
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Similarly, Derrida's Of Grammatology (1977), whilst it is perhaps inspired by 
Lejeune, is refreshingly different in its renunciation of the psychoanalytic model of 
reading: 'The reading of the literary Hsymptom" is most banal, most academic, most 
naYve.,78 
Derrida rejects the possibility of an extra-textual moment, what he calls the hors texte 
and thus shuns the concept of discovery. Jean-Jacques Rousseau is very definitely not 
available. For Derrida, who quite deliberately writes in opposition to Starobinski and 
the tradition he established, we must look to the text to resolve textual problems 
'rather than trying to exceed it toward a psychobiological signified whose link with 
the literary signifier then becomes extrinsic and contingent' .79 
Finally, Paul de Man, also writing in 1977, is similarly concerned with a rigorous 
method of textual analysis which opposes psychobiographical procedures. As early as 
1967, in his Gauss Seminar, de Man was at odds with Starobinski's portrayal of a 
"guilty" Rousseau. He said Starobinski: 'adopts a point of view not too different from 
that of the analyst toward his patient, assuming a possibility of deciphering, by means 
of [Rousseau's] language'. 80 
In his Allegories of Reading (1977) de Man concentrates on the scene in Rousseau's 
Confessions involving the theft of a ribbon.8t De Man does not say that Rousseau lieq 
about the theft.82 Rather, according to de Man, all confessions are necessarily 
discursive and, to this extent, they lie beyond the possibility of referential verification. 
To the extent that confessions are non-verifiable, they are fictional. Here de Man 
attacks a tradition of thought which had always singled out Rousseau's Confessions as 
.' 
uniquely literary. De Man universalises this linguistic predicament and threatens to 
. topple a debate where excuse supersedes responsibility rather than defines it. Against 
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the backdrop of a pseudo-moralistic debate which denounces Rousseau's 
epistemological stance as catastrophic - if no one assumes responsibility, who can we 
blame? - de Man shifts the focus of the 'discussion towards an understanding of the 
aporia at the heart of any discussion about responsibility. To be accountable one 
always needs to offer more and more evidence. Rousseau, before anyone even 
demanded such a detailed chronicle, realised and revealed the fact that his account of 
a life could never 'evidence' enough. 
It is to these three theorists that I tum in the rest of my thesis in order to trace a body 
of work which attempts to stand up to conventional interpretations of Rousseau for 
the sake of re-defining what autobiography means. In the next chapters I hope to 
show. how the very fate of these three men who have chosen to prioritise Rousseau 
within their own philosophical agendas has become entangled with the fate of 
Rousseau. We will examine how writing "under the influence" of Rousseau can 
appear to effectively pollute a discourse and force its author to share in Rousseau's 
unenviable fortune. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
DE MAN'S CRIME 
2.0. Introduction 
This second chapter proposes an evaluation of the homogeneous debate surrounding 
the death of Paul de Man and the subsequent discovery of his wartime journalism for 
collaborationist newspapers. In 1987 a Belgian post-graduate student called Ortwin 
de Graef 'uncovered' early wartime writings by de Man in the Nazi newspaper Het 
Vlaamsche Land.1 One article in particular, ''The Question of Jews in Literature", 
became the catalyst for an entire debate limited to the discussion of de Man's possible 
antisemitism and the implications of this stance for subsequent interpretations of his 
oeuvre. I wish here to e<~amine how this response to de Man, a response reliant upon 
a cryptobiographical reading of the de Manian oeuvre, misunderstands both the 
deconstructive tendency and de Man's philosophical 'itinerary'. I will trace thi~ 
itinerary to de Man's intertextual use of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's work, specifically 
the much (mis)read text Emile, and reveal the importance of de Man's negative 
hermeneutics in unsettling the terms of any post-de Manian' critique which would 
denounce de Man's texts through a naive reading of the author into the text. 
The frrst section will treat the strongest voices in this debate, exploring a rich, 
.. 
'aberrant tradition' 2 and the implications of its conclus,ions for the theory of 
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deconstruction. I will then offer comparisons between these readings of de Man, 
concentrating on what I believe to be the major concern of the debate: to establish a 
disappearance of the de Manian subject within his texts in order to permit the 
reintroduction of this subject 'on its own terms'. This issue will lead to a wider 
investigation of the 'death of the author' in literary theory. 
Following on from this, Section Two will examine Rousseau's Emile and the de 
Manian oeuvre as evidence of a strong reading of this text. Analogies drawn .will 
hopefully complicate a post-de Manian debate which relies on the possibility of the 
disinterested author. My reading of Rousseau's work in de Man's texts will 
problematise the entire framework of a critical response to the work of both de Man 
and Rousseau which has as its aim the uncovering of authorial intention within the 
text. 
2.1. The death of de Man and the loss of subjectivity 
The death of an author and the subsequent desire for a 'story' about that author 
constitutes nothing less than a desire for the return of that author on the reader's 
terms. This is the most prominent feature of the critical activity surrounding de 
Man's death and the revelation of his wartime journalism. The strongest voices in a 
debate on authorial accountability which demanded the 'return of the author' -
specifically de Man - fabricated textual scenarios within which de Man's intention 
might reveal itself. All this in spite of, or perhaps because of, the de Manian 
insistence on the unavailability of intention. 
In the foreword to the second, 1983 edition of Blindness and Insight, de Man wrote: 
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I am not given to retrospective self-examination and mercifully forget what I have written 
with the same alacrity I forget bad movies- although, as with bad movies, certain scenes or 
phrases return at times to embarrass and haunt me like a guilty conscience.' 
In the debate which follows the revelation of de Man's wartime 'secret' this passage 
is endlessly recycled as 'evidence' of de Man's obsession with a guilty past; of a 
return (within the text), to a primal (textual) scene of guilt and embarrassment - a 
scene which, since 1987, must be associated with a type of war crime. For critics of 
de Man, the desire to tell his story - to discern the intention behind his work -
becomes the desire to reinstate de Man's biographical or subjective status by 
welcoming him back as their 'guest'. 
For Sean Burke, de Man was 'capable of considerable duplicity in both his private 
and public lives'.4 With this duplicity in mind, the foreword to Blindne~s and Insight, 
and by extension the entire oeuvre of de Man, becomes suspect: 
De Man is ostensibly reflecting on the volume of essays dating from the mid-1950's which 
have been collected as Blindness and Insight. If we read this passage against its biographical 
background, however, and take these statements as a secreted reflection on his Le Soir 
articles, de Man cuts a sinister figure indeed - a puppeteer putting in place all the strings of 
his legacy, an executor to his own dark codicil.s 
It seems that de Man's textual admission to his biographical self, to his status as 
subject, becomes evidence, within the debate, of guilt. For de Man had a secret or 
story which he did not tell. Burke tries to uncover this story through conjecture, and 
it is this shared desire for the secret, always traceable to an early textual production (a 
fascistic journalism), which disinters many of the loci of author-centred criticism in 
the debate surrounding de Man: a debate which concerns intention, autobiographical 
accountability and the importance of de Man's signature. 
It is the framing device of autobiography which necessarily shapes this discourse on 
oeuvre: the de Manian text must become explicable either as autobiographical 
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suppression or elliptical confession. The entire corpus of De Man's must then, as 
Burke contests, be 
seen to be autobiographical in essence, [as] a text which generated an entire philosophy of 
language and of the absence of subjectivity in order to keep its secret or to atone for its 
• 6 preVious errors. 
With de Man's death the issue of authorial accountability is treated through a belated 
reading of a textual body previously believed to be disinterested but, with hindsight, 
revealed as a discourse tainted with the bio-graph. Menae Mizimura7, like Burke 
confesses her impulse to write de Man's story, and it is this desire for a story, a story 
symmetrically structured about an axis which she calls a 'turn', which motivates her 
essay and leads her to discover an impression of 'deprivation' in de Man's work. It is 
the (physical) death of the author which instigates the need to grasp what has been 
read as having its own (hi)story: 'An end calls for a beginning - and a good story in 
between.,8 The lacunae in her knowledge of de Man only excites her imagination as 
to his 'possibly shady past,.9 
In a similar treatment, Alice Kaplan's Memoir requires that de Man's story be told.10 
Thus, in an ironic movement her autobiography becomes, at some point, this 
indispensable story about de Man. Kaplan's criticism of de Man as her Yale professor 
is complicated by her subsequent knowledge of his wartime journalism. Thus, the' 
inculpation of her tutor shapes itself, significantly, around an imagined de Man. A 
prior, more intimately known accusation of de Man as a poor teacher, gathers impetus 
and form from a later, 'textual' indictment based upon the specifically hypothetical 
gUilt of his 'war crime'. Her search for the motivational force behind de Man's 
deconstructive stance engineers a specifically biographical interpretation of his 
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theoretical texts, where the bio-graph is specifically and exclusively linked to a 
suppression and/or distorted confession of his wartime activities as a journalist. The 
'new' crime, replacing the old crime of antisemitism, becomes de Man's deliberately 
concealed subjectivity behind the now-recognisable 'guise' of disinterestedness in a 
discourse written entirely with the purpose of suppressing his own guilty subjectivity: 
What a waste! [being de Man's student] Taking apart meaning, looking at words, shunning 
the illusion of the fully present communicative voice - these aspects of deconstructive theory 
as we absorbed it may have been part of de Man's intellectual struggle against the 
manipulative tendencies of fascist propaganda.11 
Barbara Johnson's approach draws parallel conclusions. She reproaches de Man for 
neglecting his 'duty' to explain himself. 12 In 'refusing to tell his own story,J3 de Man 
remained uncritical of himself and, therefore, open to a belated criticism which can 
rightly, Johnson thinks, reconstruct this story exclusively around his early journalistic 
career. The story, required by Johnson, would be a revelation of de Man's textual 
motivation and would 'offer a guarantee of de Man's moral character and political 
vision' .14 
Terry Eagleton continues the trend of a debate centred around a criticism of the 
possibly sinister motivation behind deconstruction. Eagleton calls de Man a 'fascist 
sympathiser' who was 'silent about his affiliations' .IS Silence - here embodied in de 
Man's refusal to tell his story - protects an uncritical self and is ultimately traceable to 
a suppression of the historico-political self through the guise of disinterestedness. The 
anti-de Manian polemic demands that this political self be remstated in order·to re-
assess de Man's theoretical contribution in the light of his Nazi sympathies: 
It is possible to read de Man's post-war work as an extreme reaction against the politics of 
Being, elements of which he himself had espoused in his notorious early essays. In the later 
de Man, all notions of language as replete with Being, of signs as organically related to 
things is denounced as pernicious mystification.16 
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Eagleton detects a 'more than literary motive,17 behind de Man's theoretical prose 
and, yet again, this 'more' is traceable to a secreted, and therefore incriminating, 
SUbjectivity. 
Christopher Norris also chooses to speculate vis a vis the de Manian 'story'. Again 
the oeuvre becomes contaminated by the 'life' of the author. Norris recalls not only 
de Man's textual connection to fascism but also that his uncle, Hendrik de Man, was a 
Belgian socialist with a role in the rise of Nazism. Norris's self-avowedly reductive 
reading of de Man is an attempt to attribute a textual production to the 'sobering 
memories' of an uncle's wartime activities.18 Such conjecture satisfies the need to 
understand the intentions of the author. When Norris writes that 'one could read the 
entire course of [de Man's] subsequent work as a single-minded effort to redeem or 
exorcise the memory of those earlier reviews' ,19 a 'more than literary motive' is 
suspected. And again he writes: 'There does seem reason to suppose that de Man is 
here [Allegories of Reading] engaged in something more than a piece of purely 
diagnostic commentary.' 20 
De Man's hi [story] is suspect and his theory is necessarily implicated in this suspicion 
,,, 
because it can no longer claim to be 'pure'. No longer altruistic, no longer evidence 
of a neutral pedagogy, it has become contaminated and 'deeply suspect on ideological 
grounds' 21 specifically due to the 'unearthing' of what is considered as de Man's 
essentially unique prehistory. 
My intention here is not to deny an interest in de Man's wartime journalism but rather 
to' question its power to contaminate his later theory where this contamination is 
dependent upon the collapse of a previous discourse with pretensions to non-political 
disinterestedness. Accusations made against de Man which suggest that he attempted 
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to secrete his (inevitably) subjective and therefore, partisan status, rely upon a belief 
that de Man ever claimed to have achieved a pure~y diagnostic theory of reading. 
The reappearance of the author as guest 
The indictment against de Man is based on the simple claim that de Man successfully 
(a)voided his personality from his theory in order to suppress his gUilty secret: 'The 
biographical subject [was] entirely eliminated- the author's life history and 
personality disappear[ed] irretrievably into the textual machine.,n 
The de Manian text is understood to have somehow performed a philosophy of 
language reliant upon the absence of subjectivity, and to have achieved this due to de 
Man's strong need to absent the self. It is this absenting of the subject which interests 
us here because it is here that we locate a crucial misunderstanding of the 
deconstructive tendency. It seems that de Man's detractors explain the absence of the 
subject within the text - an absence due to the priority of language - by describing this 
absence as de Man's suppression of his subjectivity due to a guilty past. In this 
interpretation, subjectivity-'can be reintroduced into the text. What can be read as the 
large scale misunderstanding of academics over the aims and self-proclaimed limits of 
deconstruction is turned now to their advantage in an attack against the author which . 
in tum becomes an attack against deconstruction itself. De Man's texts 'were 
believed, according to the debate, to have been essentially author-less in their 
objectivity. With the physical death of de Man the author returns to the text only 
because his critics, demanding a response from de Man, 'reinsert' him. What is 
paramount to the debate on de Man after 1985 is therefore the revelation of a shared 
belief in the possibility of a disinterested .discourse. 
36 
Chapter 2 
Kaplan's criticism of de Man reaches its apogee when she writes, 'all he offered his 
students was disinterested close analysis [ ... ] indifferent to much of what had come to 
pass as criticism,.2:3 This acedia supposedly included de Man's inability to appreciate 
the beautiful. A voiding of the self and the killing off of subjectivity, led to an 
absence of essentially human responses. Kaplan's assertions sit together 
uncomfortably: to be disinterested is not the same as to be indifferent. If, as Barthes 
writes, 'the death of the author is the frrst and sufficient step towards refusing to 
assign a secret, an ultimate meaning to the text',24 then, it would seem, the debate 
posits that de Man successfully killed the author that was himself in order to renwve 
his own secret from the arena of textual interpretation. Kaplan, with the author 
reinstated on her own terms, can now ask: 'What do students need to know about 
teachers?' 2S 
Kaplan admits to a prior knowledge (before 1985) of de Man's uncle's ambiguous 
involvement in the evolution of Nazi Germany. However, she had imagined de Man 
to be 'cleansed of his families' historical improprieties' .26 Her terminology here not 
only adheres to the logic of contamination and purification which is the very logic of 
Nazism, it also states her belief in the possibility of a death of the subject entailing a 
break with one's own prehistory. Put another way, Kaplan's testimony here assumes 
the possibility of an absolute forgetting of a former self to make way for anew, 
radically innocent self, essentially uninvolved with what has alre':ldy gone before. This 
belief is in no way limited to Kaplan for it is necessary that his detractors establish de 
Man as disinterested in order that this immediately be denied through the recognition 
of the impossibility of a neutral pedagogy. But the debate is only willing to shun the 
possibility of a disinterested discourse due to this specifically incriminating 
biograpliical event. So that what is crucially problematic here is that the anti-de 
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Manian critique establishes the impossibility of a neutral or disinterested text, not 
through general linguistic analyses but, in the case of de Man, it prejudices his 
discourse because of a specifically individualised biographical event. 
Barbara Johnson's desire for a story about de Man's intentions stems from her own 
prior belief in de Man's discourse as 'dauntingly and quintessentially independent' .27 
Her retrospective experience of crisis (the death of an idea about de Man as well as 
the death of de Man) relies upon a belief in a non-partisan language existing outside 
the laws of exchange and desire. Johnson concludes that the political parameter must 
be admitted into literary theory, a conclusion which naively posits an absence of the 
political at the heart of de Man's deconstructive stance. 
E.S. Burt defines as a 'moral trait' in de Man what he 'sensed to be as complete a 
detachment from the claims of subjectivity and individual personality as was 
possible,.28 Confusingly a personality 'trait' becomes an index of a dislocation from 
personality. Similarly Mizimura and Eagleton focus on the absence of a de Manian 
subjectivity. Mizimura writes of a turn away from a human subject to a concern with 
language in de Man's work as emblematic of the death of a de Manian subjectivity. 
This death is marked textually by a transition in terminology and content from 'the 
homeland of literature where even familiar faces, like death, suffering, sorrow, 
inwardness, reflection, consciousness and self-knowledge are found' ,29 to the later 
work, a 'barren land inhabited by the strangest terminologies' .30 ' Before the death of 
the de Manian subject de Man was able not only to write 'better', he was also able to 
react 'sensibly' to literature.31 The tum then is a transition to a sterile discourse 
emblematic of the death of the subject and representative of a move away from a prior 
belief in the availability of linguistic meaning. In the same vein Eagleton writes: 
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few critics have been more bleakly unenthused by bodiliness - by the whole prospect of a 
creative development of the sensuous, creaturely aspects of human existence, by pleasure, by 
Nature and self-delighting powers, all of which now [Eagleton here presumes a turn away 
from the wartime journalism] figure as insidious aesthetic seductions to be [ ... ] refused.32 
And so the terms of the debate have been established. De Man's discourse was 
believed to be unique when it somehow (a)voided his subject. With his physical death 
and the 'discovery' of his past, the sham was revealed: de Man did not destroy his 
subjectivity, he merely concealed it. This concealed subjectivity returned, distilled in 
a specifically locatable event - an event, it would now seem, capable of uncovering 
authorial intention and thus reducing the meaning of the text to an investigation of the 
author. So it is that a cryptobiographical reading of the author, which it seems must 
always focus on de Man's wartime journalism, attempts to undo the possibility of the 
deconstruction of the subject. 
Anti-authorialism 
The novelist is but a recorder who is forbidden to judge and to conclude [ ... ] for if he wishes 
to go beyond phenomena he will enter into hypothesis [ .... The novelist] disappears, he keeps 
his emotions well in hand, he simply shows what he has seen.33 
At what point did the subject die? It would seem that the entire de Manian debate 
enacts (as though for the fust time) the discourse on anti-authorialism. Was the death 
of the author ever successfully theorised? Sean Burke's recent book which sets out to 
problematise the 'anti-authorial theories' of Barthes, Foucault and Derrida, merely 
reveals what had always remained in plain sight; that the death of the author 'was 
never achieved, rather it was always authored as an (im)possible, desired, future 
event: 'It is possible to enjoy the codes even while nostalgically imagining that 
someday they will be abolished.,34 
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It was the influence of structural linguistics in the mid-1950's, of the linguistic 
anthropology of Levi-Strauss and Lacan which led to the tracing of a change in the 
status of the subject's relation to knowledge. Both subject and the knowledge of the 
subject were seen to be fictive emanations of a language/writing which subverted the 
subject's attempts to control that language. If there is a death of the subject, a "death 
of the author", it remains a highly ambiguous and necessarily qualified proposition for 
these writers. 
In his essay, "The Death of the Author" (1967), Barthes defines this 'death' as the 
loss of a belief in intention and omniscience. Derrida would term this the death of the 
author as the Transcendental Signified or as the unitary cause of the text. As 
previously stated, Barthes believed that this type of 'death' would terminate any 
attempts to give the text a 'secret' or meaning which is reducible to authorial 
intention.35 It would be naIve to believe that the author is here being authored out of 
existence, what is discussed is rather the unavailability of intention in language and 
the recognition of the author as linguistic construct. Barthes writes: 
" 
The Author himself - that somewhat decrepit deity of the old criticism - can or could 
someday become a text like any other: he has only to avoid making his person the subjeci 
the impulse, the origin, the authority, the father, whence his work would proceed, by a 
channel of expression; he has only to see himself as a being on paper and his life as a bio-
graphy, [ ... ] a writing without referent, substance of a connection and not a filiation.36 
Barthes writes of a future cessation of the need to look to the author for evidence of 
textual meaning. This future knows that this author (as evidence of textual meaning) 
is desired, 'in a way I desire the author in the text' /7 and similarly, 'I need his figure 
[ ... ] as he needs mine' .38 
The desire, reiterated as necessity, ensures that the 'death of the author' be displaced 
to a future. And so Barthes adumbrates an ideal made impossible by our complicity 
in keeping the author alive. What is stated by Barthes, however, is that if the author 
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must exist due to this mutual need, the most acceptable type of author is 'amicable' .39 
The amicable author provides 'evidence' of being a writer, of 'siding with semiosis 
rather than mimesis' .40 A visible breach is maintained at the level of writing resulting 
from the sustained revelation to the reader that the author's creations are combinative 
and influenced rather than inspired. It is this honesty which, for Barthes, most closely 
approaches the death of the author - an honesty which ensures the death of the realist 
author and the deconstruction of mimesis. Through this recognition of the author as 
writerly, as combinative, comes the impossibility of the reductive reading of a text as 
the product of a specifically authorial intention. As Derrida writes: 
The subject is absolutely indispensable. I do not destroy the subject; I situate it [ ... ] one 
cannot get along without the notion of the subject It is a question of knowing where it 
comes from and how it functions.41 
And the implication again is that this ability to situate the author is reliant upon an 
authorial honesty vis a vis the reader; an amicable relationship which reveals the 
author within the text. It is obviously important to understand the nature of this debate 
on the author as it concerns our understanding of the de Manian oeuvre. 
\ 
" 
I must now ask two questions; whether de Man was ever dishonest in his relationship 
with the reader, and whether the critical response to de Man is valid when it resurrects 
a supposedly buried subjectivity - ironically dependent upon a textual source - in 
order to discern a non-textual intention behind or within de Man's texts. That is, does 
this response not rest on a basic misunderstanding of the decons~ctive stance? If it 
is true that the work is always 'more' than the work - that it is also the subject who 
writes this work - is it not enough to recognise that subjectivity in the work rather 
than attempt to fix that subject within an identity. In answer to the question: 'What 
does it matter who is speaking?' ,42 is it not enough to realise that a 'someone' speaks 
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especially if endeavours to trace that subjectivity are somewhat ironically dependent 
upon textual 'evidences'? 
Honesty in authoring 
Philosophers display altogether insufficient honesty [ ... ]. They pose as having discovered and 
attained their real opinions through the self-evolution of a cold, pure, divinely unperturbed 
dialect [ ... ] while what happens at bottom is that a prejudice, a notion [ ... ] a desire of the 
heart is sifted and made abstract.43 
If de Man was dishonest, as the debate postulates, it becomes necessary to redefine his 
'itinerary': 'For the critic of philosophical disinterestedness, the art of reading 
becomes that of retracing this primordial itinerary over and against the manifest 
structures of the teXt.,44 
This word 'itinerary' is arresting. As I have noted, the debate on de Man persistently 
traces this itinerary back to de Man's earlier textual production - to articles written for 
Le Soir and Het Vlaamsche Land - thus establishing a reductive interpretation of this 
itinerary as no more than his private battle against the ideological mystifications 
associated, specifically and exclusively, with Nazism. My reading of the texts of de. 
Man's will problematise both the already incoherent notion of de Man as author of his 
own 'disappearance as author', and the possibility of uncovering an authorial 
intention through recourse to a specific bio-graphical (written) event. 
Fidelity to an Itinerary 
It seems that with the revelation of de Man's earlier writing, a close reading of his 
later texts has been largely neglected in favour of a cryptobiographical approach. To 
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move away from this one must look to readings of de Man's oeuvre from before the 
'revelation'. Here the de Manian itinerary is no longer traceable to a 'warcrime' and 
must be differently written. It is one such reading which I wish to examine now, 
hoping to prioritise the importance of Rousseau's work for de Man. 
Menae Mizimura, in the 1985 edition of Yale French Studies dedicated to the 
teachings of de Man, attempts to trace de Man's itinerary or 'story' through a turn in 
his work which, according to her, leads to a large degree of unreadability. This turn is 
here understood as constituting a personal failure for de Man; a movement away from 
a concern with 'Man' to a concern with language. Mizimura imposes a bipolar 
structure on the de Manian oeuvre and her textual segregation centres around de 
Man's previously mentioned foreword to the second edition of Blindness and Insight 
where he writes of 'a change not only in terminology and in tone but in substance' .45 
It is a change which Mizimura calls the 'death of the subject'. However, de Man's 
ambivalence about the possibility of such a directional shift, of such a personal 
revolution and the possibility of a radical forgetting, complicates the issue and, by 
extension, the basis of Mizimura's essay. In the foreword De Man immediately· 
qualifies the possibility of any 'change' in his work: 
When one imagines to have felt the exhilaration of renewal, one is certainly the last to know 
whether such a change actually took place or whether one is just restating, in a slightly 
different mode, earlier and unresolved obsessions.46 
Ignoring this complication, Mizimura claims that a turn (the death of the subject) 
exists. Textually this is charted in the difference between an early production where 
she feels 'at home' and a later, 'barren' textual product.47 If de Man worked to 
problematise the assumption that we might not feel alienated in language, Mizimura 
would have it that he did so only after 1969 and his essay, "The Rhetoric of 
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Temporality". She proposes to illustrate the tum - the destruction of the subject - by 
charting the progress of the concept of renunciation in three of de Man's readings of 
Rousseau's novel La Nouvelle Heioise.48 Yet her interpretation of these readings 
generates many problems. The theme of renunciation in de Man's texts is complex 
and Mizimura rightly acknowledges that 'what is to be renounced is not one mode of 
being for the sake of another, but, more fundamentally, the compatibility of the two 
modes of being' .49 
There is a tension, therefore, resulting from a desire to reconcile incompatible modes 
of being and a renunciation of this temptation as impossible. This tension, I would 
say, is where de Man's writing begins. 
For Mizimura, the tum is emblematic of an end to de Man's belief in the opposition 
between an empirical self and a self constituted in and by language. And yet de 
Man's frrst treatment of Rousseau (1966) reveals his understanding that the fictional 
self is prioritised in a necessary renunciation of any belief in an empirical self which 
could escape the linguistic predicament. He writes: 'The world of Clarens (in the 
novel) is a world that is founded on a difficult knowledge [ ... ] the priority of fiction is . 
established in the renunciation of oneself. ,so 
And a year earlier he had written of the necessary 'renunciation of the naive belief in 
a hannony at the beginning of things' .Sl So that it would seem that de Man's earliest 
treatment of Rousseau's novel concerns the 'gap that cleaves Being' .52 Mizimura's 
framework, where literature, once held by de Man as a privileged place of knowledge 
can contrast with a later literary scepticism, is shaken when we understand that the 
self-knowledge at stake in his early work is necessarily qualified by the type of 
knowledge4 it offers: it is knowledge of the self as textual and combinative. With de 
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Man's second treatment of the novel I note the continuation of a theme rather than 
evidence of a dislocation. His discourse on symbol and allegory echoes the prior 
discussion of self- justification and self-knowledge, where allegory, 'renouncing the 
nostalgia to coincide, establishes its language in the void of this temporal distance' .53 
Allegory, like Darthes' 'amicable' author, renounces any attempt at realism and 
openly reveals its status as language. So why does Mizimura posit a turn at this 
point? Why does she suddenly become suspicious of the text? Using de Man's words 
on Nietzsche as indictment she writes: 'There hardly is a trick of the oratorical trade 
which he is not willing to exploit to the full.,54 
Mizimura rebels against de Man's theory because he uses language assertively to 
point out the divisions in language. De Man's methodology is suspect because it 
'convinces the reader that he offers an ultimately correct reading' /5 whilst 
undermining that argument through the problematisation of language. Thus, her 
accusation is levelled against de Man at the precise point at which he attempts to 
'perform' the dilemma of any theory, his own included, which would attempt to assert 
a truth using quotidian language. Mizimura believes in the turn because now de Man . 
writes of language rather than of characters in a novel. She misunderstands the basic 
tenet of de Man's philosophy: that man is a linguistic construct and so to write of 
language is not to kill the subject but to interpret that subject through an analysis of 
the problems inherent in language: 'The cognitive function resides in the language 
and not in the subject. ,56 
Thus, what is questionable is not de Man's assertion of the unread ability of the text 
(where readability .. would fix meaning in a discernible intention), but Mizimura's 
location of its debut as topos in the second reading of La Nouvelle Heloise. 
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What becomes important for us here is that Mizimura allies de Man's turn - falsely 
read as the death of the subject rather than the re-interpretation of that subject - with 
his rejection of Rousseau as a precursor. Yet, not only is subjectivity necessary to an 
understanding of the de Manian deconstructive stance, but the nature of this 
subjectivity is dependent upon an understanding of de Man's philosophy as a strong 
and persistent re-reading of Rousseau's own linguistic theory. It is her separation of 
de Man from Rousseau which ensures the collapse of Mizimura's reading. The turn, 
if it exists, must, according to Mizimura, affect de Man's textual treatment of 
Rousseau. She proposes to illustrate this through the juxtaposing of two texts written 
by de Man about the same textual event in Rousseau's work. The event, taken from 
Rousseau's Confessions concerns the episode where Rousseau steals a ribbon and 
falsely accuses the servant-girl, Marion.57 The fITst treatment is from before the 
alleged 'turn', the second from after it.58 However, de Man's texts, devastatingly for 
Mizimura's argument, in fact discuss two very different episodes. Where the 1977 
passage from Allegories of Reading does discuss the ribbon narrative, the text from 
1966 discusses an episode some ten years earlier within the narrative of the 
Confessions, when Rousseau himself is wrongly accused of stealing a comb.59 . 
Mizimura rightly. comments upon de Man's recognition of Rousseau's attitude of 
benign universalism but wrongly attributes this to the later textual event of the theft of 
the ribbon. She is therefore misguided when she writes, concerning the texts that: 
The same confession which is here [1966] said to have originated from the "individual self', 
"genuine self insight" or "consciousness of the self' becomes, in 1977, a possible outcome of 
the absolute randomness of language.60 
Her detennination to consolidate a turn in de Man's work based around the death of 
subjectivity is radically undennined when we understand that de Man treats of two 
very different passages here. In refusing to read Rousseau, Mizimura misreads de 
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Man and fails to understand his 'itinerary'. Mizimura would have done well to read 
another passage from Allegories of Reading (1977), where de Man treats of the comb 
episode in the same manner as he did in 1966.61 This reveals the persistence of de . 
Man's allegiance to Rousseau rather than any dislocation from him as a precursor. 
Mizimura's conclusions allow her to play out a turn which is no more than this by 
now familiar scene of the 'death of the subject'. But what they crucially allow is the 
possibility of a bifurcation - they enable, in this prioritising of a 'turn', a time when . 
de Man believed in the subject as a location of meaning not restricted to textual 
meaning. Yet her (mis )readings of Rousseau destabilise the possibility of such an 
interpretation and point to de Man's adherence to Rousseau and his belief in the 
priority of language. Her essay deserves such prolonged treatment because it not only 
separates de Man from Rousseau at the very moment when Rousseau is established as 
the precursor of de Man's deconstructive stance, but Mizimura's failure to understand 
the 'itinerary' leads to a misreading of de Man and Rousseau - a misreading 
perpetuated by later (post-1985) critics keen to trace a de Manian itinerary 
independent. of Rousseau and inspired only by the guilty desire to suppress a guilty 
subjectivity. Having abandoned Rousseau, Mizimura's de Man somehow kills his 
subjectivity and this death of the subject 'resembles the story of de Man's own life' .62 
The way opens for a crude pseudo-biographical interpretation of the de Manian 
oeuvre where the turn (also a turn away from Rousseau) enables one to believe in the 
singularity of de Man's deconstructive stance. It is important to stress that 
Mizimura's falsely referential reading is used in later attempts to disparage de Man's 
textual production. When Mizimura writes of an author moving away from the 
subject to a belief in the priority of language she fails to generalise this philosophy 
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because she detaches de Man from Rousseau. So that when she particularises the 
predicament and formalises it into a specifically de Manian desire for authority (in the 
guise of disinterestedness), she enables the turn to be relocated by later critics who. 
assume her terms without recognising their problematic status. 
So that, for example, in the hands of Christopher Norris, her essay becomes a useful 
intertext, easily reinforcing opinions produced by the discovery of de Man's wartime 
journalism. The turn is conveniently shifted - after all it was always a portable entity. 
in Mizimura's essay - and her terms lend themselves to a new reading which 
possesses the 'knowledge' about de Man. Mizimura's misguided interpretation of de 
Man's personal temptation to language and his abandonment of the subject allied to 
her suggestion that he had always been engaged in speaking about temptation, now 
becomes 'evidence' of de Man's association with Nazism and its seductive promise of 
accountability. It is her essay which lays the foundations for a debate perpetuated by 
Norris, Eagleton, Lentricchia, Johnson, Burke and Kaplan: a debate that postulates a 
belief in the possibility of the turn. It is their construction of this turn, against the 
manifest movement of de Man's texts, which enables the death of the (early) author 
and the birth of the dishonestly disinterested scholar. The paradoxical nature of this 
construction permits a later scenario: the renunciation of the possibility of the 
disinterested rhetorician and the return of the (guilty) author to the reader's circle to 
face the accusation of secreting authorial intention. Linguistic de~onstruction is n.ot 
the impetus for this renunciation of disinterestedness. Rather, this rejection is based 
on a firmly held belief in the availability of intention. It is, therefore, the readers who 
kill the author only to resurrect him and then accuse him of his untimely death. More 
importantly, they kill the 'amicable' author in order to resurrect the gUilty realist. 
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2.2. 'A rich, aberrant tradition,63 
De Man's self-proclaimed itinerary concerned a re-assessment of Rousseau due to a 
tradition of (mis)reading. A continued erroneous reading of someone de Man 
considered to be perhaps the most rhetorically aware writer among writers, 
necessitated that Rousseau be re-examined in order to rectify what had become, quite 
simply, the ossification of an interpretation. 
An examination of Rousseauian criticism from the mid-50s - taking structuralism as 
our starting point - has persisted in dwelling upon Rousseau's 'totalitarian' leanings. 
This 'aberrant tradition', which I have previously traced traced from the mid-50's and 
Isaiah Berlin, through Starobinski, Nicolson, Berman and Crocker is still evident in 
contemporary readings of Rousseau's texts. 
The three Rousseauian texts with which I am concerned: La Nouvelle Heloise, Le 
Contrat Social and Emile do articulate a (universalised) desire for the death of th~ 
mimetic author and the birth of the disinterested or realist author. The texts reveal a 
mutual telos: that the Master, the Legislator and the Preceptor all exercise an authority 
based on the possibility of objective rule: a rule unquestioned because the command is 
effaced in the appearance of naturalness. Thus, the education of the preceptor would 
be both untutored and unstudied, legislation would be unworldly, and the master's 
rule paternal. Rule will be absolute in a perfected state of disinterestedness. Yet the 
Rousseauian text ultimately presents a critique of the possibility of the disinterested 
design. Thus at every stage within the texts, Rousseau is at pains to reveal how 
despotism is only possible through a shared belief in and desire for an impossible 
disinterestedness: 
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'[the pupil] always believes himself to be the master and yet it is always you who are. There 
is no subjection so perfect as that which has the appearance of liberty.' 64 
So that whilst the text desires the possibility of libe~y in and through the truth -
through the disinterested author who would show things as they are - it necessarily' 
renounces the temptation in an admission of its impossibility. The disinterested 
author must be 
a man who sawall of men's passions yet experienced none of them, who had no relationship 
at all to our nature yet knew it thoroughly; whose happiness was independent of ours, yet 
who was nevertheless willing to attend to ours.6S 
Thus, although the texts might desire the parousia they do not and cannot establish it: 
and it is this inability to achieve transparency which is elaborated repeatedly in the 
Rousseauian oeuvre. Any reading of Rousseau which begins to understand the 
explicit problematisation of the issue of disinterestedness within the text must 
question a tradition of scapegoating which would establish Rousseau as advocating a 
belief in the possibility of an objective rule. It is here, in a reading alert to the aporias 
of the Rousseauian text, that I locate a de Manian itinerary. 
More recently readings have begun to problematise Rousseau as a realist author, 
however, even these readings are severely limited in their critical appraisal of . 
Rousseau's work. Most readings are marred by a lack of attention given to the 
intertextual dimensions of Rousseau's writing. Blind to the self-referential nature of 
his oeuvre, the most lucid readings of Rousseau are often limited to single texts and 
thus, espouse the idea. of a radical turn in the Rousseauian philosophy. Certain 
readings within what I here call an 'aberrant tradition' do offer slim opportunities to 
glimpse what we believe to have been central concerns for Rousseau. Thomas 
Kavanagh's recent investigation into authorial intention continues to exhibit an 
unwillingness to problematise themes which, within Rousseau's texts, are complicated 
through a rigorous rhetorical exegesis. In Writing The Truth, Kavanagh subjects 
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Rousseau to a reading similar to Mizimura's treatment of de Man.66 An attempt to 
trace a turn structured about the death of the subject and leading to unreadability, 
offers the chance to compare critical reaction to both Rousseau and de Man. 
Kavanagh divides the Rousseauian oeuvre about a tum. The hiatus, located in the 
Letters to Malesherbes, therefore occurs after the production of La Nouvelle Heloise, 
The Social Contract, and Elnile. It is a tum, according to Kavanagh, marked by a 
change in both style and intention67 because it locates Rousseau's desire for a new and. 
transparent language. Yet, if in these letters Rousseau does indeed write about the 
invention of a new language and content,68 this statement of renewal, like de Man's 
own assertion of change in the Foreword to Blindness and Insight, is qualified by the 
recognition of its impossibility - here made explicit in Rousseau's placing of this 
linguistic revolution or 'tum' in a possible future (il faudroit) rather than as a fait 
accompli. If, as Kavanagh states, the letters are representative of any turn, they are 
essentially unable to live, or write up to, this tum. The letters write against the 
possibility of an unsocialised semiology; a solipsistic language which would convey 
the Truth without the mediation of the sign. Without comment, within Kavanagh's 
text, the tum changes to become both tum and desire for the tum. Desire for the turn 
(for a disinterested rhetoric) now operates where previously the tum itself functioned 
as subject. Thus Rousseau's new desire, born in the letters, is defined by its 
impossibility.69 Yet because the desire itself is 'newly apparent'70 it can be the tum 
itself, for it represents a break from a past where, according to Kavanagh, the desire, 
and its renunciation as impossible, did not exist. According to Kavanagh then, prior 
to the tum, Rousseau believed in the availability of meaning through the sign: in the 
possibility of the disinterested author. Thus, Kavanagh is willing to write that Clarens, 
in La Nouvelle Heloise, represents Rousseau's 'ideal' society and that Rousseau 
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believed in the possibility of the benevolent objective ruler. Yet Rousseau wrote of a 
society which Kavanagh, as reader, can reveal to be one where the Master's rule is 
dependent upon a praxis of intervention marked by its ability to erase all traces of 
itself as duress. Kavanagh thus (re-)reveals the desired parousia as perverted 
totalitarianism. The turn is constructed by the reader (Kavanagh) so that this access to 
meaning can disappear and the Rousseauian discourse become unreadable with the 
immersion of the subject within the text. But Rousseau's protest against the identity's 
dependency upon the linguistic function, whilst apparent in the Letters, does not 
Originate there as topos. The construction of a burgeoning literary scepticism mid-
career would abandon Rousseau to isolation and silence. Yet Rousseau continues to 
write, as before, of the impossibility of the disinterested discourse, in the recognition 
that his own discourse is implicated within any critique (it is, after all, the implication 
of the Rousseauian text within this discourse which prevents it, and any text, from 
becoming unreadable). The tension between the desire to be present in language and 
the (im)possible renunciation of that desire through language, has always been at the 
heart of the Rousseauian text. It is within the space of this oscillation that Rousseau is 
able to write. Kavanagh's turn would insert the subject within Rousseau's text 
believing that, prior to the turn, the subject had been (a)voided through a writing of 
and on authenticity. Such a reading ignores the impossible demands Rousseau always 
made of disinterestedness. Again, the critic kills the subject only to resurrect it at a 
later date and on his own tenns. 
Ferrara's reading, perhaps one of the most recent within this 'aberrant tradition', 
provides an excursus on authenticity. 71 The topos of authenticity, elaborated as the 
unitary self, is here established unproblematically as the achievement of the 
Rousseauian 72 oeuvre. Yet this response refuses to recognise a persistent 
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problematisation of authenticity where it must be dependent upon the achievement of 
what Rousseau tenned 'private virtue': selflessness or disinterestedness in favour of 
the general will. Ferrara's reading of The Social Contract ignores a discussion of 
authentic action which undennines its possibility through a discussion on the 
unavailability of intention. For any act to be disinterested, Rousseau understands that 
its instigator (the authenticity), must be able to project the consequences of the act 
upon the future condition of that which is acted upon. It is this impossible foresight, 
'which places us where we will never arrive',73 which effectively terminates the 
possibility of legislation within the Rousseauian text and destabilises any reading 
which would concretise the Legislator as a benevolent and authentic Patriarch. The 
social impossibility of disinterestedness damningly tenninates the possibility of any 
contract in The Social Contract. Yet, whilst Ferrara admits that the text might be 
slightly ambiguous, he does insist that the Rousseauian text reveals a belief in the 
possibility of the disinterested author (of behaviour). Thus, any problematics in The 
Social Contract are, according to Ferrara, reconciled in Emile. Ferrara refuses to 
comment on Rousseau's problematisation of the tutor, writing that Rousseau 'was 
ignorant of the fact that roles and social expectations not only restrict individual 
identity but also sustain it' .74 
Within such an ignorance, Rousseau is said to have been able to elaborate a belief in 
the disinterested tutor. The Rousseauian educative process is written by Ferrara as ~ 
asymmetrical dyad where one member has access to 'knowledge' and prohibits the 
other member within the dyad from imposing his or her judgements or views.7s The 
disinterested preceptor is able to help the weaker member to deal with society 
'without being a representative of that society' .76 All this despite the fact that the text 
of Emile reasserts the necessary fragmentation of identity. When Ferrara concludes 
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that, perhaps, authenticity might have to retain a 'normative thrust,77 this ambivalence, 
called 'balance', destroys the possibility of an authenticity achieved within the text. 
Authenticity, expressed in terms of possible deviations from normative behaviour, 
becomes itself a normative principle.78 
I wish, at this juncture to calion one further contemporary reading of Rousseau. This 
is perhaps one of the more lucid interpretations, limited only by its confusing refusal 
to implicate La Nouvelle Heloise in an intertextual treatment with texts composed by 
Rousseau at the same time: namely Emile and The Social Contract.79 Again, the 
determination to see this novel as, somehow, standing alone, constitutes a desire to 
believe in the Rousseauian tum as the (re)tum of the subject. Jones, discussing La 
Nouvelle Heloise in terms of utopian fiction and its themes of duration and 
egalitarianism, notes that in place of these universally desired goals, Rousseau's novel 
reveals the totalitarian thrust behind utopias. Rousseau, therefore, whilst constructing 
a desired, textual utopia is credited as sufficiently rhetorically aware to deconstruct 
that same utopia and expose it within the novel as an undesirable totalitarian 
community. The utopia, once written, is denied as invalid. It is recognised as both 
Truth and Untruth,80 as universally desired, yet as failing to fulfil the desire. The 
utopia necessarily forgets that man is finite, that he is a union of being and non-being 
and that, therefore, it is impossible to regard his essential being as attainable: 'Utopia 
describes impossibilities as real possibilities - and fails to see them for what they ar~, 
impossibilities, or as an oscillation between possibilities and impossibilities. ,81 
Truth, desired and unattainable, is perhaps only available in the space of a writing 
which hovers between the desire to be in language and the renunciation of this desire. 
This is the space which Rousseau's text would occupy. Jones' interpretation falls 
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short in its refusal to understand that the utopia (here Clarens) cannot be denied or 
quitted within the text, where the text as linguistic construct is complicit in the 
utopian masquerade. The characters within La Nouvelle Heloise cannot leave Clarens 
unless they exist in another type of utopia. The utopia cannot be quitted but it can, to 
a certain extent, be revealed in the 'amicable' text. 
The de Manian itinerary and Emile 
I can remember that the fmt thing I was told about Rousseau [at school] was that he had 
written a treatise on education but given away his children.82 
Perhaps an identification with Rousseau always figured in de Man's readings of the 
Romantic author. The accusations levelled against Rousseau's texts, grounded as they 
are in a belief in some sort of 'evidence' of a duplicitous life at odds with the text and 
in a belief in the availability of an authorial intention which would contaminate the 
text, unfolds a tradition of debate not unsimilar to the post-de Manian debate traced in 
the fITst section of this chapter. Having problematised a critical tradition through a 
reading of that tradition as itself author of a certain type of 'death of the subject' 
which relies on a gUilty suppression of subjectivity, I would like to re-examine 
Rousseau's Emile as the text of an 'amicable' and therefore 'honest' author, revealing 
de Man's implication within this same authorial "honesty" due to the prioritising of 
the Rousseauian text within his 'itinerary': 'The desire to exempt ~ousseau (as y~u 
say) at all costs from blindness is, therefore, for me, a gesture of fidelity to my own 
itinerary. ,83 
I have traced a post de Manian debate which continually discerns evidence of de Man 
in the work yet will not read Rousseau. There can be no doubting de Man's strong 
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personal investment in Rousseau,84 yet few are ready to pass beyond such a 
generalised statement or to understand that any accusation of authorial dishonesty on 
the part of de Man is seriously undermined if the de Manian oeuvre is recognised as a 
persistent response to a Rousseauian negative hermeneutics. 
Whilst Barthes, Derrida and Foucault were influenced strongly by the work of Levi-
Strauss, de Man, it would seem, traced a linguistic anthropology through Levi-Strauss 
to Rousseau and this tracing leads to de Man's being a necessarily open and self-
avowedly 'combinative' oeuvre. The de Manian text, when it does not discuss 
Rousseau directly (Allegories of Reading, Blindness and Insight, Romanticism and 
Contemporary Criticism), uses Rousseau intertextually, as referent in any discussion 
of another (see, for example, de Man's discussions of Holderlin, Wordsworth and 
Heidegger). This recurrent invocation of Rousseau within his texts is both an attempt 
to redeem Rousseau from accusations that his might also be a delusive language, 
unaware of its own problematic entailments, and the result of de Man's 'honest' 
efforts to reveal his textual products as combinative, writerly and as issuing from 
somewhere other than himself. Within this schema, the text of Emile must be 
understood as one in which the question of the author is "revealed" and problematised 
to an unprecedented degree. It must also be understood as a highly influential text for 
the work of de Man. 
Emile and de Man's negative hermeneutics 
In the "Preface" to Emile Rousseau immediately problematises the authority of the 
text. The text is 'disordered and almost incoherent', its methodology 'chimerical' .85 
From the outset, Rousseau both anticipates. and creates a reade~ (response) which 
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would judge and problematise Emile as a valid educational treatise through a 
prolonged examination of the role of the author. Rousseau's fictional reader, alert in 
its created 'opposition' to Rousseau, punctuates the narrative at regular intervals when 
it would seem that the author's voice disappears within the text. The preface and the 
reader-construct work together to reveal Rousseau's limited status as author, his 
necessarily partisan and contingent position in relation to the text and, importantly, 
work to emphasise the problematics of a polemic which attempts to shape itself at the 
limits of intelligible discourse. Rousseau is the assertive author who, ironically, 
asserts the author's lack of authority: 
It is up to me not to go overboard, not to believe that I alone am wiser than everybody. That 
is all I can do: and that is what I do. If I sometimes adopt an assertive tone, it is not for the 
sake of making an impression on the reader but for the sake of speaking to him as I think 
[ ... ]. I so little expect that [my sentiments] be taken as authoritative that I always join them 
to my reasons so that they may be weighed.86 
At each point here above, Rousseau is at pains to alert the reader to his manipulations 
of the text. Within the same movement he not only refuses a suasive power which 
could and should alter the reader's mind, he also reveals his text as a concerted 
irrealism: 
'Propose what can be done' they never stop repeating to me. It is as if I were told, 'propose 
doing what is done.' Wbatcan be done is what you want to do. Ought I to be responsible for 
your willt' 
The text then will oscillate between the possible - what can be done and is therefore 
done already- and the impossible - what ought to be done - in an agenda which alerts 
the reader to the insufficiency of the possible and the danger of any belief that the 
impossible (here called the SUfficient), might ever be possible. His text, necessarily 
failing in any attempt to explain in quotidian language the attainment of the 
impossible, will, however, maintain a rigorous critique of the possible. 
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The fIrst book of Emile continues, very deliberately, to 'reveal' to the reader the 
impossibility of the task elaborated: an education in and for disinterestedness. The 
book enacts the utopian predicament we discussed previously when we cited Tillich 
and Jones with reference to La Nouvelle Heloise: it oscillates between the possible and 
the impossible and occupies this space as the site of a rigorous ecriture. For the child 
educated to be disinterested, the nature of the teacher is an obvious source of 
contention: 'Who can hope entirely to direct the speeches and deeds of all those 
surrounding a child?,88 
The text as hypothetical treatise, as a concerted irrealism, persistently negates the 
possibility of offering the child a neutral environment. In the enunciation of an 
(im)possible neutral pedagogy which would create a disinterested pupil - one who is 
no longer a 'fractional unity dependent on the denominator' 89 - the present educational 
system is critiqued. Yet in the lucidity of this critique of the possible, nature itself is 
found to be lacking and fragmentary: 'No one can remain in the state of nature when 
it is impossible to live there, for the fIrst law of nature is the preservation of the self 
[ ... ] and this attaches man to things. ,90 
The recognition of nature's lack and of a necessary supplementarity at the beginning 
of things, admits the impossibility of an authenticity necessarily shaped by 
independence: 'To be something, to be oneself and always one, a man must act as he 
speaks [ ... ]. I am waiting to be shown this marvel.,91 This 'marvel'must escape the 
fragmented subjectivity of fractional man: this marvel must. be whole and 
disinterested. And so the text wonders: can the disinterested individual be created? 
Such a person must be, so to speak, 'untouched', so that Rousseau's education policy 
ironically becomes a concerted effort 'to prevent anything from being done' .92 Yet, if 
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nature itself requires a supplement - if we are born weak and need help - to be 
disinterested one must, evidently, create oneself. The child must be allowed a contact 
which is, somehow, a non-contact. There must be contact with another who has been 
self-created and is therefore disinterested and desireless: with a man who is 'more 
than a man' .93 The tutor must already be what the pupil will be, and this necessity 
creates new difficulties. If the governor must be this 'marvel': 
It becomes necessary to go from education to education back to I know not where. How is it 
possible that a child could be well raised by one who is not well raised himself?94 . 
One must, then, be able to trace a path back to a pre-socialised state of plenitude, the 
maintenance of which might ensure a race of Nietischean Ubermensche: men who 
had not felt the division within being, disinterested men with whom any contact 
constituted a non-contact. The book is written in the knowledge of this impossibility, 
and in supposing this marvel found within the text, such a marvel - here the teacher -
can only be written in the knowledge of what he is not. Rousseau, in creating himself 
as this Ubermensche, attempts to theorise the impossibility of authorial objectivity~ 
The subsequent narrative attempts to expose the teacher's power as symbol when 
Rousseau describes a society-machine which is 'faites avec paroles' .95 The teacher 
cannot be this 'isolated' or 'uncontaminated' being because he is necessarily 
implicated within language. 
Importantly then, the lessons of. the text are not directed towards the pupil within the 
text, Emile, but at the reader-construct. Characteristically, after each lesson has bee~ 
directed at this 'reader-pupil', Rousseau alerts the reader to his own problematic status 
as author and therefore, to the problems inherent in learning his lessons. If each 
lesson is a warning against the duplicity of language, each lesson necessarily must 
include, within its own problematic rhetoric, a warning against any belief in the lesson 
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as true. At the point of deconstruction, Rousseau 'withdraws', becomes the 'reader', 
and examines the stance from which the lesson might be elaborated for it to be true. 
Each time the lesson is undermined, whilst it is right to say that there remains a sense 
of optimism within the text - a sense that there remains something to be learnt, 'I 
know of no philosopher who has yet been so bold as to say: this is the limit of what 
man can attain and beyond which he cannot go' .96 
Qui non c'e la radice (here is no root) 
The lessons of Rousseau in his Emile are directed against the Trivium: against the art 
of reasoning as it infiltrates science, philosophy and legislation. All the lessons in 
Rousseau's negative pedagogy stem from the frrst, which teaches that, unable to posit 
a language that might ever have been natural to men, we can only ever say that 'all 
our languages are works of art' .97 Because there is no extra-linguistic dimension to 
language, it follows that any discourse is 'artistic'. Discourse is recognised as 
aesthetic ideology rather than truth-statement. From this Rousseau directs his lessons 
against the discourse of math~matics, history and geometry, revealing our inability to 
penetrate beyond the sign to attain that which is signified.98 He reveals the non-
objectivity of any discourse and alerts the reader to the danger of giving authority to 
what is only a defective fiction. His lessons reach their apogee, in the assertio?, 
'concede nothing to the authority of men' ,99 and his own text is necessarily, if 
confusingly, implicated in the warning.1OO The idea of disinterestedness has been 
rejected in a recognition of the unavailability of intention through language: 'We will 
never be able to disentangle the secret intention which dictates the scream.' 101 
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As with Rousseau's Social Contract, which was disabled by the impossibility of 
foresight, language cannot discern motivation. When one tries to account for 
intention in language the imagination comes into play and fabricates possible textual 
scenarios. Thus, when we try to discern the intention behind the universe - why the 
earth is in motion - we think we see a hand that moves it.102 If intention escapes 
language then Rousseau, as educator, would alert the reader to the measures and 
instruments upon which we depend for our knowledge. The greatest measure, 
obviously, is language. These linguistic fabrications upon which we depend he terms 
'frames' and these 'frames' serve us as proverbs.103 Any knowledge produced will be 
'framed' by the pupil/teacher dyad in order that it exist, so to speak, in inverted 
commas. Within this frame knowledge can be recognised as an 'artwork'. The telos 
of this negative education then is to produce the deconstructive reader who would 
discern the frame in the discourse, to produce a reader who would be 'backstage, 
seeing the actors take up and put on their costumes, counting the cords and pulleys 
whose crude magic devices deceive the spectator's eyes' .104 
With the death of the realist author the deconstructive reader is born, and this reader is 
born with the knowledge of his or her implication within a framed discourse, but with 
the optimistic hope that a certain 'honest' admission to the machinations of language 
is possible: 'One must use a great deal of art to prevent social man from being totally 
artificial. ,lOS 
And it is in this oscillation between the possible and the impossible that we discern 
the optimism of a negative hermeneutics, for in recognising insurmountable 
difficulties, it could be said that: 
in applying oneself to them, one does overcome them up to a certain point. I show the goal 
that must be set; I do not say that it can be reached.106 
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It is from this difficult space that a negative discourse must attempt to articulate itself, 
and it is in this space - as the result of the temptation to be 'present' in language and 
the renunciation of that temptation as impossible107 - that I believe de Man decided to 
establish his own problematic philosophy. 
The lessons or Paul de Man: an honest philosopher 
It remains that I discuss the de Manian oeuvre as re-reading of the 'honesty' apparent 
in a Rousseauian authoring. Certainly de Man's suspicion of the aesthetic is 
repeatedly written with reference to this strong precursor. At every moment in the de 
Manian text one is reminded of a former moment which recalls Rousseau. And so, 
when de Man writes of language's failure to match up with phenomenal experience; 
All the obstacles to understanding [ ... J belong specifically to language rather than the 
phenomenal world; consequently the expectation that they could be mastered by analogy 
with processes that stem from the psychology of perception is by no means certain108 
I am reminded of Rousseau's statement to the effect that truth is in things and not in 
the mind which judges those things.109 The aesthetic is denounced by de Man as a 
seductive notion, appealing !o the pleasure principlello and this description of the 
aesthetic as desirable also recalls the moments where Emile discusses the 
aestheticisation of history and the seduction of the lie.111 De Man's persistent analogy 
in his Resistance to Theory,112 which specifically links the belief in the aesthetic to an 
illness which seeks its cure in that same aesthetic recalls, in style and content, the 
warning offered in Rousseau's Emile: 
They always assume that in treating a sick person one cures him and that, in seeking a truth 
one fmds it [ ... J. I will be told that the mistakes are the doctor's, while the medicine itself is 
infallible, then let it come without the doctor, for so long as they come together, there will be 
a hundred times more to fear from the errors of the artist than to hope from the help of his 
art 113 
... 
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The contamination of scientific discourse through its association with the aesthetic is 
always written by de Man with reference/deference ,to Rousseau. If language cannot 
be reduced to phenomenal cognition, the 'surplus' - the 'more' of Eagleton and 
Lentricchia and the 'story' of Burke, Johnson, Mizimura and countless others - must 
always be the production of an aesthetic ideology, otherwise termed a fiction. The 
reflections of de Man upon the Trivium are directly influenced by a reading of Emile 
and his reading of Pascal's HReflexions sur la Geometrie en Generale: de L'Esprit 
Geometrique et de I' Art de Persuader", deconstructs mathematical rigour in the spirit 
of Emile: the proofs of the mathematician are, according to de Man, 'allegories' 
where nothing but the textual inventiveness of the mathematician is revealed.114 
The pollution of the political by the aesthetic, perhaps the dominant thema in the de 
Manian oeuvre also pays tribute to a reading of Rousseau. De Man's discourse 
emphasises the impossibility of knowing - as the New Critics claimed to know -
where to draw a firm juridical line between literature and other types of language'. 
Recognisably taking its shape from Rousseau, de Man's texts acknowledge the 
necessary figural dimension in language - a dimension which would be suppressed by 
discourses not willing to admit any allegiance with rhetoricism. As in The Social 
Contract and Emile, historical knowledge is seen to be defective due to its reliance 
upon a complex rhetorical structure with no real access to any world beyond the text. 
By extension, political action, dependent upon this historical knowledge, is defecti~e 
due to its refusal to realise that 'social forms of separation derive from ontological 
and meta-social attitudes' and that any political solution refuses to recognise that 
'thought cannot overcome the division inherent in being' .115 
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Thus it would seem that accusations levelled against de Man and, more specifically, 
against the de Manian oeuvre - accusations which traced a dishonest 'itinerary' to a 
private battle against the ideological mystifications associated exclusively with 
Nazism - must be reassessed in the light of an 'itinerary' associated with a reiteration 
of the early Romantic philosophy of Rousseau. Allegations, levelled by Lentricchia 
and Eagleton, trace de Man's political quietism to previous fascist sympathies - to a 
conjectured, specific biographical event - rather than to a re-reading of Rousseau at 
the moment when he argues against the possibility of successful political action. De 
Man's continued assertion that meaning is not reducible to any form of phenomenal 
cognition is self-avowedly the result of a reading of Rousseau.116 So that when he 
works to discredit political thought in his radical essay on the textualisation of history 
- "Literary History and Literary Modernity" - he writes that 'the basis of historical 
knowledge is not empirical facts but written texts' .117 This text, condemned by Sean 
Burke as 'rash', is again traceable to Emile.118 As long as the anti- de Manian debate 
discusses this political quietism in terms of a possible reaction to; 1) his uncle 
Hendrik de Man, 2) a 'guilty' textual event, or 3) the Holocaust, it refuses to trace an 
intertextuality in the oeuvre which would lead to a scene before the Second W orId 
War thus permitting a universalisation of a (linguistic-ontological) predicament rather 
than a particularised and necessarily hypothetical scene of individual guilt traceable to 
a discourse we here call Nazism. 
All the criticisms levelled by the debate at the de Manian oeuvre and the dishonest 
philosopher can be read as criticisms which de Man himself, through his texts, had 
already openly discussed. A close reading of de Man's discussion of authoring, 
written before the 'discovery' of his early journalism, deconstructs the terms of this 
later debate against de Man and turns it into a critique of authoring in general. That 
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is, the terms of the post-de Manian debate have, a priori, been consistently 
deconstructed by de Man throughout his work and can be used here to dismantle the 
very foundation of the critique which later challenges him. The specific trend in post-
1987 critiques of his work, which attacks his rhetoric at the precise point where it 
attempts to remain intelligible in the face of language's own undecidability, prefers to 
equate a rigorous rhetoric with a dishonesty of intention. Culler argues: 'One can 
only make sense of [de Man's] writing if one already has a sense of what he is 
saying.,119 But this type of attack against de Man's dishonest discourse is pre-empted 
in de Man's own reading of Rousseau: 'In any study whatsoever, unless one has the 
ideas of the things represented, the representative signs are nothing.' 120 
All theories are necessarily stated in a mode of error. Because we have no extra-
linguistic ideas, de Man's theory and all theories must necessarily take their place in 
the framework of a prior discourse. So that a criticism of de Man's supposedly-
uniquely gUilty discourse must be understood to encompass all discourse if, by guilty,-
we mean partaking of ideological moments. De Man's reading of Rousseau attempts 
to counter this inevitable critique of the deconstructive stance - this reliance upon 
individual scape-goating - by revealing the limits of any theoretical 'facts' which must 
rely upon the speculative or aesthetic aspect of language. Because de Man's itinerary 
is, self-avowedly, to openly re-read and re-write Rousseau's oeuvre, any criticism of 
de Man's texts must also criticise Rousseau's texts. And if this criticism of de Man's 
texts relies on a specific, biographical event when it dismisses de Man's discourse, 
how can it dismiss Rousseau's parallel discourse since he never wrote for H et 
Vlaamsche Lande or Le Soir? The method used by the debate to indict de -Man, a 
method which centres around his dishonesty as an author, is seen to rest on a 
misunderstailding of deconstruction's major tenet. When Norris writes, 'there is a 
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tension between the demystifying rig our of de Man's critique and the fact that 
comprehension must rely on the suspension of that rigour to a certain degree~ ,121 he 
not only reasserts Culler's criticism, he re-articulates the debate's main objections to . 
deconstruction. If deconstruction is a theory about the undecidability of language, 
how can it be delivered authoritatively within language? De Man's 'brand' of 
deconstruction must be uniquely dishonest because, at its core, it conceals the secret 
of his suppressed subjectivity. Whereas in fact, de Man's texts continually and openly 
assert the problematic nature of his authorial status through a reading of Rousseau's 
examination of the authorial role in Emile and through his own continued textual 
occupation of a site which I have identified as an oscillation between the theoretically 
possible and the impossible. Thus, de Man reveals his text to be 'as systematic and 
rigorous as possible', he writes that deconstruction 'states the fallacy of reference in a 
necessarily referential mode', and that 'nothing can overcome the Resistance to 
Theory since theory is itself this resistance' .122 Like Rousseau's texts, de Man's 
oeuvre desires the parousia, but cannot establish it. l23 Norris is mistaken to write of 
the suspension of rigour. The tension within the de Manian discourse results from a 
rigour which cannot be suspended - just as the utopia cannot be quitted ... the rigour is 
instead recognised as part of our reliance on the aesthetic. 
2.3. The turn 
De Man's writing against modernity and against the possibility of a revolutionary act 
which would forget the past, is a writing against the 'tum'. A belief in history and in 
the revolutionary act, represent for both de Man and Rousseau, the desire for 
something which would endure: a desire made possible only through an act of the 
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imagination. For de Man and Rousseau meaning cannot only be linguistic, that is, 
meaning could only be detennined on the basis of some further fact about language 
which might leave no room for henneneutic doubt. Because this further fact does not _ 
exist, because the sign always substitutes for the signified, only a deconstructive 
rhetoric, aware of its own complicity, is possible. However, the debate which 
opposes itself to de Man would believe that this 'further fact' does exist: that there is 
an aspect to language which can access meaning or intention. This aspect is called 
here the imagination or the speculative text which offers the temptation of 
pennanence (where meaning is a pennanence of interpretation). A successfully 
henneneutic reading would do away with the necessity of any further reading and thus 
establish a pennanence (here a story about de Man). This 'further fact' then is the 
'more' of Eagleton and Norris, it is the story which Johnson required as guarantee of 
de Manian intention, it is the 'more' Mizimura believes she uncovers in her 'story' 
about de Man. Each of these interpretations of de Manian intention relies on a 
Hegelian concept of the imagination as able to overcome quotidian knowledge and on 
the possibility of a turn. Yet the theory of deconstruction writes against the 
possibility of the tum and the creation of a radically new self and in this 'amicable' 
writing it deconstructs the debate which follows de Man's death. Deconstruction 
reveals this 'further fact' to rely on the powers of the imagination to fabricate an 
impossible pennanence, so that any debate about authorial intention is necessarily 
conjectural: it is a debate which believes in the imagination's power to return the 
subject - which it killed - to a scene of henneneutically successful reading. So that, 
just as a negative henneneutics seeks to deconstruct the possibility of disinterested 
truth through the discovery of a necessary politicised aesthetic, positive theorists -
here the de~ate - argue that a principled account can be given to avoid a situation 
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where discourse might serve to articulate the interest of the author. Thus the debate 
misunderstands de Man's deconstructive stance, it refuses to read Rousseau and, 
finally, it kills the 'honest' author in order to resurrect the realist. The author is . 
returned to the text as omnipotent, as the Author-God understood as unitary cause, 
source and master of the text. The debate can then 'discover' the author 'behind' the 
work and thus explain the text. Polysemia is cancelled in a debate which assigns an 
ultimate meaning to the text - a 'secret' traceable to authorial intention. To this 
extent, the debate represents a politics of violence because, whilst it protests against 
the Author-God of a dishonest philosophy, it succumbs to the desire to resurrect this 
same Author-God within the logic of its own debate: 'One of the pupil's first efforts 
is to discover the "secret" of those who govern them.' 124 
A necessary part of any reading, the desire for narrative meaning becomes a desire to 
understand authorial intention. The debate, then, represents an instance when many 
voices chose to ossify textual meaning through the tracing of an itinerary which 
denounces both de Man and the deconstructive tendency through a conjectured 
connection with the rhetoric of Fascism. De Man's oeuvre becomes nothing . more 
than a struggle against this rhetoric. Such scapegoating refuses to admit that all 
theories are necessarily articulated from within an aesthetic or ideological framework 
tempted by the lure of permanent meaning and that writing from within this position 
does not necessarily enable one to tar the text with the brush of totalitarianism. 
Similarly, the indictment of Rousseau by an aberrant critical tradition intent upon 
exempting itself from any involvement within his discourse parallels de Man's 
treatment. It is too easy to dismiss an entire oeuvre through a conjectured link to 
Fascism, and I am not alone when I note that Rousseau's texts have, undeservedly, 
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been read in this way: 'Perhaps after the barbaric totalitarianism of Hitler and Stalin, 
critics of ideas have been too prone to search for a sc.apegoat in Rousseau.' 125 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ALTHUSSER'S CRIME 
3.0. Introduction 
This chapter resembles its predecessor in both structure and aim. It too investigates 
the debate surrounding the 'death' of an author - here Louis Althusser - and the 
simultaneous revelation of a crime. I will concentrate on the response to this crime as 
one which initiates a crypto-biographical reading of Althusser's philosophical oeuvre 
and, more specifically, as a response which would cite the crime in any subsequent 
textual reading. This response, I believe, misunderstands both the deconstructive· 
tendency and Althusser's 'itinerary' which here, as before, is traced to an intertextual 
commitment to Rousseau. I here propose that Althusser's reading of Rousseau into 
his own work unsettles the terms of a 'post' -Althusserian debate on theoretical 
autonomy. 
Section One will discuss the anti-Althusserian debate as it stood after the events of 
November 1980. I will pay particular attention to the belief held by the debate that 
the Althusserian discourse - prior to the crime - had, somehow, achieved the 'death of 
its author' through the attainment of a disinterested theoretical objectivity. The 
necessary denouement of such a widely held belief is that, in the event of a crime, an 
Althusserian subjectivity can be re-introduced, by the debate, into this, allegedly, 
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purely scientific, independent discourse via a specific reference to that crime. This re-
introduction will necessarily, according to the debate, deligitimise and disparage 
Althusser's thought. Section Two will examine the criticisms voiced against 
Althusserism prior to the crime in order to isolate specific critical trends, that is, 
themes specific to the debate prior to November 1980. Section Three will look at the 
Althusserian oeuvre concentrating specifically on Aithusser's reading of Rousseau's 
Social Contract in his Politics and History: Montesquieu, Rousseau, Hegel and Marx. 
Recourse to this Althusserian text enables us to complicate and unsettle a debate 
which must establish Althusser as a wilfully disinterested theorist. Althusser's oeuvre 
also problematises any debate which would discuss intention within the text, that is, 
any debate which desires specific 'evidence' of the author within the text. Finally, 
Section Four will summarise my findings - frrstly, how the anti-Althusserian debate 
which established itself before his crime was left inadequately challenged due to a 
refusal to read Althusser closely and secondly, how this debate could then lend 
credence to the more virulent and worryingly 'policing' anti-Althusserian polemic 
after November 1980. The arguments used against Althusser - arguments based on 
mere speculation as to the possible motivation of Althusserism - intensified and were 
lent an 'air of truth' by the 'evidence' of his crime. Thus it was that the main charges 
rallied against Althusserism - its elitism, its irresponsibility, its gUilt, its anti-
humanism, its anti-historicism and its subsequent ethical abyss - were left 
unchallenged and so could, after 1980, translate into an attack which could fabricate 'a 
'story' about Althusser's 'crime' to lend credence to its critique and so, damningly, 
terminate his discourse. 
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3.1. Destruction and self-destruction: the death of an Althusser 
On the 16th of November 1980, Helene Althusser was, allegedly, strangled to death 
by her husband Louis within the walls of their home in Paris' prestigious Ecole 
Normale Superieure. This was, and remains, his sole crime (in legal terms). 
It is the nature of the response to Althusser's crime which interests me here. In the 
case of de Man the revelation of a crime followed upon his death and as such it was 
both the physical death of an author, and the death of an idea about that author, which 
initiated a desire for a story about that author. The debate then had to reinstate de 
Man's missing subjectivity to facilitate the return of the author. In what way then 
does the very real death of Helene Althusser constitute the death of Louis Althusser? 
That is, in what way is Louis Althusser removed from the subjective arena in order 
that a debate might be able to construct a discourse which could reinstate his 
subjectivity on its own terms, assured that the author will not rise up to challenge 
them? Quite simply, with the murder of his wife, Althusser committed a type of 
suicide. l On the night of the crime he was immediately sent to St. Anne's psychiatric 
hospital. It was there that sentence was passed and Althusser was condemned to the 
silence of the non-lieu. Later, in his second autobiography, The Future Lasts a Long 
Time, he would describe this judgement as 'the tombstone of the non-lieu, of silence 
and public death'.2 
Literally, the non-lieu is a no-place. A medical examination diagnosed Althusser as a 
manic-depressive and therefore denied him any trial, ultimately robbing him of any 
responsibility and refusing him the right to respond: 
The Penal Code [.,,] since 1938, makes a distinction between someone held not to be 
responsible; a criminal who has committed an act while suffering from dementia or 'under 
duress" , and an individual who is quite simply held to be responsible because he is recognised 
as being normal,3 
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Denied any response Althusser becomes essentially subject-less. Althusser later 
voiced support for Foucault's definition of madnes,s as being 'without body'. If 
Althusser is bodiless, existing in a no-place, for all intents and purposes removed, 
from the sphere of response and responsibility through incarceration, he is, is he not, 
in a way dead? November 16th, therefore, marked the first 'death' of Louis Althusser. 
Following upon this 'death' arose the inevitable public desire for a story - for a 
response which might replace his missing body and answer for his actions. The debate ' 
which surrounds Althusser's crime and 'death', like that which tried to contain de 
Man, is one which centres on the issue of authorial accountability. If the author 
cannot assume responsibility - because he has been silenced - the debate will take it 
upon itself to 'return' the author by fabricating textual scenarios within which 
authorial intention might reveal itself. Responsibility, therefore, shifts as it now 
becomes the responsibility of the debate to reinstate Althusser's subjective status and 
intention through an insertion of his bio-graph into the text. 
The restitution of the author. 
The most prominent feature of the critical activity following Althusser's crime and 
'death' is a debate on authorial accountability which reveals the shared desire for a 
story which might deligitimise Althusserism through reference to' his 'guilty' past. 
The debate against Althusserian theory which began in 1980 was so ruthlessly 
damning that even now its effects are being felt. In 1988, almost a decade after the 
crime, Etienne Balibar, speaking of Althusser at a conference in the U.S.A. said: 'In 
his own country there is an absolute taboo now suppressing the name of this man and 
the meaning of his writings. ,4 
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The reason for this sustained silence is clear: 
We should not underestimate the effects of the scandalous murder of Althusser's wife, which 
influenced both opponents and friends, and is certainly not the weaker among intellectuals. 
To the contrary, since they are especially ill at ease when confronted with questions of crime . 
and madness, if these are not (yet) literary cases.s 
A large part of the reason why Althusserism remains, to this day, a taboo subject, at 
least in France, is because of the virulence of an anti-Althusserian debate which 
effectively terminated his teachings. This media debate, which surfaced on both 
sides of the Channel in the weeks, months and years following Althusser's crime, . 
worked to establish a number of key facts which I now hope to elaborate upon. 
Specifically, the French (and World) press attempted to create a link between the 
philosophical thought of Althusser and the tragedy at the Ecole.6 With this end in 
mind, it became of paramount importance that Althusser be seen to have lied. 
Althusser is therefore shown to have been a mysterious character who secreted an 
enormous discrepancy between his public and private life.7 He is simultaneously a 
respectable teacher (Normalien) and a mental patient (A-normalien).8 Because of this 
his writing becomes suspect - Althusser had a secret, he was a mental patient - and he 
chose to shirk his academic and moral responsibility by remaining silent about this 
secret. His oeuvre must, therefore, be explicable as autobiographical suppression 
andlor elliptical confession. The text functions as both reflection on insanity and 
product of that insanity. 
It is this shared desire for a secret or story about Althusser, always traceable to his 
crime, which disinters many of the loci of author-centred criticism. As with de Man, 
an entire oeuvre is reduced to autobiographical status. A text previously held to be 
disinterested is 'rediscovered' - Althusserism is tainted with the biograph and the 
motivational impetus behind theoretical marxism is traced to a specific biographical 
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event. After 1980 this event must be the murder of his wife although before, as I will 
discuss later, one could substitute an entire series of p~ssible crimes. 
The new crime - let us note that the anti-Althusserian debate accuses Althusser of 
'more than' the murder of his wife - becomes Althusser's hidden subjectivity behind 
the now recognisable guise of disinterestedness. The debate can now suspect a 
possibly sinister motive behind Althusser's symptomatic reading of the 'process 
without a subject' - he hoped to efface his own, pathologically abnormal, subjectivity 
and created the theoretical environ in which to do so. 
My intention here is not to deny the seriousness of Althusser's crime but rather to 
question its power to contaminate an earlier theoretical production, where 
contamination is dependent upon the theoretical. undermining of a previous 
Althusserian pretension to disinterestedness - here called a purely scientific discourse 
- through reference to that crime. The debate must rely upon its claim that Althusser 
effaced the subject within his theory in order to secrete his own partisan - because 
criminal- subjective status. 
Interestingly, in order to do Jhis the debate must reveal its prior (to 1980) and 
sustained (excepting the case of Althusser) belief in the possibility of a disinterested 
discourse. That is, in order for their argument to make any sense, they must exhibit 
two things - that they did once believe that Althusser had created a purely objective 
discourse and that a purely objective discourse remains attainable, except in the case 
of Althusser. So it is only after November 1980 and with specific reference to 
Althusser that the question is asked - 'What do students need to know about 
teachers?' 9 
79 
Chapter 3 
It was generally held, by those intellectuals who voiced criticisms after 1980, that 
Althusser's theory had been somehow produced in a vacuum, absolutely and 
irrevocably cut off from the outside world. His, allegedly, was a discourse which 
claimed, and somehow managed, to achieve the purity of objectivity. A spatial 
metaphor is employed by his detractors which allows Althusser to remain outside 
society and 'normal' every day experience, living instead 'a huis clos':o This idea of 
seclusion and exclusion is consistently reaffmned in relation to Althusser. The debate 
writes in opposition to an academic establishment (with Althusser forming part of this 
establishment) which protects the elitism of the idea. 11 This leads to two further 
suppositions, firstly, that Althusser was dishonest about his supposedly disinterested, 
scientific theories and secondly, that the debate can insert his 'true' intentions into the 
theoretical works now that it 'knows' Althusser. The'debate can sully the so -called 
purity of the Althusserian idea through the resurrection of his subjectivity here traced 
to a localisable biographic event: 
A Ia suite du crime aberrant du pbilosopbe Louis Althusser, intellectuel en renom et maitre A 
penser revendique par toute une generation, certains se demanderit si Ia pbilosopbe, Ie monde 
des idees pures, ne seraient pas responsables de telles folies. 12 
Two ideas are apparent in the above citation - that intellectualism provokes mental 
breakdown13 and, perhaps more interestingly, that a 'pure' philosophy can, sometimes, 
be contaminated by the life of the philosopher: 'L'ennui, c'est que Ie penseur [here 
read Louis Althusser] n'est jamais, dans son existence, seulement un philosophe. ,14 
A previously held belief in the possibility of objective thought collapses when an 
entire philosophical oeuvre is contaminated by the subject who wntes. The debate 
inserts the author into the text, but not just any author - this author is both criminal 
and madman. Crucially the author is welcomed· back into the text as a realist who 
shunned mimesis in order to suppress his guilty secret: 
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Certains esprits [ ... ] s'inquietent [ ... ] et s'interrogent [ ... ] si l'enseignement d'un philosophe, 
peut etre contamine [ ... ] par son comportement prive [ ... ]. Les idiosyncracies de [Louis 
Althusser] passaient tout uniment dans ses pensees les deliees, les plus originales. Ses gouts, 
ses preferences, mais aussi ses obsessions, ses maladies. B~ef, son subjectivitt irreducible. 1S 
The possibility of a non-partisan discourse is, thus, collapsed by the debate but only 
and uniquely with reference to the story of Althusser's history of mental illness and 
criminal record. It is only through such a psychologisme which would reduce all of 
Althusser's thought to un sale petit secret de famille that the debate believes one can 
interpret the 'more' of the text. 
Obviously there are many conclusions to be drawn from this position. Firstly, that the 
debate wants to assume responsibility for revealing the Althusserian discourse to be 
more than an inspired vision of the real. The 'more than' literary motive, as we have 
already noted, looks to Althusser's history for self-validation. Althusser is' not just 
any subject with any history, for of course, there have been other philosophers and 
they too have had lives. Somehow, Althusser is the exception, just as de Man was. 
He is a Socrates 'mais engagees' .16 What might this ever mean? What might it be to 
remain unengaged and how did Socrates achieve this feat. Whatever the answer, quite 
fatally such ambiguous statements have the power to render Althusserism redundant 
because they believe in the attainment of a disinterested discourse. Mental illness, 
crime and Marxist philosophy are conveniently linked by Althusser's detractors: 
'Philosophe, communiste, donc fou deux fois, Althusser aurait du etre interdit 
d'enseignement.,17 
Nearly all the journals published around the time of the murder bear witness to the 
same worrying desire to portray Althusser as some sort of madman poised ready to 
commit a host of unimaginable crimes. IS Once Althusser is established as a moral 
enemy his. discourse itself can become the enemy in a confused melange of 
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indictments which generally work to condemn both the man and the work. Althusser 
is 'fou, philosophe, sans enfants, passione, elitist' .19 
To be diagnosed as a manic-depressive effectively puts an end to Althusser's 
philosophical influence: ,[E]tre fou rend caduque toute expression creatrice - on n'a 
pas Ie droit d'avoir une insertion professionnelle quand on est une malade mentalle.,20 
A teacher cannot be a murderer because to admit that a man whose ideas have been 
widely accepted and lauded by society is both mentally ill and a murderer would 
necessitate that this society ask itself questions about itself and about Althusser as a 
product of that same society. The denunciation and ostracism of Althusser(ism) must 
be complete in order to disassociate the man and the work from that society. Any 
debate must establish Althusser as somehow apart and aloof from any societal context 
in order that that society might ignore its part in creating Althusserism. Elitism of the 
idea is therefore the strategic creation not of Althusser but of the anti-Althusserian 
debate. Author-centred criticism is revitalised only and specifically to trivialise and 
destroy Althusser's work because it is the most effective strategy that the debate can 
use to terminate a discourse which it has always opposed. Previous to 1980 it had 
little evidence at its disposal, that is, the stories fabricated about Althusser in order to 
disrupt his theories were weak and ineffectual but this new story has the power to 
black-list him. 
The debate against Althusser continues to be just as virulent. As recently as 1992 
with the publication of Yann Moulier Boutang's biography of Althusser, the anti-
Althusserian polemic continued to unearth 'scandalous' facts about the author's life 
hoping to demean the significance of his political thought. A more recent article 
reveals the "persistence of a mode of Althusserian interpretation even if it does offer 
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an interesting variant upon the theme. The article, by Mark Lilla, appeared in the 
Times Literary Supplement, which, on its cover, displayed the title, "Althusser: the 
Murderous Child".21 The device employed here is to link Althusser with Foucault in . 
ways calculated to denigrate the life and thought of each by guilty association with the 
other.22 The murder of Helene Althusser and Althusser's subsequent incarceration in a 
mental hospital are, according to Lilla, 'another morbid episode in the denouement of 
"la pensee '68", along with Foucault's death from AIDS' .23 
Lilla continues: 'Althusser's work is one extended effort to make us share his 
(abnormal) condition.,24 Luckily, for Lilla, biography offers the solution because it 
enables (normal) people 'to see what a profoundly intimate meaning the philosophical 
flight from subjectivity and the attack on humanism had for Althusser'. 2S Of course, 
because biography allows Lilla to discover a 'truth' about textual motivation, it offers 
him an effective strategy of deligitimisation which 'avails him in his effort to police 
the socially established boundaries between the normal and the pathological,.26 
Similarly, Geraldine Finn's recent book, Why Althusser killed his Wife, refuses to 
separate the philosophical thought from the private man and even goes so far as to 
suggest that Althusser's social theory constitutes a legitimisation of violent and 
potentially murderous behaviour: 
We cannot afford to continue to separate the intellectual in a man [ ... ] from the emotional: 
the depression from the ideas; or the political from the person; the commitment to class 
struggle from the stormy marriage, the dead wife .. The truth is that the Althusser who killect 
his wife is Althusser, the revolutionary. [ ... ]Althusser appeal[ed] to science to authorise and 
legitimise [his] theories and practices as a social scientist and to authorise and legitimise 
violence at the same time.27 
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3.2. A different motive 
To problematise the already problematical idea of Althusser as author of his own. 
disappearance as author (in a body of work known as Althusserism), and to further 
complicate any belief in the possibility of uncovering textual motivation through 
reference to specific biographical events, I will now look to readings of the oeuvre 
established before the crime, where Althusser's itinerary must be differently traced. 
This section will look at the debate against Althusser prior to November 1980, 
uncovering the major themes in a body of work directed against Althusser's new 
Marxist theory. 
Before 1980 and the death of H~l~ne Althusser, the debate which surrounded the work 
of her husband was, largely, supportive. Indeed, it was difficult to get work published 
if one wanted to criticise Althusser's highly fashionable reading of Marx.28 Dissension 
usually exhibited only small-scale quibbles within largely supportive analyses. 
However, it would be naIve to suggest that Althusser was without 'enemies' and it is 
true that the momentum of critical opinion against Althusserism was already gaining 
strength in the years and even months preceding his 'crime'. The first text of any 
note published against Althusserism (and Althusser) was the 1972 edition of The New 
Left Review. Following this, the seminal text against Althusser(ism), written by E.P. 
Thompson and called The Poverty of Theory, appeared in 1978. I shall also look at 
the book, entitled One-Dimensional Marxism, published in early 1980 and written as a 
combined attack on Althusser and his work. 
Even before November 1980, the debate against Althusserism desired a 'story' about 
Althusser and the motivation 'behind' his theory. A subsequent need arose to situate 
the author within the text in order to under~tand why he wrote a~ he did. According 
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to E.P Thompson in his The Poverty of Theory finding such a 'story' is simple. 
Althusser is a Stalinist and Althusserism is no more than 'Stalinism reduced to the 
paradigm of theory'. 29 Althusser's anti-humanism and anti-historicism provide a 
perfect ex-post facto rationalisation for the deeds of the tyrant. Why is his theory 
Stalinist? Quite simply, it would seem that Stalinism is, for Thompson, a matter of 
linguistic style and Althusser's rigorously written theoretical utterances are, therefore, 
Stalinist. Thompson then goes even further, he sees in Althusser's doctrine of 
determinism - the process without a subject - a rationale for the forced liquidation of 
millions of people. Thus: 
Althusserts attempts to focus attention on the underlying structure of production relations at 
the expense of concrete individuals who inhabit these structures is but one of a number of 
sophisticated ways of denying the reality of human freedom. It is also [ ... J an evasion of 
moral responsibility.30 . 
The writers in the 1972 edition of the New Left Review also seek the 'story' behind 
Althusserism: 'What impels Althusser to sunder the identity between the real object 
and the object of knowledge?,31 
The answer is immediate: the motive behind this break with empiricism is Althusser's 
desire for theoretical autonomy. Althusser's entire oeuvre is thus reduced to the wish· 
to establish himself as autonomous. It is, according to Geras, because of this desire 
that Althusser elaborated a theory of theoretical practice where this practice is said to 
have its own distinct - from reality - raw material and product. Geras wants to know 
the criteria which might guarantee that any knowledge is true. Althusser, he clainis, 
produces an account of science that is idealist. 32 Our preliminary look at Geras will 
reveal a pattern of objections typical of the anti-Althusserian critique prior to 
November 1980. Initially, Althusserism is equated with mystification.33 
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Althusser rejects, as empiricist, the idea that the real object known by science is the object of 
knowledge, insisting that the object of knowledge is internal to thought: the real object is, 
nevertheless, the 'absolute reference point' ,34 
Geras objects to the 'mechanism' of the knowledge effect in Althusserianism and to 
Althusser's refusal to explain the criteria for the validity of scientific knowledge. That 
is, he objects to Althusser's refusal to offer 'evidence'. Althusser is 'too silent,3S 
about the conditions of knowledge production and this leads to an idealism at the 
heart of his Marxist science.36 This silence, which is dishonest because it is a willed 
silence, opens a space for further criticisms. For it can now be seen by Geras that this 
silence is the result of an Althusserian desire to become, as theorist, somehow 
omnipotent: 
Althusser thinks the relation between Marxist theory and the working class movement as one 
of exteriority: the former is produced outside the latter, and must be imported into it, failing 
which this movement can only arrive at conceptions which are ideological and bourgeois 
ideological at that. 37 
Geras here initiates a spatial metaphor which will become a dominant feature in this 
debate. Geras asks where this 'outside' might be only to immediately conclude that i~ 
lies 'on the inside of a purely intellectual process without historical conditions or 
detenninants' .38 
The aim of one who inhabits this intellectual or objective space 'outside' class society 
must be to effect a unilateral and purely pedagogic relationship with the working 
classes: to give the proletariat Truth. This ~litism is, according to Geras, the fmal 
consequence of a theoretical idealism which would celebrate the autonomy of science. 
Geras continues to develop the spatial metaphor: Althusser desired, and somehow 
occupied, a purely intellectual position beyond nonnal human experience. He thus 
effected his own 'death' as both a subject and an author and rid himself of any 
historical context, in order that he might appear as a purely intellectual repository for 
'truth'. Once Geras has established that this was indeed the motive behind the work, 
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he denounces Althusser's secret. Whilst other Marxists produced their theories from 
within the working class movement, Althusser's theories were produced in this 
intellectual 'outside' that we have already described. But Geras' paradigm falters in 
his attempt to distance Althusser from other Marxist theorists: 
Marxist theory was not produced outside the working class movement. It was produced 
inside . .,True, it was produced by intellectuals and these intellectuals were mostly of 
bourgeois or petty-bourgeois origin. But that is another matter.39 
But it obviously isn't another matter. Within the narrow confines of Geras' naIve 
metaphor, these Marxist intellectuals, precisely because of their bourgeois 
intellectualism must also inhabit this 'outside' with Althusser. Yet Geras allows that 
another bourgeois intellectual might somehow be both inside and outside the working 
class movement. He collapses the inside-outside metaphor to permit a broader field 
of interpretation wherein the bourgeois outside can become a type of working class 
inside. Yet Althusser is not admitted into this privileged space. He still remains on 
the outside due to a self-imposed exile result of his 'well-formed science, elaborated 
elsewhere' .40 We are not told where this 'elsewhere' is but it is obviously somewhere 
that Althusser and only Althusser has access to. Althusser is someone who, it is not 
stated how, manages to inhabit a space outside both proletarian and bourgeois 
experience. 
The final ingredient of the anti-Althusserian debate now emerges. Having somehow 
achieved his. own 'death', having (a)voided his subjectivity to emerge as p~re 
intellect, Althusser 'purges' Marxism of its ethical content.41 His, allegedly, unethical 
reading of Marx is a 'guilty reading indeed'. 42 Althusser has, therefore, written a 
gUilty text, that is, a text specifically made guilty through its links to a man named 
Louis Althusser. This interpretation of Althusser's theory as unethical - inspired by 
the fact that in Reading Capital Althusser writes 'Capital should not be reduced to an 
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ethical inspiration ,43 - results from Althusser's supposed desire to remain active in 
relation to a passive working classes. Thus, for Geras, Reading Capital is written to 
produce 'a new form of ideology in the masses'.44 Geras wonders why Althusser 
wants to continue to offer the masses new ideologies if not to perpetuate their 
subordination: 
Althusser tells us, in at least 100 passages, that ideology is a realm of mystification and 
deformation, of illusion, falsehood and myth, of confusion, prejudice and arbitrariness, of the 
imaginary and non-knowledge. He thus cuts off the masses [ ... ]. How then can the 
intellectuals brandish what they know to be an ideology without violating the first principle 
of revolutionary politics- to tell it as it is.4s 
In the same vein, Glucksmann's criticisms of Althusser in the same edition of The 
New Left Review attack the 'duplicity' of Althusser.46 Again, the central criticism 
shapes itself around the idea that Althusser desired, and achieved, the production of a 
theory which- somewhat paradoxically we must here point out - established the 
autonomy of both theory and theorist: 
A concept of production is central [ ... ] because it both regulates the primordial divisions of 
the Althusserian universe, and establishes the breaks by which scientific theory ensures its 
independence vis a vis ideology and politics.47 
Althusserian science supposedly guarantees its own objective 'truth' due to its 
complete rupture with empiricism. Althusser is criticised for posing as the originator' 
of his theory - he is gUilty (again) of a 'conceptual empiricism', of a 'forced use of a 
dictionary' and of using language to establish that everything just so 'happens' to be 
production.48 Glucksmann opposes Althusser's assertive style which claims, without 
evidence, that everything is production. Like Geras, Glucksmann accuses Althusser 
of being silent about what distinguishes scientific discourse from other forms of 
discourse and about the criteria which guarantee its truth. Althusser, according to 
Glucksmann, shirks his responsibility to answer these questions. On this silence rests 
their assertion that Althusser perpetuated a belief in the truth and autonomy of 
science. Althusser is accused of 'getting away' with this duplicity due to the rigour of 
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his analysis. For Glucksmann the structure of Althusser's theory can only operate if 
there is 'some more secret correspondence between a theory and its object'. 49 This 
'secret' leads Glucksmann to speculate that a type of 'transcendental correlation' is at 
work in Althusserism. 
The idea of violence is introduced into Althusserism when his theory is denounced as 
an inherently violent one - a 'savage structuralism'so - which, through the concept of 
production, is gUilty of conceptual empiricism. Once again, it would seem that 
Althusser's entire aim is to found an anti-historicist and an anti-humanist reading of 
Capital in order to consolidate the idea of a 'process without a subject'. Althusser's 
work is 'guilty' because it fails to resolve the issues it raises. Of course, we are back 
with Geras and the question of ideology. Marx has been misread, according to 
Althusser, through a lack of understanding of the ideological structures at work in our 
production of knowledge. According to Glucksmann, Althusser's is a duplicitous 
theory because it proposes that one can examine this misreading from the stance of an 
ideologically uncontaminated theory. Althusser is guilty because he, supposedly, 
duplicitously escapes the theoretical circle via a transcendental correlation which 
identifies the concepts of thought with the 'conditions of existence' of the real rather 
than the real itself. Althusser, again, is criticised for being, somehow, on the outside 
of human experience, for transcending limits through a metaphysical philosophy that 
seeks to explain the whole. 
Victor Seidler in One-Dimensional Marxism voices much the same problem with his 
reception of Althusserism. Again, it is as if Althusser were on the 'outside' of normal 
experience: 'Learning has to be related to experience [ ... ], if ideas are to be 
reproduced mechanically, very little will be learnt.'S} Althusser's thought processes 
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are seen as mechanical rather than subjective. Seidler is 'suspicious' of a 'certain 
kind of abstract theoretical work' .52 As with Geras and his limited understanding of 
what constitutes bourgeois intellectualism, it would seem that this certain type of 
abstract theory is Althusser-specific. Why? Because once again it appears that 
Althusser has produced something that remains apart from the living context in which 
it should have been formulated. Seidler cites Marx's "Theses On Feuerbach" to 
support his case against Althusser: 
The question whether human thinking can pretend to objective truth is not a theoretical but a 
practical question. Man must prove the truth, that is the reality and power, the 'tbis-
sidedness' of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking 
that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.S3 
Althusser's is, then, a purely contemplative relationship with the social world. If the 
theoretical domain is autonomous, and Seidler accepts this as Althusser's claim, then 
how can it relate to the class struggle? Seidler sets this against the more 'reasonable' 
claims of Gramsci who refuses to differentiate between philosophy, theory, and 
science. In Gramsci's forced equivalence, philosophy is demystified and stripped of 
any special status: 
It is essential to destroy the widespread prejudice that philosophy is a [.,,] difficult thing, It 
must frrst be shown that all men are 'philosophers'[, .. ] though in [their] own way and 
unconsciously,S4 
This, according to Seidler, establishes the philosopher on a more egalitarian, hence 
honest, footing with the working class. The philosophical consciousness of the 
worker is developed through a critical relationship with experienc~ - although neither 
Seidler or Gramsci write what might instigate this critical attitude, which they call 
'knowing thyself. Their belief contradicts Althusser's science which is 'brought to 
the aid' of the proletarians. Again, Seidler's criticism of Althusser's belief in 
theoretical autonomy is enforced through an . attack on the limits of a purely 
theoretical'" theory: Althusser does not illuminate class experience from a standpoint 
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within society. What could be taken as evidence of authorial honesty is rather taken 
as evidence of the limitations imposed on an autonomous theory which remains 
outside proletarian experience. The spatial metaphor is repeated: 'Somehow, 
[Althusser'sJ science takes up a position which is superior to experience, thereby 
situating us outside the struggles in society, observing the process. ,55 Althusser 
(a)voids his subjectivity to become this transcendental all-knowing other. The 'new 
danger' of Althusserism is, therefore, that his 'overview' of the capitalist mode of 
production simply 'asserts' that individuality is generated automatically within the 
capitalist mode of production. 56 Althusser's allegedly mechanical rhetoric leaves 
Seidler at a theoretical impasse: if Althusser can objectively assert the death of the 
subject, he can remove the possibility of revolutionary behaviour. Seidler, like the 
others, objects to the style of Althusser's 'enormously self-confident rhetoric' .57 
Ultimately this argument leads us to the by now familiar territory of authorial guilt. 
Althusser is incriminated and condemned as unethical because his 'implicit 
conception of socialism tends to [ ... J suppress all-important moral discussion' .58 
This amoral stance is linked to Althusser's (a)voidance of subjectivity within the 
rigorous formulation of an objective, mechanical and ultimately duplicitous theory of 
class struggle. 
It is important to notice here that Seidler pushes the implications of this argument 
further than previous' critics. Althusserism is indicted as irresponsible. In °his 
construction of a rigorous reading Althusser supposedly dissolves the concept of the 
individual and replaces it with that of class. The individual is deconstructed and 
revealed to be 'not responsible' for the kind of life he/she has. The 'clarity' of the 
argument .. - that is, its deceptive rigour - can 'tempt' the reader into separating the 
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individual from society and, therefore, viewing individual blame as the responsibility 
of a class. 59 In dissolving the category of the individual Althusser thus removes the 
idea of individual responsibility. This continues to be associated with the idea that 
Althusser somehow achieves, within the space of his writing, the autonomy of the 
subject. The spatial metaphor is re-introduced to explain the achievement: 
Somehow the critique moves [readers] to a position of detachment, outside of capitalist 
society, and estranged from our individual experience. It offers us an overview from which 
particular conflicts can be observed [ ... ] or particular discourses identified [ ... ], This gives a 
sense of enormous power and importance to the theorist, who can remain strangely detached 
and all-knowing.60 
The dissolution of the subject allows an irresponsible theory which condones the 
rejection of any notion of personal responsibility. This, according to Seidler, is the 
result of a 'very specific temptation' .61 Althusser alone has been tempted to see social 
practices as somehow constituted by language, and this temptation results from an 
'insensitive' ,62 dehumanised philosophy which remains unable to connect to historical 
experience and whose politics have developed in an unspecified 'outside' .63 
Simon Clarke, also writing in One-Dimensional Marxism, condemns Althusserism as 
bourgeois philosophy wrapped insecurely in Marxist rhetoric. This 'duplicity' - a 
word which recurs throughout the critical debate to suggest dishonesty - makes 
Althusserism 'dangerous'.64 What is interesting here is that Clarke manages, where 
the others only speculated, to construct a 'story' around Althusser's theoretical 
autonomy. The motive behind the oeuvre is simple: Althusser believed that the 
French Communist Party (p.e.F.) suffered from the lack of a theoretical substructure. 
His project thus began 'apparently with an innocent return to the texts of Marx' .65 
Soon this innocence, which was only ever apparent, makes way for an inevitably 
guilty motive: 'The innocence of this return is, however, only superficial.,66 Clarke 
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continues: 'Althusser does not approach the works of Marx, Lenin or Mao as a 
disinterested student of the texts. ,67 
Once again Althusser is attacked for his duplicitous approach - for removing his 
subjectivity through a suasive rhetoric which would conceal his 'interested' reading of 
Marx. Clarke's story revolves around Althusser's 'ambition'. Althusser's 'itinerary', 
initially aimed at purging Marxism of historicism, became transformed by a desire to 
establish his authority within the p.e.F. In order to establish the anti-historicism of 
Marx it was necessary to establish the autonomy of theory - and the theorist - and to 
separate Marxist philosophy from historical marxism. Althusser, therefore, is merely 
an opportunist. This self-avowedly ad hominem critique, aimed at revealing the 
'sordid history,68 of Althusserism is, for Clarke, justified if it helps us to understand 
the selfish origins of Althusserian theory. Thus, Clarke sides with Ranciere and 
focuses his anti-Althusserian polemic precisely at the point where theory meets 
politics. Again we see the critic attack a 'mechanical' concept of theory. For Clarke 
there is a direct link between the guilty ambition of the philosopher and his theory of 
the autonomy of theoretical labour: Althusser constructs an asymmetrical relationship 
where theoretical labour enjoys dominance over its manual counterpart. In order to 
etemalise this theoretical authority, he must construct a theory which will prove that 
this relationship is not only a feature of capitalist society, but that it is a necessary 
relationship. 
In order to believe that Althusser desired and achieved this theoretical autonomy 
Clarke must also use a spatial metaphor which is, by now, established as the leitmotif 
of the debate. Unlike Marx, who developed a theory of real human history, Althusser 
can only 'dictate theoretically' .69 As the title of this book suggests, Althusser is 
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somehow one-dimensional; existing as pure intellect in a multi-dimensional, 
historico-political world. Althusser is able to separate his mind from his body to offer 
a 'contemplative' theory which, for Clarke, is essentially bourgeois. Allied with this 
criticism of Althusser's false objectivity is the by now common criticism of 
Althusserism's theoretical impasses: its dead-ends and circles.70 This criticism 
believes that Althusser, somehow outside human experience, cannot sufficiently 
theorise revolutionary potential. Althusserism is allied with bourgeois empiricism 
because 
It mistakes its own ideological preconceptions for reality, thus it gives us lrnowledge only of 
its ideological preconceptions: instead of taking reality for its object, it takes its given object 
for the real.71 
If Marx subjected the appearance of the real to a critical examination, the error of 
bourgeois empiricism, hence of Althusserism, is that-it remains 'insufficiently critical 
of its own preconceptions'.72 Althusser claims to offer a privileged vision of reality 
whereas, according to Clarke, Marx's critique of the concept of the given allowed him 
to arrive at a more adequate -and honest - basis for knowledge. The implication is 
clear: Marx's is an essentially honest concept of knowledge whereas Althusser's is 
dishonest because of its reliance on vision. For Clarke, Althusser's entire philosophy· 
centres around the concept of production just so that he might establish the autonomy 
of theoretical practice and, by extension, his own dominance within the P.C.F.. A 
completely new reading of Marx has its origins in pragmatism: 
This version of Marx. does not derive from a reading of Marx. at all, but from the need to 
invent a Marx who can defend the isolation, autonomy, and authority, of theoretical 
activity.73 
Althusser initiates an ideological abstraction: ideological because he abstracts a 
concrete practical activity from the social relations within which any practice must 
exist. Ult~ately, Clarke's indictment leads to a familiar conclusion - Althusserism 
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is irresponsible and immoral: 'In adopting a liberal defence of the autonomy of 
science, Althusser adopts the liberal view of society that accompanies it. ,74 
Of course the final criticism in any anti-Althusserian debate must attack the 
theoretical impasses of Althusserism. The circle of Althusserism is Althusser 
specific, that is, the dilemma of his thought is a direct result of the man and his 
(guilty) secret - here read as ambition. Once again, the critic resorts to a spatial 
metaphor situating Althusser 'outside', in a purely ideological predicament. Althusser 
becomes the 'scholar-hero' presiding over a 'supporting cast of millions': he is, unlike 
Marx, confined in a world of speculative thought.'s Clarke, like Geras, believes that 
radical action, through the eradication of specific institutions which reproduce 
material power relations, could pose a real threat to ideology. Althusser's theory of 
ideology can thus be seen as the real bone of contention for a debate which regards 
ideology as a visible enemy. Indeed, for his detractors, Althusserism is not a 
Marxism at all, it merely distorts Marx for Althusser's own sordid ends. Clarke 
refuses to believe that Marxist theory might have been born within the old theoretical 
problematic of classical political economy. True, he might allow that a reading of an 
inconsistent theory called., classical political economy might lead to a new 
development (neo-classical economics) but he will not entertain Althusser's 
suggestion that such a reading of the inconsistencies within this classical political 
economy lead to Marxist theory. He must dismiss such an idea as absurd bec~use 
Marx must not be seen to have been an intellectual. Marx's theory must be seen to 
have stemmed directly from an active, physical involvement which owed nothing to a 
re-reading of theory, indeed, Clarke seems intent on elaborating a Marxist theory with 
no engagement whatsoever in the act of reading .. This non-cerebral Marxism can then 
be contraSted with Althusser's intellectual absorption, his isolation from historical 
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experience, his essential 'subjectlessness' - his one-dimensionality in . a two-
dimensional world which produces the 'contempla~ion that can only be the one-sided 
appropriation of a part of the social practice of a sensuous-supersensuous person' .76 . 
3.3. Fidelity to an itinerary 
How might one respond to this debate? At a local level I can seek to complicat~ 
specific arguments. For example I can trivialise Thompson's damning of Althusserism 
as Stalinist due to its rigorous rhetoric and its doctrine of determinism. Anti-
humanism is not necessarily pro-Stalinism just as Marxist humanists are not 
necessarily anti-Stalinist.77 And if Stalinism is merely a matter of rigorous style what 
of Kant or Spinoza? To see in the doctrine of determinism a rationale for the 
slaughter of millions is unwarranted in the extreme. Others, specifically Spinoza, had 
no difficulty deriving a humane and liberal morality from determinism78 and it is not 
right that one should gloss over these complications just to condemn Althusserism as 
an inherently violent philosophy. However, perhaps the best approach to counter 
these criticisms, and the one I propose, would be to re-read Althusser in the light of 
this critique. 
Marxist Humanism gained popularity immediately after the War. In its optimism it 
embraced slogans which called for 'the return of Man'. Yet' where did Marxist 
Humanism come from? A humanist interpretation of Marx was not known in 
Western Europe until after Goldman's translation of Lukac's History and Human 
Consciousness, a text which interpreted Marxism as a theory of human alienation.79 
Later, Lukac's was to recant and openly criticise the errors of that book, however, it 
had already become the canonical text for Marxist Humanists. Existential Marxists 
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converted a critique of society into a general philosophical critique so that alienation, 
seen by Marx as a social and economic problem, was translated into an eternal 
'condition humaine'. After the atrocities of the War, Althusser, unlike Marxist 
Humanists, but like many others, began to wonder if we could ever return to an idea 
of individuality based on an intrinsically pure and good 'Man': '[S]euls des coeurs 
tout a fait purs peuvent separer sans douleur ni regret Ie pur de l'impur, les coeurs 
moins purs restent attaches a l'un et a l'autre. ,so 
The noble idea of an individual existing within society and yet free from ideological 
contamination and pure of thought seemed implausible after the atrocious events of 
the War. Thus what Althusser questioned was not 'man', but 'Man', asking: 
'Comment eriger l'Homme avec un grand H, comme mesure de valeurs, sachant 
desormais ce dont il a ete capable?,sl 
The aim of structuralism, therefore, was to question the existence of an authentic pre-
social man. Althusser looked for the pure heart and the independent self but instead 
he found a subjectivity mediated within a necessarily overdetermined social context. 
Althusserians intended to replace a concept of man as the unified centre of history 
with the study of structures as the unconscious foundations of historical change. So 
that, Althusserism wanted not to kill the subject but to resituate it by removing it from 
the centre of social inquiry. Similarly, Althusser did not kill the author but rather 
attempted to show that it is impossible for the author to be the' sole determinailt of 
textual meaning. This does not remove the notion of responsibility but rather stresses 
its complex nature. Althusser, like de Man, had no nalve belief in any harmony at the 
beginning of things, and, like de Man, was attacked because of an assertive use of 
97 
Chapter 3 
language to state the divisions inherent in language. Althusser is thus attacked at the 
precise point where he performs the dilemma of any theory, his own included. 
Throughout his life it may be remarked that Althusser attempted to retreat into an 
organised, one might instead say institutionalised, space: the army, hospital, even the 
Ecole Normale. However, where he might have attempted to resituate himself 
physically, to live on borderlines within society, at no time did he, or could he, 
attempt the impossible - to live outside society. Althusser desired retreat rather than 
escape.82 Nor do his journals suggest that he believed the purely contemplative author 
either possible or desirable: 'L'erreur des philosophes ancien en general a ete de 
penser sans vivre ou de penser comme si on ne vivait pas' .83 
His early works bear witness to a suspicion of any ,york which claims to be the result 
of a purely objective vision.84 In his early journals Althusser called himself 'un petit 
artisan rural' - a producer of knowledge using rough tools to invent ideas. Here 
theoretical labour enjoys an equivalent status with manual labour, not a position of 
dominance within an asymmetrical relationship as suggested by Clarke.8s In journals 
written as early as 1937, and thus prior to his joining the p.e.F. and possibly 
entertaining the sordid ambitions outlined by Clarke, Althusser formulated a theory of 
philosophy with production at its centre.86 Already the 'story' constructed by the 
debate to establish the motivation behind the oeuvre begins to collapse if one can 
locate the core of Althusserism - the concept of production - in texts written a decade 
before Althusser's involvement with the Communist Party. 
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3.4. Reading Rousseau 
It is here that I would like to look at Althusser's reading of Rousseau's Social 
Contract, a reading which will deconstruct the spatial metaphor which is such a 
feature of the anti-Althusserian critique. Hopefully, the reading will discuss concepts 
which problematise any debate which would kill the amicable author in order to 
resurrect a realist. A series of questions must be answered if I seek a response to the 
criticisms of the debate and I propose to answer the following questions by turning to 
Althusser's reading of Rousseau: 
1: Does Althusser initiate the death of the subject within a dishonest and disinterested 
theory which leaves no room for humanity? 
2: If so, does Althusser (a)void subjectivity in order to conceal a gUilty secret? This 
secret could be ambition, the desire to appease the p.e.F. or insanity. Indeed, one 
could substitute a chain of secrets or crimes to fill the gap that the story demands. 
3: Following on from this, we must ask if Althusser's is a specifically dishonest 
philosophy? 
Early on in his writing Althusser exhibited a deep understanding of the dilemmas 
inherent in any philosophy. A philosophical discourse must partake of ideological 
elements: 'Le probleme de tous les problemes philosophiques (et politiques et 
militaires) que de savoir comment on peut bien sortir d'un cercle tout en y restant.,87 
How can we leave a circle whilst remaining within it? The circle here is the closed 
space of an ideological empiricism and the question of how to escape it whilst 
remaining within its confines was to' fascinate and trouble Althusser throughout his 
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life. I will show that his engagement with this question stems from his reading of 
Rousseau. Althusser refuses to accept structuralism's role in initiating the 'death of 
Man'. He looks instead to the Renaissance for the birth of a theoretical anti-
humanism, stating that it was his early apprenticeship in the texts of the 18th Century 
and, more specifically, a study of Rousseau, which led to contemporary Althusserism: 
L'homme n'est plus defmi en soi des la Renaissance [",J, La tombe conceptuelle de 
l'homme est philosophiquement que Ie jeune Althusser se contente d'arpenter avec la 
scrupuleuse fidelite des enthousiasmes de jeunesses88, 
Althusser's most sustained discussion of Rousseau appears as an essay on the Social 
Contract entitled ''The Discrepancies".89 Althusser, here offers an extremely rigorous 
reading of the theoretical inconsistencies in Rousseau's text whilst always bearing two 
points in mind - firstly, that Rousseau was aware of these discrepancies and 'sign-
posted' them within an extremely rigorously written' text and secondly, that all theory, 
his own included, functions because of the existence of these necessary discrepancies 
and, to this extent, all theory is fictional. 
The social contract within the Social Contract is a verbal construct. It can only allude 
to the problems inherent in its structure through a series of wordplays which Althusse~ 
will call 'arbitrary truths' .'" For Althusser, social contract theory and all theory 
functions due to this internal play of discrepancies. These discrepancies are 
simultaneously concealed and revealed in order to enable the contract to function as 
theory. For Althusserthe theoretical 'gaps' detennine subsequent readings and, ~ore 
importantly these subsequent interpretations -including his own - should give 
evidence of the 'necessary existence of these discrepancies' .90 
The Social Contract poses the ultimate question for Althusser: 'How can man unite 
with all and remain free?,91 'Free' must here mean independent in the fullest sense -
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autonomous, unattached, objective, non-partisan, both inside and outside of society. 
If, before socialisation, the human animal had. no particular self-interest it was 
because he remained unopposed to other men through necessary social ties but, after 
socialisation, individuals become trapped in relations as a result of their own 
activities. Rousseau's text interests Althusser because it turns to theory for its solution 
rather than looking to solve man's predicament from an 'outside' vantage point. 
There is no solution possible which might introduce an element external to that field, 
'no transcendental solution, no recourse to a third party, be it God or Chance' .92 
Rousseau's solution is, in fact, an essentially judicial contract which would establish a 
civil and social state. However, the contract proves to be a highly ambiguous 
structure because its central clause demands a paradox, it demands the 'total 
alienation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community' .93 
The people are meant to give, not sell, themselves and their rights to the community. 
Such total alienation is inconceivable and illegitimate yet, as Althusser notes, it is the 
'single clause in Rousseau's Social Contract' .94 The remedy of this problem lies in its 
very excess - forced alienation will become free and voluntary through the first 
discrepancy written into the contract. 
If there are always two recipient parties (R.P.'s) in any contract - here the individual 
and the community - the 'mystery' of the mechanism here, in Rousseau's social 
contract, lies in the unique nature of the second R.P. In nonnal con"tract 
circumstances, both R.P. 's should exist prior to and external to t~e contract, but here 
the second R.P. is the product or object of the contract. That is, the community, or 
second R.P., exists only because of the voluntary alienation of the individual who 
constitutes the frrst R.P .. This marks the first discrepancy in Rousseau's text, where 
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'the very solution of the contract is inscribed in one of its conditions' .9S Rousseau's 
language, according to Althusser, both masks and signals the discrepancy. Rousseau 
says that 'the people only contracts with itselr ,96 but he signals the discrepancy as he 
allows it to function: 'Each individual is making a contract, so to speak, with 
himself. ,97 
For Althusser, the discrepancy is simultaneously admitted and negated in the 'so to 
speak'. More importantly, Althusser writes that the existence of such discrepancies 
are necessary to all theory and are acceptable so long as they are signalled to the 
reader.98 Rousseau's Social Contract then, becomes a text about the impossible 
possibility of the contract and the fictional status of theory: 
If the 'Social Contract' is not a contract but the (fictional) act of constitution of the second 
R.P. (that is, the coup de force of the solution), in the same way it can be said that the 
Discrepancy is not what Rousseau says about it (its concept never being anything in 
Rousseau but the denegation of its fait accompli), but the act of constitution of Rousseau's 
philosophy itself, of its theoretical object and logic.99 
Close on the heels of this first discrepancy another emerges. Any contract need~ an 
arbitrator- a third man that might negotiate in a conflict between the two R.P.' s. 
However, the existence of this third man would suppose that such a person could exist 
outside the civil society o(the contractors. Such a possibility immediately collapses 
the possibility of this society of 'free' men because it allows that a civil society might 
leave outside itself 'the very condition of its own existence: that third man' .100 Thus, 
there can be no third man, especially because for Rousseau, as we have already noted, 
there is not even a second man, but just one man contracting with himself. Rousseau's 
contract allows a non-contract to function as a contract because, via another 
discrepancy, total alienation converts to advantageous exchange. According to 
Althusser, Rousseau can work this conversion precisely because man is selfish and, in 
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thinking of the generality, considers only himself. Thus, 'the individual interest (is) 
forced into the generality of equality' .101 
This is the site of the second discrepancy. There is a difference between what is 
termed general or universal interest and what is known as particular or private 
interest. According to Rousseau it does not and cannot follow that the deliberations 
of the people are ever general, that is, their actions are never universally motivated.102 
The idea of a general will rests upon the possibility of independent thought: 
If, when the people, being furnished with adequate information, held its deliberations, the 
citizens had no communications one with another, the grand total of the small differences 
would always give the general will, and the decision would always be good.103 
However, any 'enlightenment' of the people depends on the absolute absence of any 
ideological elements within the information offered: 'There must be no factions or 
partial associations in the state such as classes, orders, parties or groups [ ... ] otherwise 
no longer general but partial will.' 104 
Ultimately Rousseau writes that the general will is only able to express itself if each 
citizen is allowed to think only his own thoughts. lOS Ideology must be eradicated. 
However, the necessity for a third discrepancy in Rousseau's text reveals the 
., 
impossibility of realising this disappearance of particular interest. Factions must not 
exist if man is to be free in thought, but factions do exist. For Althusser, this is an 
absolute point of resistance, a simple irreducible fact which confronts the Social' 
Contract with its first real problem after a series of surmountable obstacles. ·Here 
Rousseau's theory encounters a discrepancy with respect to the real when it 
acknowledges the impossibility of a universal will based on real, objective 
knowledge. 106 Rousseau reveals the ideological concepts which underpin all the 
theoretical spaces of his contract. The final phase of the text attempts an avoidance of 
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this reality. People must be enlightened and factions must be eradicated. He 
instigates what Althusser calls a 'flight forward in ideology' .107 This flight forward 
would ensure a permanent moral reform to restore the purity of individual 
consciousness. However, this reform depends upon a necessarily impure education. 
Also, this flight forward is aimed at protecting the individual from the contagion of so 
called particular interests, and because of this, this flight forward can have no end. 
We recognise here the same theoretical predicament that Rousseau toyed with 
throughout Emile -see Chapter 2 - when· he wondered who might educate the 
educators when what is at stake is the objectivity of thought? We are caught in a 
circle. Rousseau knows this and indeed one could say that all his texts only ever write 
about and around this theoretical circle. On the question of escaping this circle, 
Althusser believes that the only possible response·to such a predicament is a stylistic 
one: 
If there is one recourse, but one of a different kind [it is] a transfer this time, the transfer of 
the impossible theoretical solution into the alternative to theory, literature. The admuable 
'fictional triumph' of an unprecedented writing (ecriture) [ ... and] the admirable failure of an 
unprecedented theory: the Social Contract. lOB 
I would argue that Althusser's entire oeuvre concerns itself with the issues raised in 
Rousseau's Social Contract. Later on, in his text Reading Capital, Althusser hoped 
that his own theory had, to some extent, paralleled Rousseau's and managed to be 
triumphant within the theoretical circle: 
If, without leaving it, we 'avoided turning around in this circle', it is because this circle. is not 
the closed circle of ideology, but the circle perpetually opened up by the closures 
themselves.109 
There is room within the circle to ask questions and seek answers even if these are not 
the ultimate question and the ultimate answer. It is not futile that concepts should run 
side by side with reality, approaching but never meeting. It is the idea of approach 
which concerns both Rousseau and Althusser; in the oscillation between the 
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temptation to reject empiricism and the renunciation of that temptation as impossible, 
writing begins. It is this writing, this approach concerned not with definitions but 
with developments, which concerns Althusser. 
It is right to say that the idea of self was central to Althusser's work and that his 
lifelong commitment to Catholicism revealed a concern over the authentic nature of 
the self. llo To be truly authentic the self must, on all levels, be independent. Very 
early on in his life Althusser revealed a deep understanding of how all discourses, 
including philosophical ones, necessarily include ideological elements: 'Le probleme 
de tous problemes philosophiques [ ... ] que de savoir comment on peut bien sortir d'un 
circle tout en y restant.' 111 
If the circle is the closed space of an ideological empiricism Althusser, like Rousseau 
in both his Emile and the Social Contract, admits that the only possible solution is a 
stylistic one: to use language to create the illusion of having left this space. ll2 
However, this must not mean the 'dishonest' disguising of our ideological 
predicament behind the mask of an objective rhetoric. Althusser is at pains constantly' 
to emphasise the impossibility of theorising - reconstituting the whole - without 
recourse to ideology. The choice is simple: one can think the totality and ignore the 
thinker or think the thinker and destroy the totality.ll3 Althusser, like Rousseau, 
would say that the solution lies not in some 'au-del?J' - in some Transcendental 
Signified - but in thinking the impossible. In thinking both the totality and the 
thinker behind that totality Althusser espoused a fictional response to the dilemma. 
In all his thought we can identify the workings of Rousseau's Social Contract. 
Specifically Althusser's concept of the subject is Rousseauian. The anti-Althusserian 
debate believes that Althusser uniquely killed the subject in order to kill his own, 
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guilty subjectivity. Rather, Althusser, in a re-reading of Rousseau, resituates the 
subject. Althusser writes against the notion of a universal human subject and rejects 
the transcendental subject characterised by philosophical humanism because the idea 
of a timeless human subject ignores the distinctions between social classes and any 
determination by historical and class situations.114 Importantly, Althusser does not 
dismiss a moral belief in the importance of human beings but dismisses the notion -
central to Western philosophy - that it is possible to isolate a transcendental subject 
who cannot be identified with the point of view of any concrete, historically and 
socially defined group but who represents what is common and essential to human 
beings as such.lls There cannot be, for either Althusser or Rousseau, a meta-social 
individual. Thus, human behaviour is discernible, not in terms of intention, but in 
terms of the practices which involve humans. Whilst anti-humanist in a certain sense, 
this is not the type of mechanistic determinism against which the debate reacts: 
Althusser does not reduce human motivation to a pre-social economic self-interest 
even if he knows it can include the pursuit of economic ends. Even if the driving 
force of social change in Althusser's marxism is something beyond the individual and 
their conscious intentions this something can only be accounted for in terms' of 
collective human activity. He does not destroy the individual but recognises its very 
definite limitations. Humans still make their own history, just not in terms of some 
'common humanity'. This understanding of Althusser, in the light of his use of 
Rousseau, significantly problematises a debate which would cite Althusser as 'author 
of the death of the subject and, consequently, as the author of his own death as author. 
Indeed it would seem that the entire Althusserian oeuvre could be read as a meditation 
upon, or re-reading of, Rousseau's oeuvre and it is to this extent that Althusser's 
subjectivity disappears within the text. In his autobiography The Future Lasts a Long 
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Time, Althusser wrote extensively about the issue of authorial accountability where he 
concluded: 
When you are aware that you alone are responsible [ ... ] for your truthfulness as a philosopher 
[ ... ] surely the least you can do as a sign of that honesty is to use language in keeping with the 
nature of your activity [ ... ], and [to] express yourself in the way which conveys directly what 
you are thinking and doing?1l6 
Althusser clearly states here that language should be used to reveal the philosopher in 
the work as thinker and 'doer'. Like Rousseau in the Social Contract, language must 
be used to signal the writerliness of theory. Obviously I must here turn to Althusser's 
concept of practice. For Althusser, Marxist philosophy is the 'theory of the history of 
the production of knowledge'.117 Indeed, according to Althusser, all levels of social 
existence are the sites of distinct practices. These practices are simply processes of 
transformation of a given raw material into a determinate product effected by a 
determinate human labour using a means of production. I IS Theory, or science, is a 
practice which brings togeth~r thought power and the means of theoretical production, 
to produce from concepts, representations and intuitions, a knowledge product.1l9 
How then can one support critics who would argue that for Althusser theory is 
autonomous and exterior to social conditions? Althusser's concept of practice clearly 
states otherwise - the _raw material in the .knowledge practice is, according to 
Althusser, already worked upon and therefore, never really raw.120 The raw material is 
already a product, an interpretation if you like. For Althusser, the raw material could 
be said to be the Rousseauian oeuvre, so that his theory is no more than are-working 
of this material. Althusser's concept of theoretical production openly admits to its 
implication within a prior ideological discourse as he clearly restates Rousseau's 
belief, voiced in the Social Contract, that one cannot think one's own thoughts. In 
order to further this interpretation of the Althusserian oeuvre, I will now take a closer 
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look at Reading Capital, probably his most famous work, to see how it looks to the 
Social Contract for inspiration. 
Reading Capital: re-reading Rousseau 
Althusser quite clearly states that his is not an innocent reading and to this extent he 
and the debate are in agreement. However, his position is further elaborated, his 
might be a guilty reading, but so are all readings: 
[A] philosophical reading of Capital is quite the opposite of an innocent reading. It is a 
guilty reading, but not one that absolves its crime on confessing it. On the contrary, it takes 
the responsibility for its crime as a 'justified crime' and defends it by proving its necessity'.121 
Just as in Rousseau's Social Contract we are here up against the philosophical 
necessity of what we can call a 'guilty' reading if by guilty we mean ideological. And 
Althusser's Reading Capital is ideological, if, .by ideological, one is pointing out a 
discrepancy of theory with respect to the real. But, rather than implicating only 
himself in this gUilt, Althusser, through a reading of Rousseau, would extend this 
necessary 'guilt' to all philosophy. The debate would have it that only Althusser is 
guilty and this because of specific biographical episodes in his life. However, the 
purity of the objective discourse is here written as elusive to all due to an inherent 
inadequacy of theory with respect to the real. The only truly responsible attitude - and 
the theme of responsibility recurs throughout this text - is to openly admit to one's 
engagement in an ideological discourse within the text itself through an 'honest' 
relationship with the reader. There is no privileged space, 'no 'outside' where one 
might secretly write from and where one might write in innocence: there is no third 
man. Althusser attempts to deconstruct the innocence of every guilty reading which 
would rely on the 'immediate' reading of essence in existence: 
The yearning for a reading at sight, for Galileo's Great Book of the World, is itself older than 
all science, [and] is still silently pandering to the religious fantasies of epiphany, parousia, 
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and the fascinating myth of the scriptures, in which the body of Truth, dressed in its Words, 
is the Book: the Bible.lz2 
Althusser's texts measure and exhibit a distance (ciecollage) from the real. We should 
not expect to be able to read the 'truth' in an apparently manifest or clear discourse 
because the text of history is not simply one in which the Logos speaks. Rather, the 
text is a notation of the effect of a structure of structures and any belief to the contrary 
is merely an oversight where sighting is concerned. Knowledge is not immediate 
vision, it is production and thus subject to structural limitations. If science can only 
pose problems within the terrain of definite conditions of possibility, so that any 
'sighting' within this terrain is not the act of an individual subject's 'vision' but rather 
it is the terrain or field which sees itself in its own definitions, then, similarly, the 
'unseen' or unknown within a scientific discourse is just the problematic's non-vision 
of its non-objects. Importantly, Althusser opposes seductive spatial metaphors which 
would enable one to think the terrain literally as a space limited by another space 
outside of it. 123 Here is no theoretical space occupied by an author outside. a non-
theoretical, which is to say, a 'reader' space. It is, crucially, in this rejection of t~e 
possibility of any spatial hierarchy, that we locate resistance to a debate which relies 
on the fabrication of a ,~tory about Althusser's desire to inhabit a purely contemplative 
or theoretical space estranged from and opposed to collective experience: 
This other space is also in the fust space which contains it as its own denegation [ ... ]. In other 
words, all its limits are internal, it carries its outside inside it.124 
Because knowledge exists only in thought this does not mean that theory is produced 
in a vacuum, rather, thought itself is an ideological space. l25 To this extent thought 
only differs from ideology to the (limited) extent that it recognises itself as ideology. 
It would be naIve to imagine that Althusser ever believed theory to be the product of a 
theoretical labour produced outside a class context, there are just different ways of 
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being within ideology. If the working classes engage in the class struggle through 
physical labour, then the theoretician engages in it through intellectual labour. But it 
is crucial to collapse the notion of any specific hierarchy at work here - Althusser 
does not exalt the mind over the body and so condone an intellectual ~litism. Indeed 
he deconstructs the boundaries separating the two realms to insist that thinking is 
itself a physical labour and that his contact with Marxism engages the body.126 It is 
the body which is capable of thinking and to this extent theoretical and manual labour 
exist as parallel struggles. As Althusser writes: 'Everyone is not a philosopher 
spontaneously, but everyone may become one.' 127 
This differs from Gramsci's statement in his Prison Notebooks, which is often cited by 
the debate as evidence of Gram sci 's more egalitarian approach to philosophy. For 
Gramsci all men are unconsciously philosophers. l28 Yet, in truth, ideology has little to 
do with 'consciousness', even if this term were not highly ambiguous. Ideology is a 
system of representations imposed upon men but not via their consciousness. The 
crucial difference for Althusser is time - the working class individual has no time. 
Even Seidler, who criticises Althusser for leaving the masses ignorant to the workings 
of ideology, has to describe the proletariat as 'virtual slavers] to the routine of 
assembly line production' where it can be 'difficult to give thought to individual 
wants and needs' .129 The only difference for Althusser is that the philosopher works 
with history and not with nature. In this sense all men might become philosophers 
because philosophers do not exist 'naturally': one is not born a philosopher just as one 
is not born a coal miner. There is no foundation within Althusser's work for an elitist 
concept of philosophy. To 'give' Marxist theory to the proletariat is to give them a 
socially contextualised product just as they too offer products in exchange. And, as I 
have noted, Althusser does not believe his product (science) to be a 'pure' product. 
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All sciences, his own included, must necessarily be expressed in the approximations 
of an ideological, quotidien language and Althusser echoes Rousseau's Social 
Contract when he admits that the raw material in the production of theory is ~already 
complex' , 
a structure which combines together sensuous, technical and ideological elements: 
knowledge never, as empiricism desperately demands it should, confronts a pure object 
which is then identical to the real object.130 
Here again I locate a resistance to the debate which would separate theory from 
ideology. Althusser clearly writes that theory uses an ideological raw material. In 
this way, Althusser combats a discourse which would place him, as some sort of 
autonomous and elitist scientist, on the outside of an ideological and hence, 
proletarian inside. Citing Pierre Macharey, Althusser stresses that .'every science is a 
science of the ideology'.131 There is, of course, a way in which theory is autonomous, 
but it is not because in its conception theory remains outside societal and ideological 
conditions, rather it is because theory looks to itself for its criteria of validity. But at 
no point does Althusser make claims for his theory beyond claims he makes for any 
theory. Indeed he persistently emphasises the limits of theory and refuses to resort to 
a spatial metaphor which might enable him to duplicitously 'escape' the confines of 
any linguistic theory: 
The whole history of the 'theory of knowledge' in Western philosophy [ ... J shows us that this 
problem of knowledge is a closed space, that is, a vicious circle (the vicious circle of the 
mirror relation of ideological recognition). It's high point of consciousness and honesty was 
reached precisely with the philosophy which was prepared to take theoretical responsibility 
for the necessary existence of this circle, that is, to think. it as essential to its ideological 
undertaking, however, this did not make it leave the circle, did not deliver it from its 
ideological captivity, nor could the philosopher who has tried to think. in an openness (which 
seems to be only the ideological non-closure of the closure) [ ... J leave the circle.132 
It is as if Althusser knew the terms of the debate which would later surface against his 
work. Althusser clearly collapses the terms of a debate which would believe that he 
could ever have adopted a position outside the circle because the outside of the circle -
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either in its exterior or in its profundity - is always the outside of that circle and 
therefore belongs to that circle as its 'repetitions'.133 Althusser's theory, I stress, 
always acknowledged these repetitions in its repetition of Rousseau. 
3.5. Non-Lieu 
After the crime of November 1980, the verdict of non-lieu - a legal death - opened up 
a space in which previous criticisms of the author could resurface as personalised, 
biographical evaluations of the 'author-in-the-work', armed with the 'evidence' of the 
crime. The crime gave fresh impetus to a debate which sought a story about the 
author in order to contaminate an entire oeuvre. Before the crime stories emerged 
about the petty ambitions of Althusser; about the violent ego behind the philosophy. 
Importantly, the myths of violence, ambition, immorality and elitism were not 
challenged and dispelled by a close reading of the work. Such a close reading would 
have better understood an oeuvre which attempts, according to Rousseau's plan, to 
establish the writer on a more honest footing with the reader through the production 
of an openly 'ficti?nal' and writerly philosophy which necessarily partakes of a 
'guilty' indulgence in ideological moments. It was an unwillingness to read Althusser 
closely, - and to read Rousseau at all - which led to the debate, as it stood prior to -, 
1980, remaining profoundly unchallenged. 
This unchallenged indictment of the author which criticised his anti-humanism, the 
death of the subject, his guilt, violence and immorality, his elitism and desire for 
autonomy- lent credence to the more virulent and worryingly policing anti-
Althusserian polemic after November 1980. The strains of speculation intensified and 
the story of the crime lent an 'air of truth' to any discussion about a possibly sinister 
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motivation behind the work. Thus it was that the main criticisms levelled against the 
oeuvre, left unchallenged, translated into an attack which could fabricate a story about 
Althusser's mental illness to damningly temiinate the Althusserian discourse. The 
terms of the earlier debate resurfaced, only now their criticisms of the oeuvre were 
supported by an 'evidence' which could prove, beyond doubt, that both philosopher 
and philosophy should be banished to the 'no-place' of the non-lieu. 
This chapter attempts to challenge a reading that would look to the author's life for 
evidence of textual meaning. If it is true that the work is always more than the work -
that it is also the subject who writes that ~ork - should we not seek to complicate that 
subjectivity rather than attempt to fix that subject within an identity which we will 
always be able to oppose if only because it is 'other' to our own identity. On a more 
specific level I have tried to challenge a reading which would reduce the oeuvre to a 
production generated entirely in order to suppress a, somehow, abnormal subjectivity. 
Where Althusser's itinerary has been variously traced to this concealment of a guilty 
subjectivity, I have retraced the itinerary to the work of Rousseau, concentrating, in 
this chapter, on his Social Contract as a text which seeks to re-examine the very 
concept of the gUilty text if guilty here means non-objective. Rousseau's, and 
therefore Althusser's, generalisation of the concept of gUilt in a society where no man 
can be free in thought, complicates and perhaps explains a debate which is intent on 
distancing itself from an oeuvre which would seek to implicate all of us in its 
construction. I leave the last words to Althusser: 
We must go further than the unmentioned presence of the' thoughts of the living author to the 
presence of his potential thoughts, to his problematic, that is, to the constitutive unity of the 
effective thoughts that make up the domain of the existing ideological field within which a 
particular author must settle accounts in his own thought.l34 
113 
Chapter 3 
1 See K.S Karol, "The Tragedy of the Althussers", New Left Review, No.124, pp.93-95. 
2 Althusser, Louis, The Future Lasts a Long Time ([as L'Avenir Dure Longtemps, suivi de Les Faits, 
1992] ed. Olivier Corpet and Yann Moulier Boutang, trans. Richard Veasey, London: Chatto and 
Windus, 1992), p.xi 
3 ibid., p.xi 
4 Etienne Balibar, "The non-Contemporaneity of Althusser" in The Althusserian Legacy, ed. E Anne 
Kaplan and Michael Sprinker, (London: Verso, 1993), p.1 
$ ibid., p.1 
6 Most of the material used here was assembled using the Althusser archive established at L'[nstitut 
Memoires de l'Edition Contemporaine (hereafter L'I.M.E.C.) in Paris, April 1997. 
7 See France-Soir, Le Monde, Le Parisien articles from around the time of the murder for descriptions 
of Althusser's "mysterious" nature. 
8 Minute, punning on Althusser's position as teacher at the Ecole Normal Superieure called him 
"L'anormal superieure". 
9 I am obviously referring here to Alice Kaplan's comments on de Man in the previous chapter. For 
examples of this question being asked see especially the article in Le Soir, 22/1111980 written by 
Fran~ois Held and the France Soir article by M. Dutourd: 
Pendant 32 ans, plusieurs promotions de normaliens ont eu pour 'maitre ~ penser' un fou 
attenit de psychose maniaco-d~pressive.· La plupart de ces normaliens sont devenus profs et 
ont, sans doute, propag~ l'enseignement de leur 'maitre ~ penser' ~ des milliers d'~coliers et 
d'~tudiants. On peut dire que ceux-ci ont ~te forme par les disciples d'un fou criminel. 
10 Le Quotidien de Paris, 1811111980: article by D. Jamet. 
11 Le Quotidien de Paris, 18/1111980: article by D. Jamet. See also Pierre Sambre in the same issue; 
in Le Quotidien de Paris, 19/1111980, Pierre Daix writes on this subject. 
12 Le Quotidien de Paris, 19/1111980: article by Patrick Resten 
13 'Ab, il a craque lui aussi[ ... ] cette vie n'est pas fmalement tr~s saine[ ... ]. On constate beaucoup 
d'intemement, surtout du cote de la recherche.' (Le Quotidien de Paris, 18/11/1980). 
14 Le Quotidien de Paris, 18/1111980: article by D. Jamet. 
15 Le Quotidien de Paris, 19/1111980: article by Patrick Resten. 
16 Farran, Jean, Journal de Dimanche (undated copy in the L'I.M.E.C. archive) 
17 Minute, 28 Nov.-2 Dec. (newspaper page references not given in the archive) 
18 Minute, 28 Nov.-2 Dec. 
19 Minute, 28 Nov.-2 Dec. 
20 See also R. Maggiori in Societe, Pierre Daix in Le Quotidien de Paris, 19/1111980, and DJamet in 
Le Quotidien de Paris, 18/1111980. All the writers here would destroy Althusser's work because of 
his comportement prive. . 
21 "Marx and Murder", by Mark Lilla, T.L.S. No.4669, Sept.25, 1992, P.3-4. This text is cited by 
David M. Halperin ill Saint=Foucault; Towards a Gay Hagiography (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), p.132. 
22 Halperin, David M., Saint=Foucault, p.132 
23 "Marx and Murder", by Mark Lilla, T.L.S. No.4669, Sept.25, 1992, P.3-4, cited by David M. 
Halperin in Saint=Foucault, p132 
24 ibid. 
2S ibid. 
26 Saint=Foucault, p.133. . 
27 Finn, Geraldine, Why Althusser Killed his Wife: Essays on Discourse and Violence (New Jersey: 
Humanities Press, 1996), pp.5-6 
28 See Simon Clarke's "Introduction" to One-Dimensional Marxism (ed. Simon Clarke, London: 
Allison and Busby, 1980). . 
29 Thompson, E.P., The Poverty o/Theory (London: Penguin, 1978), p.182 
30 ibid., p.152 
31 Geras, "Louis Althusser: an Account and an Assessment", New Left Review, No.71, 1972, p.65. 
32 ibid., p.77 
33 ibid., p.80 
34 ibid., p.80, citing Louis Althusser's contribution to Reading Capital, Althusser's joint-work with 
Etienne Balibar (trans. B. Brewster, New York: Random House, 1970), pp.l09-110. 
114 
Chapter 3 
3S ibid., p.81 
36 ibid., p.83 
37 ibid., p.83 
38 ibid., p.83 
39 ibid., p.84 
40 ibid., p.84 
41 ibid., p.85 
42 ibid., p.85 
43 Althusser, Louis, Reading Capital, p.79 
44 Althusser, Louis, Reading Capital, p.131. 
45 Geras, "Louis Althusser: an Account and an Assessment", New Left Review, no.71 (1972), p.86 
46 Glucksmann, Andre, "A Ventriloquist Structuralism", New Left Review, no.71, (1972) p.88 
47 ibid., p.68 
48 ibid., p.68 
49 ibid., p.74 
so ibid., p.80 . 
51 Seidler, Victor, "Trusting Ourselves: Marxism, Human Needs and Sexual Politics", in One-
Dimensional Marxism (ed. Simon Clarke, London: Allison and Busby, 1980), p.103 
S2 ibid., p.103 
S3 ibid., p.107 
54 Gramsci, Antonio, ed. and trans!., Hoare, QuIDtin, and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, Selections From 
the Prison Notebooks (London:, Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), p.323 
55 Seidler, Victor, "Trusting Ourselves: Marxism, Human Needs and Sexual Politics", p.113 
56 ibid., p.114 
57 ibid., p.114 
58ibid., p.120 
s9ibid., p.128 
6Oibid., p.129 
61ibid., p.148 
62ibid., p.152 
63ibid., p.150 
64 Clarke, Simon, "Introduction" to One-Dimensional Marxism, p.13 
6S ibid., p.14 
66 ibid., p.14 
67 ibid., p.14 
68 ibid., p.16 
69 ibid., p.20 
70 ibid., p.28 
71 ibid., p.63 
72 ibid., p.63 
73 ibid., p.34 
74 ibid., p.35 
75 ibid., p.38 
76 ibid., p.63 
77 See Perry Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism (London: New Left Books, 1977). 
78 See Smith, Stephen B., Reading Althusser: An Essay on Structural Marxism (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 23. 
79 ibid., p.36. As Smith points out here, this in itself was a 'redoubtable accomplishment' since 
Marx's early writings on this subject were, at that time, undiscovered. 
80 Yann Moulier Boutang in wuis Althusser - une Biographie: La Formation du My the (1918-1956) 
(Paris: Bernard Grassel, 1992), p.251, cites Althusser's then-unpublished text: "Du Contenu Dans La 
Pens~e de G.W.F.Hegel". 
81ibid., p.251 . 
82 ibid., p.16. Boutang writes of Althusser's 'quete deliber~e de l' anonym dans la r~traite du couvent 
de la pens~e' . 
83 Althusser, Louis, Les Cahiers Journaliers, iv., Jeudi. 20 Mai, 1937 (stored at L'I.M.E.C.). 
84 Moulier Boutang, Yann, wuis Althusser - Une Biographie, p.130. 
115 
Chapter 3 
as ibid., p.145 
86 Althusser, Louis, Les Cahiers Joumaliers, 1937-1945, stored at L'I.M.E.C. 
87 Moulier Boutang, Yann, Louis Althusser - Une Biographie, pp.173-174, and Althusser's "The 
Facts", in The Future Lasts a Long Time, pp. 312-3 
88 Moulier Boutang, Yann, Louis Althusser - Une Biographie, p.260 
89 "The Discrepancies" is taken from a lecture series delivered at the Ecole Normale Superieure 
between 1965 and 1966, and is published in Althusser's Politics and History: Montesquieu, 
Rousseau, Hegel and Marx (trans. B. Brewster, London: New Left Books, 1972). 
90 Althusser, Louis, "The Discrepancies", p.1l4 
91 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, The Social Contract I.vi.p.90 
92 Althusser, "The Discrepancies", p.123 
93 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, The Social Contract I.vi.p12 
94 Althusser, ''The Discrepancies", p.126 
9S ibid., p.123 
96 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, Emile (penguin edn.), pA25 
97 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, The Social Contract, I.vii.pp.13-14 
98 Althusser, "The Discrepancies", p.l33. For Althusser it is enough to read Rousseau closely to see 
that his contract is not a contract. 
99 Althu&ser, "The Discrepancies", p.133 
100 ibid., p.138 
101 ibid., p.143 
102 See Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, The Social Contract Il.iii.p.22 
103 ibid., II.iii.p.23 
104 Althusser, "The Discrepancies", p.150 
lOS Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, The Social Contract Il.iii.p.23 
106 Althusser, "The Discrepancies", p.l51 
107 ibid., p.151 
108 ibid., p.151 
109 Althusser, Louis, Reading Capital. This sentiment closes Althusser's contribution to the text 
110 Moulier Boutang, Yann, (Louis Althusser - Une Biographie p.130) writes that this 'souci 
d'authenticite' marks all his work. 
111 ibid., pp.173-174. See also Althusser's "The Facts", pp.312-3 
112 See letter no.l9 in L'I.M.E.C. archive. 
11l Moulier Boutang, Yann (Louis Althusser - Une Biographie, p.262) recalls Hegel: 'D'un cote nous 
avons realite sans totalite, de l'autre, totalite sans realite' . 
114 See Althusser, Louis, "An Interview on Lenin and Philosophy", in New Left Review (London: New 
Left Books, 1971), for his ideas on this and echoes of the Social Contract. 
lIS See Eric Matthews, Twentieth-Century French Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 
1996), p.128. ., 
116 Althusser, Louis, The Future Lasts a Long Time, p.175 
117 See Reading Capital, pp. 44,56,75,89,157. 
118 ibid., p.52 
119 ibid., p.27; n.9, pAl. 
120 ibid., ppA5, 59 
121 ibid., p.14 
122 ibid., p.16 
123 ibid., p.25 
124 ibid., Reading Cap ita I, pp.26-27 
12S ibid., pA2 
126 Althusser, Louis, The Future Lasts a Long Time, p.213 
127 See Lenin and Philosophy, pp.15-25. 
128 See my previous fn.54, citing Gramsci in Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p.323 
129 Seidler, Victor, "Trusting Ourselves: Marxism, Human Needs and Sexual Politics", One-
Dimensional Marxism, p.109 
130 Reading Capital, p.43 . 
131 ibid., pA6, citing Pierre Macharey in Madness and Civilisation, (paris: P.U.F., p.63). 
116 
Chapter 3 
132 ibid., p.53, Althusser is here obviously referring to Rousseau, especially in the Social Contract, 
where he tries to assume this responsibility for the necessarily circular nature of theory and its 
ideological make-up. 
133 Althusser, Louis, Reading Capital, p.53. 
134ibid., p.14 
117 
Chapter 4 
CHAPTER FOUR 
INTENTION AND RESPONSIBILITY 
4.0. Introduction 
This chapter attempts two things; firstly, it aims to discuss the contribution that 
Rousseau, de Man and Derrida have made to the discourse surrounding the concept of 
slander. Both de Man and Derrida wrote on this subject in the year of 1967, tracing 
their discourse back to the same Rousseauian text: The Confessions.1 Secondly, it will 
examine the concepts of slander and scandal and their current usage in both legal and 
literary contexts. Following on from this the chapter will concentrate on the ethical 
ideas of responsibility and intention at the heart of our legal system, hoping that the 
implications of my reading will lead to a redefmition of slander and scandal 
particularly as it concerns any response to the 'literary scandals' surrounding the 
authors I am here concerned with. 
4.1. Definitions of slander 
Any examination of the word slander reveals its etymology to be inextricably linked 
to that of the word scandal. Indeed, it would seem that the two words were once 
118 
Chapter 4 
synonymous: both share the same root- the Latin scandalum, the Greek skandalon, 
and the French esclandre. Both slander and scandal are given as synonyms in the 
OED. which defines them as 'defamation~ by spoken word, look, sign or gesture,.2 
However, in our daily usage we consistently discern a difference between the two 
concepts where scandal, far from equating with slander, is rather its product. 
. A study of criminal law systems reveals an aporia at the heart of any consideration of 
the question of slander. French criminal law lacks any solid basis because Roman 
Law furnished no organised body of doctrine or analysis in this area. It was only by 
applying doctrines of the natural and inherent 'rights of Man' that any root concepts 
could be established. What results from this is a very subjective legal ideology which 
claims to derive social authenticity from the conscious experience of the subject. 
Interestingly for us, what does seem intractable in French criminal law is the validity 
of the confession as evidence of intention: 'The confession, though not provided for 
by any statutory text, is a recognised mode of proof, and almost impossible to 
impeach on the grounds of fraud or violence.,3 
Likewise, the Anglo-American legal system is rather ambiguous on the subject of 
slander. If written falsehoods are libels, spoken falsehoods are slanders. In America 
there is no provision under the First Amendment and civil libel seems mainly to be 
governed by Common Law rules of ambiguous and complicated origin.4 In the U.K. 
the general ruling is that action for slander lies if the plaintiff can prove that he has 
suffered special damage as a result of scandal. S 
What interests us here is the difference that grew up between the two concepts of 
slander and scandal. Legal definitions now appear to understand slander as verbal 
utterance or gesture whereas scandal is the product of this slander - a usage which has 
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repercussions for literary theory.6 So that two things are at work here: slander and 
scandal obviously no longer mean the same thing to us. The slander, as I have noted, 
is an abstraction (utterance, rum our, gestu~e) belonging to a past which, in order to be 
proven, concretised and made available in the present, must produce a scandal. It is 
the scandal as product which enables the existence of the slander to be proven. That 
is, in our current legal system, the scandal is textual and the slander (as gesture, 
movement, utterance) is outside of the text: "hors texte".7 It would thus seem that it 
became, at some stage in legal development, necessary to legitimise the possibility of 
slander by making it productive. This necessary production changed scandal from its 
synonymous status with slander into· something which was "literally" available and 
which might make the slander available by evidencing it. 
What this obviously results from is tpe legal and ethical necessity to make the law 
potent by sanctioning the possibility of the availability of intention. The law bases 
itself in the possibility of the hors texte and its availability through the confessional or 
scandalous text. This idea will be discussed further, however; I now wish to 
introduce those writers who, I believe, have attempted to redefine and re-synonymise 
the concepts of slander and scandal. 
Literary scandals 
Rousseau, de Man and Derrida have all written extensively on the subject of slander 
and scandal as well as appropriately being its victims. The link that binds these three 
men is something which I hope to discuss here: it is a textual link commonly known 
as Rousseau's Confessions. In 1762 the Social Contract and La Nouvelle Heloise 
were publicly burned in France and Geneva. Rousseau was widely denounced, went 
120 
Chapter 4 
into exile and wrote the Confessions. This text, a text written in and about scandalous 
contexts and where Rousseau scandalises himself, was to prove to be a most 
influential text for both de Man and Derrida. Their fust point of intersection came in 
1967 with Derrida's OfGrammatology and de Man's "Gauss Seminar". Both papers 
focused on Rousseau's Confessions as the authoritative text when discussing slander. 
Ten years later de Man's Allegories of Reading (hereafter Allegories) would also re-
read Rousseau's Confessions and, in 1988, Derrida would re-read de Man's 
Allegories. By then both de Man and Derrida would also have become victims of 
their own personal "scandals" which, in turn, would become the subject of Derrida's 
later texts.8 
Rousseau's Confessions, as I have already stated, were written at a time of scandal 
about scandal. Further texts written at the time of his exile reveal Rousseau's 
complex thoughts about reputation and the (non)availability of any true knowledge 
about the nature of another's intentions. To an admirer he wrote: 
In thanking you for thinking well of me, I nevertheless advise you, Sir, no longer to waste 
your time defending or praising me. All the good and evil one says about a man one does not 
know means little.9 
It is perhaps at this stage in Rousseau's discourse on scandal that de Man's interest 
was awakened. Paul de Man had an obvious interest in the subject throughout his 
career and in an early (1941) article entitled "Sur les Possibilites de la Critique", de 
Man defines a certain autonomy of both literary history and the author: 
Literature is an independent domain having a life and laws belonging only to it and which in 
no way depend on the philosophical or ethical contingencies stirring at its side. The least one 
can say is that the artistic values governing the world of letters 'do not merge with those of the 
Truth and the Good, and that whoever borrows his criteria from this region of human 
consciousness will be systematically mistaken in his judgements [ ... J. One does not have the 
right to condemn Gide as a novelist because his moral life was debatable [ ... J. A writer can 
be attacked for the inadequacies in his style, for sins against the laws of a genre he practises, 
but never for weaknesses or lacks in his moral personality.lO 
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Literary critics have a responsibility to the text only. The life of the artist must 
remain unavailable for comment. Later, in the "Gauss Seminar" of 1967, de Man 
would return to this subject revealing Rousseau as his precursor. In his lecture, 
"Rousseau and the Transcendence of Self' de Man discusses his early introduction to 
Rousseau, concentrating on the perpetuation of a central irony in Rousseau's work; 
that Rousseau might write a treatise on education and yet, foster out his own 
children. 11 From his earliest education then, de Man was sensitive to scandals 
surrounding the author-figure which might, in tum, render their texts scandalous. His 
interest in this subject continued to associate itself with the figure of Rousseau when 
de Man wrote about The Confessions in his Allegories of Reading12 and it is to this 
text that we now tum. 
Allegories initially examines the concept of the confession. The word confess, from 
the Latin confessare, means 'to speak fully' .13 De Man questions the possibility of a 
confession if that confession must offer a complete speech which would amount to a 
statement of the 'truth'. According to de Man, Rousseau is unable merely to offer 
statements.14 This is to say that neither Rousseau nor anyone else can state the 'truth' 
where this 'truth' is understood in relation to the real because speculation is a 
necessary part of all speech. De Man focuses on a passage at the end of Book II 
where Rousseau writes of the theft of a small pink and silver ribbon from the head of 
a household where he worked in his youth. 15 At the time, an investigation was set up 
to find the ribbon culminating in a type of mock court room scene where Rousseau 
denied the theft and falsely accused a maidservant, Marion, of having stolen the 
ribbon to give to him in order to win his affection. This accusation resulted in her 
dismissal. De Man writes: 
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For one thing, to excuse the crime of theft does not suffice to excuse the worse crime of 
slander which, as both common sense and Rousseau tell us, is much harder to accept.16 
Indeed, in the fourth of his Reveries of a Solitary Walker, Rousseau stated: 'To lie in 
order to harm is slander; it is the worst kind of lie.' 17 
Any discussion of the concept of slander must be aware that, legally speaking, slander 
is totally dependent upon the availability of intention. Slander is malicious intent. In 
a legal context the intention is established by a confession which must be written 
down and given as evidence. In a literary context the intention is also textual: it is 
written into the literary work. In Rousseau's case these two c9ntexts merge in an 
autobiographical text aptly named The Confessions. The text then becomes the 
scandalous product which proves or evidences a prior malicious intention which we 
here call slander. Thus de Man can write that the Jean-Jacques of the Confessions 
stole the ribbon in order that he could be shamefully exposed. This interpretation 
suggests that the slander was motivated by the desire to produce the scandalous text: 
Marion was destroyed [ ... ] merely in order to provide [Rousseau] with a stage on which to 
parade his disgrace or, what amounts to the same thing, to furnish him with a good ending for 
Book Two of his Con/essions:8 
Thus, the slander of Marion was motivated by the desire to produce a scandalous text 
which in turn becomes evidence, because product, of that slander. It seems ludicrous 
to suggest that a young, eight year old boy would destroy someone merely in order to 
provide himself with textual material some fifty years later, yet this teleological 
interpretation of events replays the machinations of our legal system: a system where 
any intention must be revealed in the textual form of a confession. 
What de Man now attempts, using Rousseau's complex and rigorous text, is to subvert 
this working model and its reliance upon the hors texteltexte division. Aiming to 
negate the possibility of the hors texte de Man would reduce both slander and scandal 
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to a textual status by reinforcing the very Rousseauian concept of the written element 
within speech. De Man can then renounce a traditional interpretation of events in 
favour of another, startling, possibility: that Marion's nominal presence might have 
been merely coincidental. What this means is that the 'sound' Marion was uttered 
'truly without conceivable motive' .19 If Marion is merely a sound, part of a universal 
grammar which, at every turn, resists any possibility of being specifically tailored to 
our own individual needs, then this sound can be uttered without motive. That is, 
why should a reiterable sound -a so-called Proper Name which can, however, be 
shared, a linguistic construct which is available to all - reflect an individual intention? 
Once subjective intention is removed from the arena of interpretation terms such as 
desire, shame and guilt become redundant and the subjective basis upon which our 
legal system operates collapses.2O 
De Man then turns from The Confessions and 'reported guilt' to The Fourth Reverie 
and the 'guilt of reporting' .21 Here the lie, or slander, is specifically connected with 
the act of writing The Confessions (and necessarily with all writing). For de Man the 
'random lie,22 of the Marion episode is a consistent feature of the Fourth Reverie. In 
this text, the performative power of the lie as excuse is specifically tied to an absence 
of evidence - to an absence of any referential signification, and "thus, 'carries, in this 
literary context, a more familiar and reputable name since it is now called fiction' .23 
When is a slander not a slander? When it is a fiction. It would seem that the sole 
determining factor is intention and that intention must be det~rmined by consequence 
and context: 'To lie without intent and without harm to oneself or others is not to lie -
it is not a lie but a fiction.,24 As I have already noted, legally intention can be 
determined through its consequences: a slander is only proven when it produces a 
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scandalous text, a confessional text. But de Man here writes of the 'almost 
imperceptible crack of the purely gratuitous'. 25 This is what Rousseau calls 'faits 
oiseux' or facts without consequence.26 Literally, 'oiseux' describes that which 
journeys with no specific aim. Fiction is this absence of aim, this lack of any link 
between utterance and referent and, for de Man, in the space created by such a 
disruption of referential illusion, the 'sound' Marion came to be uttered. Thus, the 
key sentence in the whole of The Confessions is, according to de Man: 'Je m' excusai 
sur Ie premier objet qui s' offrit.,27 
It is the grammar itself, the word Marion, which is the active agent. Here intention is 
an objective intention contained in the word itself rather than any subjective intention 
intended by anyone: especially Rousseau when speaking that word. This unmotivated 
utterance is really saying nothing at all, least of all someone's name. Yet one would 
surely object: is there not a huge discrepancy between the fiction of The Reveries and 
the very real denunciation of a girl named Marion?28 If the former is admittedly 
without consequence, surely the latter is slanderous: 'Whatever is contrary to truth 
and hurts justice in any conceivable way is a lie. ,29 
If I understand that the name Marion was not intended by Rousseau but by the 
grammar which inevitably produced it then, according to de Man, the slander against 
Marion is activated as slander only because it is not understood as belonging to a 
fictional (textual) realm. That is, the slander becomes a slander because the 
scandalous consequences of the spoken words seemed to infer, logically, that an hors 
textual intention had been made available. It was believed that the name Marion, 
written into our language, managed to rush to the signified it would mean, and that 
language might indicate something non-linguistic: a flesh and blood being. An 
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economy of shame and guilt was generated because the fictional utterance 
immediately became trapped in a system of signification and consequence. If the 
essential non-referentiality of the event had been grasped no such predicament would 
have arisen because 'not the fiction itself is to blame for the consequences, but its 
falsely referential reading' .30 
De Man strips the utterance of its 'truth' value and hence of its motivation. As a 
result the slander ceases to exist as slander and is neutralised as a fictional and 
therefore harmless statement. After all, 
it is the misguided reading of the error as theft or slander, the refusal to admit that fiction is 
fiction, the stubborn resistance to the 'fact', obvious by itself, that language is entirely free 
with regard to referential meaning and can posit whatever its grammar allows it to say, which 
leads to the transformation of random error into injustice.31 
Language is radically irresponsible and it is only in the instance of reading that fiction 
is erroneously assigned referential (hors textual) signification. The moment in which 
the fiction is free of meaning is immediately lost in its generated context. Yet, for de 
Man, this impossible moment must exist otherwise the text is unimaginable: 
It seems to be impossible to isolate the moment in which the fiction stands free of any 
signification; in the very moment at which it is posited, as well as in the context that it 
generates, it gets at once misinterpreted into a determination which is, ipso facto, 
overdetermined. Yet without this moment, never allowed to exist as such, no such thing as a 
text is conceivable32 
For de ¥an, language consistently works to insert an intention (as hors texte) into a 
text via the "proof' of referentiality, and, for him, this referentiality is a lie. 
Moreover, the language of intention can never be unique and thus continually escapes _ 
the supposed intending subject. De Man's aim here is to question the hors texte status 
of intention through an examination of the irresponsibility of an ultimately 'machinal' 
language.33 
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This is, of course, a dominant feature of the structuralist and post-structuralist debate. 
However, what I hope to stress here is a link between the thought of two men, 
possibly the leading voices in this debate, through a tracing of their thought back to 
the same Rousseauian text. The question which inevitably arises asks how one might 
reintroduce responsibility into a world of intention-less subjectivity? If there is a 
language of intention, of objectives, aims and desires and this structure of objective 
intentions fools us into believing that it is the subject who reproduces social relations, 
what might it mean to face up to the possibility of 'intention without anyone to intend 
it,?34 
The structure itself, which for de Man is a grammatical 'machine' traced in the texts 
of Rousseau's Confessions and Reveries as a properly seductive metaphor, contains an 
objective intention written into a linguistic schema of thought and expression. This 
objective intention will always outrun any possibility of conscious intentions. 
Interestingly, Luke Wilson cites Bourdieu at the point where his thought process 
intersects de Man's reading of The Confessions offering an interpretation of intention 
which might counter the subjectivism of a legal phenomenology rooted in the 
authentic and conscious experience of the strategising subject. He writes: 'We must 
not [ ... J reduce the objective and constituted significations of actions and works to the 
conscious and deliberate intentions of their authors.,35 
The face-to-face 
Jacques Derrida's itinerary also included and still includes the task of redefining the 
concepts of slander and scandal. His approach - an understanding of the written 
nature of speech and thus the impossibility of a non-textual event- is also gleaned 
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from a reading of Rousseau's Confessions. Derrida turned to Rousseau and the 
subject of slander at least as early as 1967: the same time as de Man delivered his 
"Gauss Seminar". Derrida produced Of Grammatology, a work which re-reads 
Rousseau's Confessions, hoping to reveal a scepticism about the 'truth' value of any 
word or sign which must always, necessarily lead to another sign.36 According to 
Derrida, knowledge is not merely a systematic tracking down of a 'truth' which lies 
secreted yet open to finding. Rather, Derrida embarks upon a redefinition of truths as 
illusions where one has forgotten that they are illusions.37 Following on from this, if 
language is a universal construct, and we are always removed from this language 
through having no part in its creation, any insertion of a subject into language must be 
fictitious. Of The Confessions Derrida writes: 'One cannot abstract from the written 
text to rush to the signified it would mean, since the signified is here the text itself.,38 
Thus, the scandalous text - the product of intention - cannot evidence the slander 
which must exist beyond the text as an hors texte. The text cannot point to a some 
thing which is outside of the text. He continues: 
It is so little a matter of lOOking for a truth Signified by these writmgs (metapbysical or 
psycbological truth: Jean-Jacques' life behind the work) that if the texts that interest us mean 
anything, it is the engagement and the appurtenance that encompass existence and writing in 
the same tissue, the same text.39 
Existence and writing are not in opposition, nor are slander and scandal; or rather, 
writing is not the product of a non-textual event and so the scandalous text cannot 
prove a slanderous intention. Derrida is saying that there are no facts 'in and of 
themselves' and that any joy in certainty exhibits a desire to, preserve the myth that 
such a difference between existence and the text does exist. Derrida does not merely 
mistrust the text as a representative of the past because of the possibility of a 
forgetfulness, but because of a deeper linguistic predicament. Through Rousseau, 
128 
Chapter 4 
writing is understood as the gift of proper names.40 For example, our own name is a 
secret which reassures us of our identity. This secret comes to function as the so-
called proper, where no proper self exists, in a process of delusion where it is believed 
that speech masters presence. Reading Rousseau one starts to recognise the written 
within speech, one begins 'to think the lure' .41 Once I recognise writing in speech I 
can admit to a universal textualising process. 
For a concept of slander to operate as our current legal process demands, a "face-to-
face" confrontational situation must be possible. What might this mean? For the 
American legal theorist Kent Greenawalt, 'defamations can harm and [ ... ] in a face-to-
face setting many defamatory comments can amount to fighting words' .42 Slander as 
utterance, gesture or rumour relies on the possibility of "face-to-face" countenances, 
on the possibility of self-presence, transparent proximity and the immediate range of 
the voice. But what if I begin to question the validity of such fundamental guarantees 
of authenticity? Such a determination of social authenticity has, according to Derrida, 
been with us since Plato. Through his reading of Rousseau's sceptical text, Derri~a 
questions the possibility of a 'living speech' .43 In his Confessions Rousseau wrote: 
I would love society like others, if I were not sure of showing myself not only at a 
disadvantage, but as completely different from what I am. The part.I have taken of writing 
and hiding myself is precisely the one that suits me.44 
If, for Rousseau, speech is defective because it cannot reveal who I believe myself to 
be, writing is seen to be dangerous. Writing is art, techne, image and ruse which 
wants nothing more than to make a deficient, absenting speech present. . It is 
dangerous because I am liable to believe that written representation is presence rather 
than proxy and 'there is a fatal necessity, inscribed in the very functioning of the sign, 
that the substitute make one forget the vicariousness of its own function' .4S 
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If speech is blindness and writing merely its supplement, one jumps from one to the 
other without progression. In this way one goes from slander (utterance, speech) 
which is never present, to its supplement, scandal (text, writing) which claims to be 
present but merely masks its defects: 'One goes from blindness to the supplement [ ... ] 
Blindness to the supplement is the law.,46 
It is necessary that I am blind to the workings of the supplement, but also the legal 
system relies on such a blindness. Such wordplay reveals the aporia at the heart of 
any legal system, indeed any system, which remains ignorant of this properly 
seductive property of language. If the face-to-face proximity of authentic presence 
always already escapes us, th~n slander, as face-to-face defamation is impossible 
because a transparent proximity beyond writing is impossible. Once I admit that 
slander relies upon the possibility of its verification within the scandalous text we can 
re-synonymise the two terms, eradicate the possibility of an hors textual moment, and 
recognise that both the legal system and literary theory rely upon a Platonistic view of 
social authenticity. The dangerous supplement, which Rousseau calls a 'fatal 
advantage' , is seductive: 
It leads desire away from the good path [ ... ] guides it towards its loss or fall and therefore it is 
a sort of lapse or scandal (scandaZon). It thus destroys Nature. But the scandal of Reason is 
that nothing seems more natural than this destruction of Nature.47 
All writing is properly scandalous because it constitutes a (necessary) lapse from 
'truth'. All slander is scandalous because the spoken is now understood as written, 
with the power of death (writing) now recognised at the heart of living speech. 
Thfough a reading of The Confessions Derrida comes to understand that a scandalous 
presence is the only possible presence and should be reinterpreted as non-presence, 
non-authenticity and, above all, fiction. Derrida and de Man unite in this reading: 
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We have tried to show [ ... ] that in what one calls the real life of these existences 'of flesh and 
bone', beyond and behind what one believes can be circumscribed as Rousseau's text, there 
has never been anything but writing; [ ... ] what opens meaning and language is writing as the 
disappearance of natural presence.48 
Writing - the supplement - is not merely a tail added to the positivity of a presence. 
Rather, this thing, this 'presence' can only fill itself up as presence because of the 
proxy of the supplement: intention only exists through the textual proxy. Somewhere, 
this non-lieu, this no-place that we could call defective Nature, must be filled up 
(tient-lieu) with signs or scandals; with fictions that side-track us into believing that 
we hold proof of an hors texte which might, ultimately, explain our authentic selves. 
Becoming personal: where one stops and the other begins 
If someone calls me vain and mean, I know that he trusts me and has something to confess to 
me.
49 
As I have noted, both de Man and Derrida shared an interest in the subject of scandal, 
focusing on Rousseau's autobiographical treatment of the subject. Interestingly, both 
Derrida and de Man - like Rousseau - would be victims of scandal later on in their 
careers. Obviously, I have discussed the debate which grew up around de Man, but I 
would like to illustrate how the scandal which touched de Man affected Derrida and, 
importan~ly, resurrected links with Rousseau. 
In Derrida's Memoires for Paul de Man,50 we re-enter the realm of scandal. This time 
we are discussing de Man's own fate after the 'revelations' about his wartime 
journalism. If scandalous language seeks familiarity and, above all, to convince that 
it knows its subject totally, it also seeks, as does familiarity, to breed contempt. 
Derrida's Memoires conclude with a lengthy final chapter entitled "Like the Sound of 
the Sea Deep Within a Shell: Paul de Man's War". This text parallels Derrida's 
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on a prior understanding of the literal non-availability of the past in the present; of the 
non-availability of any so-called real life existence beyond the text. Initially, it would 
seem that Derrida attempts two things in this text, the frrst, more conventional and 
less successful, the second, I believe, more loyal to de Man's own philosophy. Both 
are undertaken in a spirit of defence. 
Derrida is anticipating the trial of de Man that will ensue in media and academic 
circles after the revelation of his wartime journalism.51 His ambition is to complicate 
such a trial. Firstly, he attempts - with limited success - to justify that early 
journalism. For example, Derrida suggests that de Man was very young, with a wife 
and child to support. He also writes that the articles in question were written early in 
1940, before the occupation of Belgium. This method works to defend de Man's 
context. He also, in the same vein, works to defend the content of the Le Soir articles, 
focusing on the one and only article which might ever produce a scandal: "Les Juifs 
dans la Litterature Actuelle". D errid a, himself a Jew persec~ted during the War,52 
begins to defend de Man, to an extent, through a complication of the text's meaning. 
In this article in Le Soir de Man actually wrote: 
que sees that a solution of the Jewish problem that would aim at the creation of a Jewish 
colony isolated from Europe, would not entail, for the literary life of the West, deplorable 
consequences.53 
De Man has already stated in previous Le Soir articles, that literature is an 
independent domain, independent, that is, of philosophical or ethical contingencies. 
The implications of such a colony for the literary life of the West is thus understood 
by de Man to be a totally separate issue from the moral, ethical and philosophical 
implications - implications which de Man, within this context, was unable to discuss 
due to the censorship of non-literary subject matter. One might balk at the use of the 
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term 'solution' but this would be anachronistic - de Man could not have foreseen the 
terrible connotations that the very word "solution" would later evoke. Derrida 
suggests that the above citation insinuates, in its rigid structure, that deplorable 
consequences would probably result from the establishment of such a colony in all but 
the literary arena. Apart from speculation, what we can agree with, and what Derrida 
rightly points out, is that the article as a whole is argued from the outset, in print, as 
an indictment of 'vulgar antisemiticism' .54 And, since de Man names no other type of 
antisemiticism, one can presume that this article attacks all forms of antisemiticism. 
Also, by the end of 1942 de Man's contributions to Ie Soir ceased abruptly. These 
observations - all of them textual - are attempts to defend de Man against the 
inevitable scandal through the complication of any over-hasty simplification of de 
Man's writing.55 De Man, it is also noted wrote for and edited anti-fascist 
newspapers. One such journal,. Les Cahiers du Libre Examen was founded in 1937 
and edited by de Man. 
Indeed, in his attempt to rally against the inevitable anti-de~anian debate, Derrida 
can try to uncover all the biographical details of de Man's life like some literary 
theory private detective. This approach had already been discussed and criticised by 
Derrida in Points ... Interviews.56 
Reading Points ... Interviews reveals just how much this type of investigative 
discussion of de Man was linked to events closer to Derrida's own career. In 19~7, an . 
art~cle by Derrida entitled "Heidegger, the Philosopher's Hell", was published in Le 
NouvelObservateur. This publication led to a long battle between Derrida and two 
academics - Wolin and Sheehan - in what became known as the 'Derrida Mfair'. 
This 'affair' was relayed in the New York Review of Books where Derrida found 
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himself in the position of defending himself against those who would equate 
Heidegger with fascism, those who would attempt to censor any reading of Heidegger 
and those who would condemn as fascistic any dialogue (and perpetrator of that 
dialogue) which engaged in a reading of Heidegger. 
Derrida wanted to read Heidegger in a way that would look beyond or complicate the 
fascist engagement. The dynamic here is similar to that of the debate against de Man. 
As with de Man, the debate against Derrida moves from the condemnation of fascism 
as scandalous to a condemnation of Derrida's discussion of fascism: his discussion of 
fascism becomes as scandalous as that which it discusses. 57 An engagement with the 
rhetoric of fascism is seen to be, in and of itself, suspicious, even when that 
engagement represents an attempt to understand and complicate that rhetoric through 
rigorous analysis. Fascism is understood as the ultimate scandalous text because it 
puts an end to the need for any further interpretation - it knows the Truth - it assumes 
things to be familiar and it lets them pass. An entire generation of people 
unquestioningly assumed things to be true and let them pass. As such, fascism is 
dangerous and cannot be tolerated. Yet those involved in both the Derrida 'affair' and 
the debate surrounding de Man censor discourses which spring from a - critical -
engage~ent with fascism and Nazi rhetoric. To this - limited - extent, these debates, 
established in opposition to censorship and the scandalous text, are, ironically 
censoring and, therefore, scandalous: they assume that they have access to the truth - _ 
the meaning of the text is reducible to the au~or' s intention - and they can therefore 
censor any discussions with which they disagree by revealing the supposed intention. 
behind those texts. Scandal does not seek to think beyond comfortable schemas, nor 
does it seek to understand: 
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Understand what? Well, that which ensures or does not ensure an immediate passage, 
according to some mode or other, of "translation", between the Nazi engagement, in 
whatever form, and what is most essential, acute, and sometimes more difficult in a work that 
continues and will continue to give cause for thinking.58 
Derrida understands that a condemnation of Nazism is not a thinking of Nazism but 
rather, in its methodology and its effects, in its intolerance and censorship, it 
resembles that "thing" itself. The textual product we can here call the scandal is an 
obstacle to understanding and thought - it seeks to block interpretation by establishing 
evidence of intention. This evidence terminates any necessity for a continued reading. 
Such a response acts as if Nazism were isolated from the rest of Europe, from other 
philosophical, political and religious discourses and, as such, such a response is 
politically irresponsible and a 'renunciation of thinking' .59 Such a response when it 
condemns not only Nazism, but the author, calling for censorship and exile, again acts 
as if that author were an isolated being who does not share our discourse. 
Obviously, this entire episode has strong links with de Man's own fate and the 
arguments used by Derrida in his own defence are similar to those used by Derrida to 
defend de Man. However, interestingly, Derrida defends himself only with the 
second defensive approach alluded to earlier in relation to his Menwires. This 
approach leads inevitably to a discussion of responsibilities. 
For Derrida, scandals must be desired. The anti-de Manian debate could only exist if 
certain people wanted it, because, after all, de Man is dead.6O To counter such desire 
does not require a detective work which might outdo the opponents investigations. 
Biography cannot come to the rescue. Rather, the approach used by Derrida in 
Points ... lnterviews and Menwires leads us to Rousseau's Confessions. This approach 
states that all questions about de Man (or anybody) are, ultimately unanswerable, and, 
therefore, who might have the right to judge, condemn, or absolve? To push this 
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further, what we encounter here returns us to the fictional dilemma of the Jean .. 
Jacques of the Confessions. Scandal leaves undeclared the limitations imposed on any 
knowledge concerning the truth of a past event. It ignores the fact that one will never 
be able to understand the motivation behind de Man's work and,. ultimately, it ignores 
the fictionality of de Man as (auto)biographical subject. 
Slander's abstraction, its non-availability, is masked in the textual product of the 
scandal. This scandal immediately arises to supplement the past slander. So, for 
example, slanders such as Rousseau's slander against Marion, or .de Man's against the 
Jews -which can only be slanders if nwtivated by a malicious intention - are 
concretised into scandalous texts which evidence this intention. In Rousseau's case he 
produces that (ironic) text himself, perhaps hoping to complicate later texts such as 
those produced by the academics and journalists in the contemporary cases we here 
discuss. In Menwires Derrida aliudes to de Man's Allegories of Reading 61 in order to 
stress how de Man's reading of the Confessions (similar in almost every way to his 
own in Of Grammatology), should deconstruct such an investigative journalism. 
People would, no doubt, like to invite both de Man and Derrida to the 'simulacrum of 
confession' ,62 without appreciating the irony by which this desire for the confessional 
text undermines the very possibility of slander once we understand the limitations 
imposed on the nature of any confession. Confessional language is fictional. Debates 
~ 
which seek to condemn writers due to a perceived private misconduct, are based on . 
what amounts to no more than stories.63 Confessions are stories but to confess (from 
the Latin Confessare; to speak fully), is currently misunderstood as offering a "full 
speech". Confessional language must instead be understood in a double 
epistemological perspective. It functions within a possibility of verifiable referential 
cognition but also as a statement whose reliability cannot be verified by any empirical 
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means.64 The confessional text relies upon this impossibility of knowing and this 
impossibility, this literal non-presence of the past introduces the purely fictive value 
of the confessional text. To confess is a discursive process which might include a 
principle of referential verification as extra verbal moment. However, the 
confessional text must be understood as fictive and this radical fictionality enables any 
excuse to function. As de Man writes in Allegories: 
It is always possible to face up to any experience (to excuse any guilt), because the 
experience always exists simultaneously as fictional discourse and as empirical event and it is 
never possible to decide which of the two possibilities is the right one.6S 
This necessary indecision, where crimes become stories about· crimes, renders any 
excuse workable and counteracts any scandal which might attempt a total 
denunciation based on what evidence? It is this impossibility of knowing which 
guarantees the success of any excuse or alibi and counters the scandalous text. 
Biography cannot incriminate b.iography. The irreducibility of the 'other' seems to 
make a responsibility (response) impossible, or, reversely, the only possible 
responsible response embraces the undecidable and refuses to reach any conclusion. 
Scandal is here understood as ultimately irresponsible and insufficient as a response 
because of its reliance upon a radically irresponsible grammar. De Man called this 
grammar the textual 'machine', provoking an interpretation that entails the loss of the 
illusion of meaning and a rethinking of subjectivity. To this extent 'the distinction 
between fiction and autobiography is undecidable' .66 The subject is threatened due to 
the estrangement between the significance and the performance of the text. Any 
subject must be fictive because, in order to come in to being as text, the referential 
function had to be suspended. 
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Used in Derrida's defence this argument has potency. In Points ... lnterviews, Derrida 
calls upon the same theory of the unknowability of the subject, saying that if the 
media and the academic press have a duty to 'render an account,67 such a schema is 
always already complicated by the need to clearly state that things are always 'still 
more complicated' .68 
4.2. Responsibilities 
Can we possibly approach a new definition of responsibility? 
I have discussed the etymologies of the words slander and scandal and how I believe 
them to have developed differing functions. I looked at how certain writers have tried 
to deconstruct this difference through a rigorous reading of the hors texteltexte 
distinction, aiming to re-synonymise slander and scandal within the text. I also 
attempted to reveal the secret at the heart of any scandal - a secret which seeks to hide 
the fact that any knowledge is merely the supplement to a language which continually 
attempts to make a non-presence present. I proposed that the intending subject was 
not available and that fictional scenarios (scandalous texts) were produced in order to 
supplement and disguise this lack. I also suggested that once all scandalous texts are 
understood as fictitious, slander is rendered impotent and non-consequential .. 
The question still arises of how one might reintroduce responsibility into this structure 
of 'objective intentionality which continually outruns the possibility of an authentic, 
subjective and conscious intentionality. I would like to tum, finally, to Derrida's 
recent text, The Gift of Death, a text which, I believe, resurrects many of the major 
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concerns and themes of his Of Grammatology. Here again, the discourse focuses on 
secrets, the face-to-face, scandal and responsibilities.69 
Secrecy, according to Derrida, opposes responsibility. The text, as fervour for fusion, 
is part of this secret. Derrida wonders what responsibility might mean. Traditionally 
it belongs to a space where one is called upon to explain oneself, one's actions or 
one's thoughts before an other. The call to responsibility demands that you account 
for your intentions. As I have noted, the text is the traditional space where these 
intentions materialise and, even in the absence of the intending subject - de Man is 
dead - the debate will produce these texts and assume responsibility for the avowal of 
intention. And yet there is, at the heart of our history, an 'abyss' that resists totalising 
summary. Derrida discusses a chain reaction of repressions or secrets about the 
origins of the myth of the responsible and accountable self; a chain which stretches 
back through Christianity to Platonism and, ultimately, to orgiastic mystery. Each 
new structure of responsibility relies upon these suppressed secrets.70 History itself 
has conditioned our idea of responsibility through the masking .and repression of our 
non-knowledge and 'this history would need to be acknowledged as if confessed!'.71 
Thus, the secret of conventional responsibility relies on the preservation of a nucleus 
of irresponsibility due to this denial of our non-knowledge. As long as responsibility 
is subordinated to the objectivity of knowledge -to the preservation of a Platonic 
rationalism - it is essentially irresponsible. To assume responsibility. has, 
traditionally, always meant that one pursue the 'truth' via an objective knowledge. 
This knowledge, reinterpreted as falsely referential, reveals the irresponsibility at the 
heart of responsible action. In the case of the debates, their assumed responsibility, 
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taken in the absence of the 'protagonist', pretended to access authorial intention when 
all it did was offer one reading of the author's texts and censor all others. 
Thus Derrida highlights what has been - outside of the texts of Rousseau, de Man and 
a few others - an inadequate thematisation of what responsibility is or must be and an 
inadequate thematisation is, of itself, irresponsible: 
For, if it is true that the concept of responsibility has, in the most reliable continuity of its 
history, always implied involvement in action, doing, praxis, a decision that exceeds simple 
conscience or simple theoretical understanding, it is also true that the same concept requires a 
decision or responsible action to answer for itself consciously, that is, with knowledge of a 
thematics of what is done, of what action signifies, its causes, ends, etc. In debates 
concerning responsibility one must always take into account this original and irreducible 
complexity that links theoretical consciousness (which must also be a thetic or thematic 
consciousness) to a practical conscience (ethical, legal, political) if only to avoid the 
arrogance of so many 'clean consciences' .72 
Irresponsibility necessarily insinuates itself everywhere. As it stands, responsibility is 
now falsely allied to responding to the other before the "law". The legal system and 
our entire ethical framework wo~ld have it that intentionality is the secret of what is 
human: that I can tell myself. However, (and Derrida here returns to Rousseau and de 
Man), language deprives me of my singularity.73 
Responsibility is always unique, always singular, always a response to one event - my 
event - so how might I ever respond from within a predetermined linguistic system? 
Moving then, towards a redefinition of responsibility, Derrida approaches silence. So 
far, a strange contract has always bound responsibility to speech. However, it now 
appears that the absolute responsibility for my actions, if that responsibility is to be 
singular and unique - not re-iterable in language - must imply silence. This silence is, 
of course, intolerable to those professing any 'allegiance to morality in general' .74 
This silence is 'both a scandal and a paradox' /5 De Man's silence, as I noted in the 
previous chapter, was intolerable to a legion of theorists who desired the story of de 
Man. His silence was paradoxical because contrary to the norm and scandalous 
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because this silence - of the non-lieu - could be filled up as air rushes to fill a vacuum. 
A scandalous text must, necessarily replace a silence that cannot be tolerated by a 
society based on the Word. 
What must be understood and what consistently refuses understanding, is the simple 
paradox which structures our current, orthodox interpretation of responsibility: that it 
demands an accounting and an absolute singularity. Speaking, (and writing), involves 
one in a generality that (a)voids any possibility of singular response and thus, 
responsibility. How can a universal structure express my individual self? This 
refusal, this denial of the aporia at the heart of responsibility leads to falsely 
moralistic debates which treat 'as nihilist, relativist, even poststructuralist, and worst 
still deconstructionist, all those who remain concerned in the face of such a display of 
good conscience' .76 
Post-seri pt 
As I write this, Radio Four hosts a discussion on the Death of History.77 Hugh 
Whitemoor speaks of Deconstruction as an infection sprea~ing through our 
Universities: 'It was thought that the plague within France had been contained.' At 
present it is still possible to scandalise entire philosophical movements due to a 
mistaken belief in the availability of intention. The ability of academic,S to 
persistently avow that they, somehow, know the intentions behind deconstruction - as 
if we might 'know' Derrida or de Man - enables them to attack writers in order to 
denounce a wider movement which can here, rightly or wrongly, be termed 
Deconstruction. As I have noted in previous chapters, the scandal of specific 
movements - Rousseauism,' Deconstruction, Althusserian Marxist Theory - is only a 
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scandal once someone has proven that the movement is the product of a malicious 
intent. The malicious mind must be capable of theft, of killing a wife, or of sending a 
race of people to the gas chambers. The crime itself differs and is, of itself, not 
important, it merely serves a function: to reveal that such a crimi~al is capable only of 
producing a contaminated thought. 
All I hope to illustrate here is the irony by which those who would oppose these 
writers call upon biography as a weapon in their war. Looking for the 'truth' about 
someone, one finds only texts and, (mis)taking these texts for ~truth', one becomes 
'guilty' of the very irresponsibility that that someone is charged with. Irresponsible in 
what sense? Well, armed with these properly scandalous fictions anyone can call for 
the censorship of books - the supposed "real" life behind the text can be written 
unscrupulously by anyone opposed to new possibilities of thought - and the perceived 
personal short -fallings of men can be used to scandalise entire philosophical 
movements. I here point out that, rather than attack deconstruction through a rigorous 
reading of its texts, it can be much easier, much more conventional, and much more 
gratifying, to attack a thought process via the creation of a defamatory, that is, 
scandalous, biographical text, which can be (mis)taken for the truth. As Derrida 
points out, such fictional biographies have been used unscrupulously by the many 
who felt personally threatened by new types of thought and, with this in mind, 
Derrida refers us to Jon Weiner's article in The Nation which attacks deconstruction 
through de Man by attempting to 'transfer onto deconstruction and its "politics" [ ... ] a 
stream of calumny or slanderous insinuation' .78 The author of this article 'has the 
nerve to speak of de Man as an "academic W aldheim'" .79 
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It goes without saying that, until we attempt to seriously re-define what slander and 
scandal might ever mean in our society; until we recognise the paradox at the heart of 
our present day concept of responsibility - that responsibility is always unique but this 
uniqueness is denied when I respond for myself and my action~ in the generality of 
language - we will continue to allow ourselves to fall victims of dominant discourses 
whose sole aim is to convince us of their ultimate correctness. Other discourses - for 
example, deconstruction - will be proved incorrect. They will be vilified and 
censored by debates that can reductively (mis)read a critical engagement with the 
discourse of fascism as, rather, the inspired 'product' of that ultimately scandalous 
and censoring thought process we know as fascism. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE ARCHIVE 
The living is merely a type of what is dead, and a very rare type. 
Nietzschel 
5.0. Introduction 
This chapter examines two histories or archives which appear in 'documents' called 
The Confessions, by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and The Future Lasts a Long Time, by 
Louis Althusser. In times when the archive is being given an ever increasing 
importance2 by the historian and the literary biographer who seek to establish the 
validity of an event in order to attack the validity of a theory, we hope to undermine 
archive theory through the reading of the archive as copy, reiteration and type . 
. , 
Section one will reveal the striking parallels and repetitions that occur in our two 
documents through a discussion of similarities of structure, content and analyses. 
Section two will examine these two texts in the light of Derrida's Archive Fever; The 
Gift of Death and Of Grammatology hoping to discuss ideas of archive-responsibility. 
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5.1. Example or reference 
Before Rousseau's Confessions there were perhaps two significant autobiographies: 
St Augustine's Confessions and Santa Teresa's Life of Herself. However, unlike our 
later autobiographies, these were not written in any way to reveal the self, to justify 
actions or to seek legal respite. Instead they archived a religious event which might 
illustrate some greater truth: 
In the medieval schema, mystery, the historical, was subordinate to symbol, reserved for 
transcendent truths beyond history. The service of high truth authorised fictional scenarios 
since truth value lay in exemplarity, not referentiality. 3 
W.D. Howarth sees Rousseau as an essentially modern writer. According to Howarth, 
Rousseau divorced himself from a classical style of prose useful only when 
generalising about universal truths and initiated a literary exploration of individual 
personality by using a much more colourful vocabulary. To this extent, Howarth 
attests to the originality of Rousseau's autobiography when he claims that "[o]ne 
world finishes with Voltaire, another begins with Rousseau".4 Later autobiographies 
would prioritise the possibility of referentiality: the possibility that one might move 
from the text toward the signified it would mean. Rousseau and Althusser both 
exploit this possibility and claim that their texts are motivated. by the desire for 
justice.s I have already noted how the concept of referentiality is linked with the 
development of the legal justice system and how the possibility of justice. depends 
upon the possibility of a textual reference to the non-textual. The legal system offers 
the possibility of response and this response or responsibility assumes that the self is 
an instance of singularity and liberty. Any legal reading of the textual response 
assumes that it can transgress this text towards something other than it: the real life 
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"behind" the textual response. Thus, there is a fatal necessity inscribed in the 
functioning of the legal system, that the sign function as the thing itself. 
One needs proof, evidence and testimony and another word for these is archive.6 
These autobiographies, The Confessions and Future, could, then, be described as texts 
written to evidence in favour of the author by supposedly showing him as he was to 
those who had misunderstood him. The methodology of their archival technique is 
simple: they will record all the events they have lived through and all their feelings 
about those events.' By bearing witness to the singularity or the originality of these 
events they will be able to reveal the truth and uniqueness which is, ultimately, 
themselves: 'In the descriptive, the detail represents truth itself, uninterpreted 
existence, almost an essence of being, simply because no narrative motivation for it is 
imaginable.' 8 Rousseau promises to relate 'all that has happened to [him], all that [he 
has] done, all that [he has] felt'.9 
There is a common belief that something is truer the more textual space it occupies. 
Lost in an excess of detail, the archivist would seem to efface himself, allowing the 
event to present itself spontaneously: 
I endeavour in all cases to explain the prime causes, in order to convey the interrelation of 
results. I should like, in some way, to make my soul transparent to the reader's eye, and for 
that purpose I am trying to present it from all points of view, [ ... ]and to contrive that none of 
its movements shall escape his notice.[ ... ] By relating to him in simple detail all that has 
happened to me, [ ... ] I cannot lead him into error. His task is to assemble these elements and 
to assess the being who is made up of them. The summing up must be his, and if he comes to 
the wrong conclusion, the fault will be of his own making.10 
Rousseau as author disappears and only evidence of himself, w.hich naturally appears 
to present himself in all his vast detail, remains. Any responsibility for the archive is 
shifted onto the reader who then becomes a type of archaeologist who must re-order 
the archive. Rousseau is erased and the archive, because it contains all the available 
information, can seem to speak spontaneously in a confusion with the arkhe itself. 
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However, Rousseau immediately qualifies this desire. He deconstructs the archive-
machine by stating his one and only fear which is the only real fear: 'that I may not 
tell everything,.l1 The archivist must admit that some events are lost. Rousseau 
concedes that he may 'omit or transpose facts or make mistakes in dates' .12 Rousseau 
will be true to his feelings but facts will necessarily elude him.13 Similarly, in 
Althusser's text, what was initially motivated by the desire to establish a mock legal 
response to a trial he was not allowed, is redirected. Where the trial demands 
evidence and fact, Althusser is no longer willing to decide what constitutes a fact, 
writing: 'I intend to stick closely to the facts throughout this succession of memories 
by association, but hallucinations are also facts.' 14 
Feelings, desires, the unconscious - all need to be detailed if the archive is to live up 
to its claims. In the opening pages of both 'documents', the archive appears as 
increasingly fragile. In order to accomplish this archival feat, a new style of writing 
must be coined. Indeed, both writers lay claim to writing a unique work and this must 
be the case with any archive as it pertains to individuality. .On the fITst page of 
Rousseau's autobiography he writes: 
I have resolved on an enterprise which has no precedent and which, once complete, will have 
no imitator.ls . 
To a great extent, any belief in the originality of an event must lie in its unrelatedness 
to anything going before or after it. If a work refuses to be copied it is truly unique 
because surely anything that can be copied can be a copy.16 
In a movement of (dis)association, Althusser deconstructs Rousseau's claim to 
originality in Confessions and threatens to destabilise the archive-machine. 
Reiterating Rousseau he writes: 
I did what no one else has either wanted or been able to do before:' 
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This claim, made at the beginning of Althusser's text, challenges the foundation of the 
claim it reiterates. As if to make the link more obvious, Althusser must utter the 
name of his predecessor in a moment charged with irony: 
Alas, 1 am no Rousseau. But in planning to write about myself and the dramatic events 1 
lived through and live with still, 1 often thought about his unprecedented boldness. Not that 1 
would ever claim as he did at the beginning of his Confessions: "I am embarking on 
something that has never been done before." Certainly not.18 
Considering what has just been written this remark merely strengthens Althusser's 
observation: that in writing of himself he looked to another text. Within a strict 
economy and with rigorous intellect, Althusser at once recalls Rousseau's 
(problematical) claim to originality through its repetition and simultaneous 
debunking. Indeed, everything that Althusser writes in the frrst pages of Future recalls 
Rousseau's own autobiography. 
Althusser's claim to originality. rests upon the style of Future. His text is an 
"objective" one because he has asked friends to contribute newspaper articles, to lend 
diaries covering periods of intimacy with the author and, in short, to collate all sorts 
of information relating to him and 'covering those years of describing events to him 
which he had partially forgotten'. 19 
Althusser has also collected journals, articles, medical reports and other data to 
establish what he calls "facts". His book is full of comments, reflections, citations 
and random remarks from a range of sources which might be ~personal, 
psychoanalytical, philosophical or political. His archive would be jointly constructed 
from these collated texts, 'real memories' and other 'imagined ones' .20 This approach 
to archiving - the compilation of diverse source materials added to autobiographical 
narrative - allied to his written intention to be 'as objective as humanly possible' - is 
the basis of his claim to originality. He hopes to do 'what no one else has either 
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wanted or been able to do before: [to] gather together and collate[ ... ] all the available 
"information" as if it related to someone else'. 21 
Once again, Althusser's claim to originality is undermined through his determination 
to recall Rousseau at every moment within the text specifically as it pertains to the 
methodology of the archive. Wherever Althusser claims to be the first he recalls that 
other first, Rousseau, who can no longer be first because he is not the last. Even a 
superficial reading of The Confessions reveals Rousseau's reliance upon "outside" 
material in the construction of his archive. Rousseau understood that much of the 
detail of his memories was lost and hoped to replenish the gaps by using letters sent to 
him at crucial moments in his life. Rousseau also gathered and transcribed diaries and 
other published articles and wrote: 'If by chance I have used some material 
embellishment it has only been to fill a void due to a defect of memory. ,22 
But what if, as it seems in Rousseau's Confessions, these gaps can not be filled? 
What does the archive really represent? 
There are some events in my life that are as vivid as if they had just occurred. But there are 
gaps and blanks that I cannot fill except by means of a narrative as muddled as the memory I 
preserve of the events.23 
According to Rousseau, some gaps can only be filled with nonsense, whilst other gaps 
cannot be filled because letters and other archive materials are lost: 
I have begged M. de Malesherbes to try and procure me a copy of that letter. If I can get 
hold of it, through him or through anyone else, it will be found in the collection I mean to 
append to my Confessions. 24 
No such letter appears in the text, nor was there an appendix to supplement the text. 
If the archive is evidential can it tolerate missing links? Later on in his text Rousseau 
would bemoan the fact that papers collected for this supplement, gathered to 'make 
good the defects [of] memory' had all 'passed into other hands and will never 
return' .2S Letters covering a period of about seven years do remain. Some originals 
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are in Rousseau's hands and others, transcripts, with the originals are, we read, in the 
care of a M. du Peyrou. Indeed within the narrative of The Confessions Rousseau 
frequently resorts to using these letters wherever he feels less able to remember.26 
Althusser's other problematic claim to originality lies in his inclusion of 'imagined' 
or 'hallucinated' memories. These hallucinations are, according to Althusser, 'also 
facts,27 and are thus given equal status with events which might actually have 
happened, that is, events which the historian might be able to uncover. This 
psychoanalytical approach, which allows the archive to tap the unconscious, also 
recalls Rousseau's Confessions when he writes, 'my imagination [ ... ] compensates me 
with sweet memories,.28 
What unites Rousseau and Althusser, what resonates in the very word "confess", as in 
any theory of the archive, is this idea of full speech. Both, the sacrament of 
Confession and the theory of the archive presuppose an intention to make something 
fully present: to evidence some event in its totality.29 One remembers Althusser's 
intention to be 'as objective as humanly possible,30 and Rousseau's fear that he may 
not be able to tell everything. Rousseau, and later Althusser, certainly let it be known 
that evidence or events, had been lost or stolen and certainly, part of their 
responsibility as archivists is to reveal this aporia at the heart of autobiography. 
Althusser complicates his own testimony at each stage through his recollection and 
citation of Rousseau's problematic text. Althusser can only end up offering a 
'reasonably clear account of [him]self by calling upon othets to reflect upon his 
'concrete case' .31 As previously noted, this legal terminology is not itself without 
consequence for archive theory. When the archive is understood as evidence what 
happens when some part of that testimony is always lost? 
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(Anto)-biography: Althnsser and the "absent Cather" 
Certainly then, in its stated intentions and in its methodology, Al!husser's Future is a 
conscious "type" of Rousseau's Confessions. Looking at its autobiographical content, 
where content is considered as something which ought to be specific to the author, 
one is continually struck by parallels. It is not unusual for an autobiography to start 
with a rOf1U1n familial, indeed it is almost a prerequisite: 
Habitually speaking, autobiography commences with this retrospection towards the 
commencement, as if under the sway of a mythic 'once upon a time' which pinpoints the 
absolute singularity of a departure or birth.32 
The author narrates his parents' courtship, perhaps his own birth and early childhood, 
all of which crucially exist as "imported" memories.33 Any autobiography must start 
with such a fictional account of. origin: with this story borrowed from friends and 
relatives. What I hope to do now is to highlight striking similarities of 
autobiographical narrative between the two texts under discussion in an attempt to 
reveal how Althusser, at every moment of his autobiography, "borrows" or "imports" 
narrative from Rousseau's Confessions in order to establish autobiography as fiction. 
Rousseau writes of a birth marked by death and unhappiness as does Althusser.34 In 
Rousseau's case his mother died giving birth to him. As for Althusser, his mother's 
fianc6, Louis, died leaving his brother to marry her in his stead and leaving them to 
name their son after this dead uncle. Both children are made to compensate for those 
who are dead: they have to be both themselves and that other who is "behind" them: 
My birth was the frrst of my misfortunes [ ... ] my father [ ... ] never got over it. He seemed to 
see her again in me, [ ... ] he would say with a groan; "Give her back to me, console me for 
her, fill the void she has left in my heart! Should I love you so if you were not more to me 
than a son?" 
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I knew early on [ ... ] that my mother [ ... ] loved someone else through and beyond me, using 
my physical presence to remind her of a person who was absent., or rather seeing his presence 
through my absence.35 
Althusser believed that his very name, 'a dead man's name', testified to the fact that 
he represented somebody else.36 Neither author, then, is unique in this experience of 
living for and as another. Therefore, experiences which might have defined them 
merely serve to blur boundaries between them. Where Rousseau or Althusser might 
have presented themselves to us within the text they are absented: lost in each other's 
narrative in a reflexive textual movement which denies the singulality and hence the 
autobiographical 'value' of their childhood predicament. 
Althusser constantly refers to an absent father as crucial to his sense of self. This 
paternal absenteeism is also a defining factor of Rousseau's concept of identity. In a 
movement of repetition, both authors define their adolescent selves in terms of an 
enforced isolationism: 
and: 
Never once, until I left my father, was I allowed to run out alone into the road with the other 
children, 
I was forbidden by my mother to play in the streets.37 
Puritanical and paranoid, Althusser's mother educates her son in a "pure" household 
away from other children: 
The only excursion I ever made [ ... ] was to the flat of a thin, languid pair who seemed 
disembodied and otherworldly. They were not husband and wife but brother and sister [ ... ], 
both unmarried and living together permanently.:.a 
Rousseau's own frrst trip away from home is identical: he goes to lodge at the home 
of a pastor, M. Lambercier and his sister, Mlle. Lambercier, in order to pursue his 
education.39 
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Both write of the regenerative effects of country life on their spirits and of the 
importance of country ways in shaping their morals. Both also believe that their lives 
would have taken a happier course had they been born into farming families.40 What 
is interesting is that the two of them expend a considerable amount of ink writing 
highly stylised fictional accounts of fulfilling experiences "in Nature". Althusser 
writes of a day spent threshing his grandfather's wheat succeeded by an evening of 
celebration: 'What a sense of splendour and communion I felt. ,41 What follows is a 
passage rich in descriptive detail, where odours, sounds and tastes are all conjured 
through a hyper-sensitivity to the various natural stimuli surrounding him. Althusser 
writes that, among these farm h~ds, he felt like he belonged. This tale of acceptance 
and harmony within nature is, however, a fraudulent fabrication: 
Faced with the truth, I now have to make a painful confession. I was not inside the kitchen 
and, therefore, did not experience the wine-drinking and the chaotic singing at frrst hand .. .1 
dreamt it, that is to say, I sirriply had an intense desire for it to be real. It certainly could 
have happened, but for the sake of truth I have to accept and present it for what it was in my 
memory: a sort of hallucination of my intense desire. 42 
Althusser admits that he stood on the outside of the door listening in. His memory is 
constructed from distorted and muffled sounds and imagined scenarios. Yet we know 
that for Althusser hallucinations are also facts, which is to say, they are able to 
archive something about Althusser which is as much a part of his truth as other "real" 
events. To repress this unconscious archive would, according to Althusser, threaten 
the stability of the archive. 
As for Rousseau, he writes an analogous piece" although he marks it out as fictive or 
"hallucinatory" through the deliberate disruption of the narrative. Rousseau describes 
the farmhouse idyll of Les Charmettes.43 It is perhaps significant that both scenes take 
place in the same type of location and that this location is traditionally found in the 
realm of fiction.44 Rousseau's reverie or 'hallucination' begins as he details the dates 
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when he leased the farmhouse. This dating clearly interrupts the narrative flow of a 
text ostensibly concerned with portraying a utopian experience. For two pages 
Rousseau describes a rural perfection based on innocence and joy. Yet Rousseau is 
surely mistaken. Historical archives reveal that the farm lease was taken two years 
after Rousseau claimed to have moved in.4s However, we must not rely solely on the 
historian to highlight this inconsistency. Rousseau himself provides the opportunity 
for any vigilant reader to mistrust the authenticity of this archived event and to reread 
it as a 'virtual' or unconscious archive. 
Firstly, the passage in which Rousseau describes his time spent at Les Charmettes is 
markedly out of keeping with the rest of the text in terms of style and sentiment, 
owing more to the picaresque tradition of contemporary novels. More importantly, it 
is structurally impossible that this passage should not prove problematic. Throughout 
his text Rousseau has been very careful to write within the confines of a strict 
chronology. Thus, Book 1: 1 covers the period 1719-1723, Book 1:2 covers the period 
1723-28, Book 2 covers 1728-1731 and so on. A problem arises when we realise that 
there is no room in Rousseau's narrative structure for the period spent at les 
Charmettes to exist because it exists 'elsewhere' within the text. Cohen questions the 
authenticity of the passage and uses Rousseau's mistake as proof of a mental 
imbalance.46 However, Rousseau's Book 6:1, where the idyll is described, covers the 
period of 1738. This year is written only to be immediately erased by Rousseau in 
part 2 of that same book which claims to cover the period 1737-41. This second book 
should then re-elaborate the account of the idyll in a unique example of repetition for 
repetition's sake. Yet, in its detailed analysis of Rousseau's life in these three years it 
fails to mention the farmhouse at all. The year of 1738 is differently accounted for. 
Thus, Rousseau can archive an event and then retract it - as Althusser did - allowing 
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the event to disappear "behind" its rewriting only a few pages later. Not only does 
Cohen not offer an account for this stunning piece of editing,47 indeed, I have never 
yet read an account of this re-writing, but even if this major structural anomaly did 
not exist, Rousseau's own Book 6 offers us an honest interpretation of its fictive 
content: 
Indeed if it all consisted of facts, deeds, and words, I could describe [les Charmettes] and in a 
sense convey its meaning. But how can I tell what was neither said, nor done, nor even 
thought[ ... ]. My imagination [ ... ] compensates me.48 
Where historians might only be able to offer evidence of Rousseau's jealousy, 
impotence and increasing paranoia it is possible to archive these years differently and 
positively, allowing for at least two complex and contradictory narratives which 
effectively destabilise any faith in a traditional concept of the archive. Certainly, 
Althusser was referring to Rousseau with his own virtual archive. At the height of his 
reverie, when he loses himself in the one voice of the singing farmhands, he names 
Rousseau. He looses his identity not to that of a communal body of workers, but 
instead to Rousseau. The song that the worker's of Althusser's hallucination sing is 
one of peasant revolt or, more significantly, a 'song of the Jacquerie' .49 It is, for 
Althusser, 'reminiscent of the name Jacques I wished had been mine' .50 
It would". seem that the whole point of Althusser's dream archive was to evoke 
Rousseau's name and his fiction in order to undermine his own, and all other, 
attempts at archiving. Our name, the reassuring secret of self-identity, comes to 
function as the so-called-proper. I believe th~t my proper name presents me even 
though I really know that my name is constantly copied elsewhere. If the archive is 
reliant upon proper names, what might it mean for Althusser to copy Rousseau's 
Confessions inserting his own name instead of Rousseau's, whilst writing of how 
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Louis is the name of another and recognising also that Louis is a homophone for the 
word lui, the masculine third person pronoun. 
The originality and the non-transmutability of Rousseau's text continues to be 
undermined throughout Althusser's autobiography as he is seen to take the place of 
Rousseau. Rousseau's text is inserted into Althusser's where it can assume the status 
of a borrowed fiction. There are identical references to adolescent homosexual 
encounters51 and to more serious homosexual commitments in later life: 
and: 
We became so intimate that we planned to spend our lives together. I was to go to Ascoytia, 
after some years, and live with him on his estate. All the details of the scheme were 
arranged[ ... ]. Subsequent events [ ... ] his marriage [ ... ] have parted us forever.s2 
I wrote to him from Morocco, [ ... J begging him never to get married. Though he gave me 
his word, he did not keep it, and I was left to suffer. S3 
Both writers chronicle the symbolic rape they suffered at the hands of mother 
figures,S4 narrate their fascination with the monastic life,55 write of a virginity 
maintained beyond average years and reveal an obsession not only with this economy 
of sexuality but also with financial economy. Althusser was miserly, feeling that his 
need to have money "in reserve" was crucial to any understanding of him. Similarly, 
Rousseau coveted money.56 Freedom for both of them, according to their 
autobiographies, was dependent on financial security and neither was averse to bouts 
of petty thieving. 57 
In another interesting example of similitude the two authors became convinced 
beyond all medical and circumstantial evidence - Althusser was still a virgin - that 
they had V.D. In the process of visiting doctors both men discovered that they had a 
malformation of the penis which could actually prevent the sufferer from catching 
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sexually transmitted diseases.58 Indeed, both texts scrupulously chronicle health 
details. 
A sense of impotence, in the fullest sense of that word, pervades much of what we feel 
we "know" about these men. This does not mean that these authors were incapable of 
sex: both fathered children. Rather, this feeling of powerlessness is more generally 
apparent. They claim to desperately want to be in love with a woman, yet feel 
incapable of this love.59 Despite spending most of their lives with one woman, their 
wives, both men maintain that they do not love these women: 
and: 
From the moment I saw her till this very day, I have never felt the least glimmering of love 
for her [ ... ] the woman who has been dearest to me. 
I felt incapable of the least expression of genuine love towards her.60 
Certainly, while it is wrong to say that these men were sexually impotent - there is no 
textual evidence for this - both men describe their frrst sexual encounter in tenus of 
repugnance, shame and a feeling of incestuous gUilt: 
and: 
I was overcome by feelings of terror and repulsion - I could not bear the smell of her skin 
which I found disgusting [ ... ]. When she left I was plunged into a profound state of anguish 
from which I could not escape 
I felt repugnance and fear [ ... ]. The day came[ ... ] Was I happy? No; I tasted the pleasure 
but I knew not what invincible sadness poisoned its charm.61 
Both men write of the serious depressions suffered as a consequence of sexual 
experiences tainted by incestuous feelings.62 The result of this was a strategic sterility: 
Rousseau's children were orphaned out and Althusser's wife went to England for an 
abortion. Indeed, such feelings of artifice and sterility are discussed by both writers 
when relating all aspects of their lives. Artifice is identified by both as the very 
foundation of the education system. Both deliberate upon a process of seduction at 
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the heart of education which reduces it to a system of deception, imitation and 
flattery. Those who do not seduce through imitation, fail, whilst those who wish to 
remain in the system to subvert it - Rousseau and Althusser - try to operate at a 
distance.63 Rousseau went into retreat and Althusser sought "refuge" in the Rue 
d'Ulm. This deliberate policy of isolationism became the underlying principle of 
their behaviours and their philosophies: 
You only have to read my texts to realise that the themes of solitude and responsibility run 
through them like an obsessive leitmotif. On so many occasions I have repeated iliat I simply 
intervened [ ... J alone, against the world - which my adversaries made me aware of for a long 
time- and at my own risk.64 
Althusser's constant return to the risks inherent in the choice of isolation and his 
reliance upon the theme of responsibility, must be read in the light of Rousseau's life 
spent in isolation, be it at the Hermitage, Neuchatel or, most obviously, on the little 
island of Saint-Pierre in the middle of the Lake of Bienne. Here Rousseau 
deliberately chose a site which would serve as a self-contained prison.6S 
Silence, the enemy 
Mutually tied to the 'reputation of being a recluse' ,66 a necessary dilemma arises: does 
a writer seeking anonymity get more attention? Certainly it is not without irony that I 
note that both men were renowned for their reclusivity. This silence, this distance 
from other men, carried risks. Both writers paradoxically ally their desire for 
anonymity to the project of autobiography. The assembling of an archive is intended 
to compensate the reader for this anonymity by evidencing what this life has consisted 
of. Each moment then is accounted for in a movement which makes up for any prior 
withholding of information and simultaneously silences any malicious or slanderous 
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rumOUf. The archive would replace this lived experience. It is a fear of the 
repercussions of silence which motivates autobiography: 
Nothing about me must remain hidden or obscure [ ... ]. Indeed, [the reader] must never lose 
sight of me for a single instant, for if he fmds the slightest gap in my story, the smallest 
hiatus, he may wonder what I was doing at that moment and accuse me of refusing to tell the 
whole truth. I am laying myself sufficiently open to human malice by telling my story, 
without rendering myself more vulnerable by any silence.67 
And Althusser writes: 
In offering this extremely personal record of my life to whoever wishes to read it, I again 
seek, in a somewhat paradoxical movement, a definitive state of anonymity: not the 
anonymity afforded by the fact that I was declared unfit to plead [ ... ] but by publishing all 
there is to know about me, thus putting an end to further requests for me to be indiscreet.68 
Yet, it would seem that Althusser chose to construct an archive which, at every 
moment, would recall a prior archive belonging to Rousseau. Doubly complicated, 
this copy copies an already problematic, because self-deconstructive, text. Wherever 
Althusser identifies key narrative themes, wherever he "reveals" himself, he reveals at 
least one other person - Rousseau - and one other text. If Althusser's Future is a copy 
of Rousseau's Confessions, removed at least one pace from his own life, is it a 
fiction? If it is, and it must be so, then Rousseau's autobiography must also belong to 
that genre as it refers to types, substituting an idea of truth for an experience of 
actuality. Certainly, according to Althusser's biographer, Yann Moulier Boutang, 
AlthusS'er had always regarded the autobiographical work as a canular or hoax.69 
As Althusser referred to Rousseau at the very beginning of Future, so he'does, with 
more insistence, towards the end of the book. Immediately after Althusser writes of 
his desire to present himself to the reader, (see above) he embarks upon a series of 
statements whose common theme is their reiteration of the name of Rousseau.7o 
Significantly, at the height of his desire for total presence through autobiography, he 
can only refer to that 'seminal text', to that other autobiography: 
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I saw the Confessions as a unique example of a form of self -analysis, undertaken without the 
slightest form of complacency, in which Rousseau clearly revealed himself in writing about 
and reflecting on the key events of his childhood and adult life. But most importantly [ ... ] 
they dealt with sexuality.'1 
How exactly should one take this attribution of originality after over two hundred 
pages of text which could be seen as a reiteration of Rousseau's Confessions? Can I 
interpret this unproblematically considering Althusser's hommage? Bearing in mind 
that the introduction to Future ridiculed Rousseau for claiming his work as unique, I 
must acknowledge that wherever Althusser chooses to praise Rousseau's radical 
independence - his aversion to money and his self- education -" he is praising traits 
which he has constantly written of when defining himself. 
Better left unsaid 
The end of Future concerns the murder of Althusser's wife. It is a time period 
marked by amnesia, emphasised within the text by Althusser's reliance upon medical 
archives, diaries, journals and letters. Althusser can no longer pretend to believe in 
the archive. In the space of a few pages he moves away from his already admittedly 
problematical suggestion that he might really "lay his cards on" the table" and "be 
defined once and for all" to admitting that this final stage of his life - the murder of 
his wife at his own hands - 'remains unfathomable' .72 That event which could perhaps 
be said to belong uniquely to him is in fact lost. 
Indeed it is true to say that both texts oscillate between this desire for absolute 
definition and the recognition of this desire as unattainable. This event, this murder, 
resists the archiving process. It is marked by amnesia precisely because it is not a 
reiteration. Althusser cannot find an intertext where someone else kills his wife, the 
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closest he can get to this event is through the reiteration of medical and 
psychoanalytical case studies. However, no text can be found which might explain to 
him why he, Louis Althusser, killed his wife.73 Agreeing again with Rousseau, 
Althusser admits that 'gaps and blanks I cannot fill' must remain.74 
Responsibility to the reader must be redefined. One must admit that the archive is 
defective - perhaps not really an archive at all. The archive has been confused with 
historicity, and the responsibility of the archive has thus been misunderstood.7s 
Archival knowledge occludes abysses, naIvely presuming to neutralise them. In fact, 
readers of the archive lose themselves in the excessive detail and fail to notice the 
aporia at the heart of the archive-machine: that which resists narrative. Certainly, any 
honest archive admits to its deficiencies and establishes an elaborate contractual 
arrangement. The archive then comes to be seen in terms of the future. Both writers 
promise, Althusser in the very title of his work, that their archives are incomplete and 
open to supplementation, intending that the archiving process always look to the 
future for its eventual completion. In Book Seven of his Confessions Rousseau had 
promised to add a supplement to the work. Although he never did this, he continued 
to indicate, within the text, that his was a 'work in progress'. The· text only ends in an 
arbitrary way. At the end of his autobiography we realise that within the text and 
alongside our reading of the text, he too has been reading the text to an· assembled 
group of friends. This audience within the text is invited to comment on the book and 
their (lack of) comments form part of that book. We as readers are also invited to 
comment on the book and to provide additional information or relevant stories where 
we feel that Rousseau has omitted facts, with the implicit agreement that our 
comments will form part of his archive.76 
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Althusser's Future mimics this structure. We believe the book to be ending when in 
fact it continues. We discover that this book has also been read before its publication 
so that the reactions of a private audience can be recorded within the text to provide a 
part of that text. Althusser's analyst has read the book and is invited to offer a 
supplement. 77 Both authors undermine the value of the supplement as a 
psychoanalytical structure by revealing it to be a textual construct. These 
"supplements" appear within the text, they are not added to the positivity of a 
presence. Althusser also undermines the psychoanalytic model of truth where an 
opposition of conscious and unconscious states parallels concepts of appearance and 
reality. To suppose that the truth about Althusser could be recovered only with the 
help of an analyst would be to deny the medical establishment's involvement in 
literary narratives. The contribution of Althusser's doctor cannot complete the book. 
After his six page long commentary, which achieves no more than the silent reaction 
of Rousseau's privy audience, Althusser, again reminiscent of Rousseau, appeals to 
the reader for any contributions: 'One final word: I hope those who think they know 
more or have more to say will not be afraid to do so. They can only help me live. ,78 
In their structure, both texts resist the very possibility of the final word. More than 
that, they undermine the value of the word itself by problematising the status of the 
supplement as addition and opening onto a future where an infinity of words can only 
offer reiterations, copies and translations: '[T]he indefmite process of supplementary 
has always already infiltrated presence, always already inscnbed there the space of 
repetition and the splitting of the self' .79 
What escapes the archive; that which cannot be said, is what destabilises traditional 
archive theory. If what we are is unknowable in any complete sense, then what is 
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partially recovered is done so within a narrative that becomes conflated with identity 
itself. Any reiteration of this narrative establishes its truth status through a 
tautologous pattern which merely fulfils reader expectations. Althusser's narrative 
cannot be judged true because it corresponds to any external image, it is deemed true 
because it conforms to a grammar. The truth status of Althusser's autobiography can 
be corroborated through reference to other intertexts whose grammar it repeats. So it 
is that wherever historians seek to denounce Althusser or Rousseau, they do so not 
through reference to the discrepancies between their autobiographies and their "real 
lives", but through inconsistencies between their autobiographies and other intertexts. 
So that, for example, Cohen can" attack Rousseau's confessional narrative only at the 
moment when it disagrees with other types of textual evidence, such as the lease 
papers for les Charmettes. 80 Similarly, Elisabeth Bruss and Catherine Beaudry are 
suspicious of Rousseau because, according to them, two textual givens should add up 
to an extra-textual truth. With Rousseau, however, discrepancies between texts can 
lead to accusations of 'bad faith. ,81 
5.2. Coming home, or ''home is where the text is" 
The papers that I had collected to make good the defects in my memory and to guide me in 
this undertaking have all passed into other hands and will never again return to mine. 
Confessions, pp.261-262 
I was distressed to learn that, urged by the authorities and without consulting or even 
notifying me, those in charge at the Ecole had moved all my things out of my large flat in the 
rue d'Ulm, a flat which had meant so much to me in my life [ ... ]. This measure seemed to 
condemn me [ ... ]. So far as my flat was concerned, my physical surroundings, it was as if I 
no longer existed. 
Future, pp.262-263 
The meaning of "archive" comes to it from the Greek arkheon: a house, a domicile, an 
address. 
Archive Fever, p.2 
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If, as Derrida states, there is an 'archontic dimension of domiciliation' ,82 an archontic 
function without which no archive, as such, can exist, this function is consignation. 
The archive properly resides as signs gathered together at one address. The archive is 
'written proof' ,83 it is a system which promotes the very possibility of proving and so 
it is of itself and in essence a principle which rejects heterogeneity. So what happens 
when the archive is divided between many different addresses? Rousseau's letters 
were stolen, mailed to another's house or destroyed. Similarly, Althusser's 
possessions were all moved from his house and sent to an apartment that he had never 
seen. This displacement threatens the possibility of their archives so long as a 
traditional definition of the archive as a principle of consignation and domiciliation is 
upheld. 
Rousseau and Althusser are both homeless when we meet them in their 
autobiographies. Certainly, any "proof' of who they are resides apart from these 
archivists. According to Derrida: 
Wherever secrets and heterogeneity would seem to menace even the possibility of 
consignation, this can only have grave consequences for a theory of the archive, as well as 
for its institutional implementation.84 
Yet, despite the obvious problems which should counter the' possibility of an 
Althusserian or Rousseauian archive, these institutions do exist and are influential in 
shaping our ideas about who Althusser and Rousseau were, are and will. be. The 
archive is a powerful mechanism for the control of memory. As Derrida suggests, 
those who control the archive and, to a lesser extent, those who· have access to it, have 
the power to determine what the rest of us will know about that archive and know as 
if b 8S I we remem ere 
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Perhaps, as Derrida suggests, democracy can be measured by access to and 
participation in the archive. However, even if this were the case, even if it were not 
impossible to imagine a time when one might always be seen as a threat to archive 
stability,86 what can it mean to gain access to an archive that has always already been 
mutilated and impoverished? If the archive is always the site of a suppression, how 
can we re-interpret the archival principle of domiciliation and consignation? 
What might it mean to us that, once dead and buried, Rousseau's body was exhumed 
and, contrary to his wishes, reburied in Paris, a city he loathed, next to his arch-rival 
Voltaire? What might this second burial site archive about Rousseau? Might it better 
serve in telling us something about those who control his archive and who wish it to 
be known that Rousseau is welcomed "home" to France, so that the archontic 
principles of domiciliation and consignation are in effect a blow against democracy? 
Also, what might it mean that once I gain access to the archive, I see only 
reprographics and transcripts, whilst supposed "original" ma~erial remains beyond 
sight or touch, secreted in temperature-controlled stacks. 
According to Derrida, the archive is a site of law. It is perhaps. more specifically a 
site of memory, of conservation and of suppression which we can understand in terms 
of the legal system. It is where one can 'accumulate, capitalise, stock a quasi-infinity 
of layers, of archival strata that are at once superimposed, overprinted and env~loped 
in each other' .87 
Certainly, archives encourage a geological or archaeological approach. Excavation, 
surgery and circumcision are all appropriate metaphors and Derrida discusses the 
removal of the epidermis of the penis as a pertinent symbol of archival investigation: 
one cuts through layers until one "arrives". What then do we make of two writers 
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who suffered from phimosis: a condition where the prepuce resists any investigative 
surgery, where the glands cannot be uncovered or excavated and where a guarded 
privacy is maintained. Certainly there can be "hidden" archives and we have called 
these the archives of the unconscious. What is psychoanalysis if it is not an attempt to 
attest to a type of archival documentation where the historian might identify nothing. 
For Freud, as indeed for Rousseau and Althusser, dreams, hallucinations and 
delusions all form a part of truth so that 'there is a truth of delusion [ ... ] analogous to 
that "historical truth",[ ... ] this truth is repressed or suppressed' .88 
But this virtual archive is no less problematic than its "real" counterpart and in Future 
and Confessions the psychoanalytic model of truth was problematised through its 
implication in the literary narrative. Above all, Rousseau and Althusser seek to upset 
this archaeological trope of discovery. Rather, what I want here, is to find the 
moment proper to the archive and to rid myself of the mistaken belief that memory 
and the archive might ever be the same thing. Or as Derrida would say, the archival 
moment cannot be predicated upon a spontaneous memory but is experienced instead 
as a "prosthetic" memory, 'that re-producible, iterable, and conservative production of 
memory'.89 
Here is no sense of any archaeology or excavation, rather it is a sense of knowing as if 
we remember because of a knowledge production based on tautology: all texts are at _ 
least a second reading. Who might the mnemo~ist be? Who might possess a memory 
from which nothing is ever erased? The possibility of a remembering of origin and 
the idea of spontaneous memory are effaced in favour of a concept of the archive as 
the 'copy of an impression' .90 At least twice removed from origin, the archive as copy 
168 
Chapter 5 
of a copy reformulates the Rousseauian and Althusserian concept of autobiography as 
reiteration. 
If my "new" concept of the archive still lacks rigour it is perhaps because I am 
uncertain where this archive belongs. Certainly, if I cannot trust the archive to 
faithfully record the past, if it always fails in this respect, it must belong to the future 
and to the promise of an event archiving itself in this future to come. Even if the 
archive has proved inadequate to the task I still invest hope in the archive to come. 
Thus, I continue to say that the archive will exist. There is a desire, what Derrida here 
calls a "fever" for the archive and for this future-to-come, this t a-venire Both 
Rousseau and Althusser write of this future and of those in the future who will 
attempt to complete their archives. The last page of their texts could be seen as the 
foundation of a promise. Certainly, Derrida ties memory to this idea of the promise 
and removes the area of responsibility for the archive from the subject of the archive 
to those who make up and determine the future of that archive. Responsibility for the 
archive is, then, held in trust. According to Derrida, it is the question of a 'response, 
of a promise and of a responsibility for tomorrow' .91 The question of whether those 
who make up this future, those with whom this promise is made, ever do assume 
responsibility for and respond for the control they exert over the archive is not 
addressed. If the archive must be a collaborative project who is then responsible for 
the proper names of Rousseau and Althusser? 
What Rousseau and Althusser attempted was to redefine this archive-responsibility. 
Unable to complete their own archives they turned to future writers. However, the 
status of this inchoate writing was challenged. Their concept of the archive demands 
that we respond to what the archive is: reliant upon proper names, titles, hierarchies 
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and classifications. For them, our only responsibility is to a recognition of this typo-
nomology or mechanics of the archive. If there can be 'no meta-archive' ,92 yet the 
archive constantly desires to be what it can only ever represent, then the admission of 
this desire within a text that operates as desire, is the only responsible archivy. Our 
responsibility, our promise to Rousseau or Althusser, is to oscillate between the text 
as parousia and a recognition of the text as desire for that parousia. The only 
consolation for Rousseau and Althusser is that this future, where they are literally 
unavailable (because dead) will never be able to make them more than literally 
available. It is a future of repetitions,93 so that what will be written they had already 
written themselves. The future of their archive will contain its past as the living 
contain the dead: not just Althusser's archive containing Rousseau's, but Rousseau's 
containing Althusser's and both containing so much' of what had gone before.94 
Words, gestures and memories are all shared and all already belong to somebody else 
where they are all already inadequate as definitions of that somebody. So that no one 
is ever able to bear witness to the singularity of either an event- or a person. No one 
'ever responds in an absolutely living and infinitely well-adjusted manner, without the 
least automatism, without ever having an archival technique overflow the singularity 
of an event' .95 There is always some 'answering machine' effect/6 some spectrality in 
the response and thus, some dead in the living. 
I must, therefore, assume the only form of responsibility, that taken by Rousseau and 
Althusser, which is to bear witness to this ghostliness of the archive and to oppose all 
attempts to use the archive as an index of individuality. Certainly, in a world which 
is, as Derrida claims, 'en mal d'archive' ,97 in a world increasingly eager to believe in 
the truth-value of the archive and increasingly dependant upon this truth status, there 
is a need to reassess the limitations of the archive and to question its powers to present 
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the absent. Unquestionably, wherever we face nostalgia, and the archive is always 
partly driven by nostalgia, it will not be easy. Yet the fact that the uniqueness we 
search for remains unfindable should not be lamented. The admission of spectrality in 
the archive does not disallow individuality. Rather, what escapes iteration, the very 
unfathomable thing, remains unique. Our silence, perhaps greatest at death, is what 
belongs uniquely to us. This silence is what made Rousseau and Althusser so 
dangerous, it is what forced them to write their autobiographies and it is ultimately 
this silence which we read between the lines of those same autobiographies. We 
should learn to embrace silences which might resist even the most rigorous detective 
work and respect the uniqueness of our 'unconditional right to secrecy' .98 Perhaps 
this secret or silence is not so much a right as a necessity: it is what escapes the 
archive, even that virtual archive of the unconscious, because it is a secret kept from 
even ourselves, it is a silence despite our speech. And so, in our nostalgia for the 
archive, for evidence, proof, or testimony, we must always bow to this lack at the 
heart of the archive and to that which has 'burned [ ... ] without a name, without the 
least symptom and without even an ash' .99 
Something, somewhere, goes free .... 
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CHAPTER SIX 
"I CIRCUMFESS" : DERRIDA AND (AUTO)BIOGRAPHY 
6.0. Introduction 
In the previous chapter I read Althusser's autobiography, The Future Lasts a Long 
Time, as a conscious 'type' or copy of Rousseau's Confessions, wondering what the 
consequences might be for truth value of a confession that repeats itself. In this 
chapter I read three texts by Derrida which concern the confessional text or 
autobiography. The fIrst of these, The Post Card, contains a series of 
'autobiographical' envois which, in tum, discuss autobiography. The second text, 
Circumjessions, is a 'type' of autobiography and the third, Monolingualism of the 
Other or The Prosthesis of Origin is a text about cultural identity and the limited 
possibilities for the historical archives of Nation States. Where Derrida theorises the 
autobiography in terms of copy or citation I will read the influence of Rousseau, de 
Man and Althusser. I also hope to compare Derrida's interpretation of confessional-
language, and the legal context within which it is embedded, t? de Man's analysis - in 
his Allegories of Reading - of a "machinal" language at work in the 'trial' scene of 
Rousseau's Confessions. 
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6.1. The Post Card 
Possibilities for talking face-to face 
What one calls life ~ the thing or object of biology or biography - does not stand face-to-face 
with something that would be its opposable ob-ject: death, the thanatological or 
thanatographical. This is the ftrst complication. l 
Derrida's Post Card, published in 1987 as an epistolary novel purporting to reveal to 
the reader a series of postcards written by himself to an "other" or series of "others" 
during a period of about three years (1977-1979) is, in fact, a vehement diatribe 
against the truth status of autobiographical writing. Derrida admits to a shameful 
desire to reveal or 'present' himself to us in these letters. Reminiscent of both 
Rousseau and Althusser in the opening pages of The Confessions and The Future 
Lasts a Long Time, Derrida here yearns for a new and honest language, an ultimately 
private language, which might be so true and transparent that it must be 'invented at 
every step,.2 Later, he writes: 
I would like to erase all the traits of language, coming back to the most simple (you know, 
like when I breathe [ ... ]) in order to send to you "words" that are "true" enough for me not to 
recognise them.3 
However, these archives or 'confessions' are ignoble simply because they demand 
that we use an everyday language, capable of reiteration, to describe that which is 
unique and in the absence of any such spontaneous language capable of presenting 
him to another, the post-carded structure of the book at least enables Derrida to 
"'banalise" the cipher of the unique tragedy,.4 
That is, this device of the post cards allows Derrida to illustrate the 'iterability' of all 
discourses. The post card as a reproduction opposes itself to the idea of a "single" 
and therefore "true" letter and so enacts the tragedy of identity as copy and duplicate. 
Derrida is discussing the possibility, indeed the necessity, that the same words can be 
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repeated in different contexts - here the same post-card or discourse can be sent to a 
different address or context - and this possibility makes any stability of identity of 
these words impossible and places Derrida, and all of us, 'in relation, without 
discretion, to tragedy' . S Moreover, the possibility of this repetition of words from one 
context into another context whose intentional field is almost certainly unrelated 
removes the possibility of discerning authorial intention within the text: 
The disappearance of truth as presence, the withdrawal of the present origin of presence, is 
the condition of all (manifestations of) truth [ ... ] Differance, the disappearance of any 
originary presence, is at once the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility 
of truth.6 
So that the fonn that this 'novel' assumes has been chosen by Derrida to reveal the 
particular type of tragedy from which we suffer. The postcard is a copy - it is a 
multiple capable of mass reproduction and destined for the market place - and our 
inability to write about ourselves in any unique or truly singular way places us in 
relation to this structure. Marion Hobson, writing about Derrida's Dissemination, 
notes that for him: 'Both in the movement that is identity, and in the movement of 
presentation, of appearing, there is a necessary replication.,7 
Identity can only establish itself through a repetition - I identify something, for 
exampl~ a signature, by referring it to something else - whereas the unique resists 
knowledge. The 'tragedy', according to Derrida, is that I can not communicate about 
myself in any unique way. Derrida here repeats Rousseau's sentiments, voiced in his 
Confessions, that 'writing and hiding'S - where writing is hiding or perhaps, more 
accurately, disappearance - are our only options: 'I believe that I prefer to write to you 
(even if you are facing me, or as" at the moment [ ... ] just next to me).,9 Later he 
writes: 'It is a question [ ... ] of turning my back to them by pretending to address 
myself to them.,lo 
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It is not that identity is replicated, rather that replication constitutes identity. And this 
replication that is identity arises from the fact that our identities are constituted in 
language. Derrida - like Rousseau in his Confessions - is writing about the absence of 
a spontaneous language between individuals. Writing lies at the heart of so-called 
spontaneous speech, and this 'written' language always interrupts the possibility of 
the face-to-face. 
The trial 
Because of the post-carded structure of autobiographical writing it is impossible that 
there might be a 'unique addre'ssee': more than one person can receive the same 
reproduced card. A linguistic generality as the defining feature of confessional texts 
renounces the possibility of any authorial responsibility. This impossibility is what 
Derrida calls 'our tragic 10t'.11 We desire truth and this desire 'has extorted the most 
terrifying "confessions" from us, after which we were more distant from ourselves 
than ev~r, without getting near to any truth at all' .12 
So that really, all these confessions can only serve a single function, which is to 
satisfy a certain 'perverse desire to see or to show' petty details, and 'false secrets' .13, 
Those who read these texts believing to find a real 'flesh and ~lood' person beyond or 
behind the text can only be motivated by some corrupt voyeurism and those who write 
them by a type of exhibitionism. Later, Derrida similarly describes the desire to read 
the entire corpus Platonicum as the desire to 'settle into it as if into a very refined 
brothel, with confessionals and peepholes everywhere' .14 
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Derrida is hoping to debunk the truth status of autobiographical writing by showing 
that confessional texts are desired because of a misplaced faith in the authenticity and 
the veracity of any biographical narrative. This general misplaced faith, obvious in 
the trust our society places in biography, stems from the validation', of a legal system 
which relies on the confession as evidence of intention and which, in tum, emanates 
from the very Christian concept of the availability of intention. De Man considers a 
similar dilemma in Allegories when he writes of Rousseau's slander of Marion over 
the ribbon theft: 
The more crime there is, the more theft, lie, slander, and stubborn persistence in each of 
them, the' better. The more resistance to exposure, the more satisfying the scene and, 
especially, the more satisfying and eloquent the belated revelation.l$ 
There is, then, behind the need for confessions to be true, a terrible salaciousness, a 
vulgar voyeurism which feeds off the details which the confessional text, or 
autobiography, offers. In fact, "memoirs" or confessional texts are merely 'shadows 
and blanks,16 and the archivists who insist on attributing some truth status to these 
"documents" exhibit: 
that fundamental, irreducible imbecility, and that vulgarity, that ~garity in their 
imperturbable assurance [ ... J. They want to authenticate. As if I could not pretend to write 
fictive letters, with multiple authors and addressees!17 
Derrida opposes the idea of authenticity to that of fiction. For literary critics 
everywhere who seek authenticity in this genre, Derrida's use of epistles and in 
particular, his use of postcards, attempts to upset their crusade: 
what above all throws them all off the track in their hunt is that the epistolary simulacrum 
cannot be stabilised, installed in a certain place, and especially that it is not necessarily, and 
completely, intentional:8 
The epistolary model refuses consignation and domiciliation and thus, the archiving 
process itself. Because this novel is founded upon a post-carded structure, dependant 
upon the very possibility of repetition, copy and stereotype, it is never properly 
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determinable in terms of an intention which must rely on the possibility of 
uniqueness. Thus, this structure of iterability continually defies the call to 
responsibility demanded by the legal context established in any reading of 
autobiography. So that, for Derrida, the authenticity of the autobiographical text is 
always necessarily questionable due to its relation to fiction. For this reason Derrida 
admires Plato's letters because their authenticity was always 'most suspect,.19 
For Derrida, autobiographical texts are necessarily guilty in relation to truth-telling 
and authenticity if only because the addressee, under whose dictation the text is 
always written - the biographer, the literary critic, the 'private detective' - makes 
unreasonable demands of the genre by turning all autobiographical writing into a trial 
or a 'police affair'. 20 Who is judged in autobiography? Derrida wonders whether the 
accused is Derrida or "Derrida" and this ontological impasse recalls to mind a similar 
question raised in Rousseau's autobiographical sketch, Rousseau Juge de Jean-
Jacques in his Third Reverie. Derrida's letters, on the other hand, are not written to 
convince us or to 'plead [his] case' .21 Since autobiography cannot be read outside of a 
legal context Derrida writes to plead another case - that autobiography is necessarily 
fictional. Derrida takes his point of departure from the principle that we can only 
write and/or receive postcards and that the 'true' letter is always held in 'reserve' .22 
The problem with the autobiographical or confessional narrative is that i~ is always 
written in response to an accusation of gUilt. For example, without considering the-
obvious here - Rousseau's Confessions or Althusser's Future -' Plato's letters to Denys 
were written in response to a demand to tell the truth or, as Derrida puts it, 'as always, 
in question was a truth in response to an accusation, within a trial, the effect of a 
cause'.23 
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In The Post Card Derrida is highlighting the fact that autobiographical writing always 
occurs in response to a demand from the reader. The text then becomes an excuse or 
apology for a 'crime' where we are forced to believe the author 'without proof, 
without narrative, [and] without detail' ,24 because the postcard relies on a 
representation without any evidence. As Marion Hobson writes: 'What is repeated 
can be absent, in the same way as in writing the originating meaning or intention, that 
is, the life, can be absent.' 25 
For an analogous discussion I can refer back to de Man's interpretation of "evidence" 
in Rousseau's Confessions. 26 Here autobiography is discussed by de Man in relation 
to Rousseau's 'trial' for stealing a ribbon from the head of a household where he was 
employed. In this 'trial' Rousseau shamefully lied about the theft and slandered a 
maidservant, Marion, when he accused her of the theft that he had committed.27 
Within this narrative passage, the courtroom analogy helps to establish the idea of the 
autobiography as a trial where the author is the defendant and the reader the judge. In 
Rousseau's case the Confessions are supposedly written because of this 'trial' arid 
because of Rousseau's desire to excuse his behaviour, or 'plead his case'.28 It is then 
the memory of a crime which instigates Rousseau's text. However Rousseau, in fact, 
goes on to give us a series of excuses for his behaviour. What de Man writes about -
this series of excuses at the heart of Rousseau's confession - reveals the fictive nature 
of all confessions: 
The ftrst thing established by this edifying narrative is that the Confessions are not primarily 
a confessional text. To confess is to overcome guilt and shame in the name of truth.29 
Rousseau's Confessions, according to de Man, do not unveil a state of being, that is to 
say, they do not' state facts. Rather, there is a discrepancy between Rousseau's 
sentiment interieure - which prompts the excuse - and the act of theft and slander: 
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But the spatial inside/outside metaphor is misleading, for it articulates a differentiation that is 
not spatial at all. The distinction between the confession stated in the mode of revealed truth 
and the confession stated in the mode of excuse is that the evidence for the former is 
referential (the ribbon), whereas the evidence for the latter can only be verbal. Rousseau can 
convey his inner feelings to usonly if we take, as we say, his word for it.30 
Thus, confessional language, according to de Man, must be considered under this 
double epistemological perspective: there is a verbal and non-verbal nature of 
'evidence' in the confession so that the confession can never be verified by empirical 
means. To this extent, the confession cannot tell the truth because the apologetic text 
relies on the impossibility of establishing an hors texte. So it is that when Rousseau 
writes of the theft and slander in a later text, his fourth Reverie, de Man can state: 
'Clearly the apology has not succeeded [ ... ] the excuse presented in the Confessions 
was unable to satisfy Rousseau as a judge of Jean-Jacques. ,31 
The machine 
From the outset, the truth status, or authenticity, of these envo~s is ambiguous - w~o 
composes these letters, who receives them and, perhaps above all, do they represent a 
real correspondence? Derrida persistently complicates the very idea of 
correspondence: 
Who is writing? To whom? And to send, to destine, to dispatch what? To what address? 
[ ... ] lowe it to whatever re~ains of my honesty to say [mally that I do not knoW.32 
For Derrida, the subjective status of the author of autobiographical t~xts is 
indeterminable. Derrida quite openly writes that it is we, the readers who must decide 
how we want to interpret or edit these postcards. He denounces this necessary 
selection process at the heart of the archive and - in a movement reminiscent of 
Rousseau in his Confessions and Althusser in The Future Lasts a Long Timi3 - shifts 
any responsibility for interpreting the text onto the reader: 
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But it was my due to give into it [selection], and it is up to all of you to tell me why. Up to 
you [tol] frrst: I await only one response and it falls to you. Thus I apostrophise.34 
Once Derrida has refused to place himself at the centre as author of these envois he 
goes on to ask us to consider these postcards as part of a larger correspondence: 'You 
might consider them, if you really wish to, as the remainders of a recently destroyed 
correspondence. Destroyed by fire or by that which figuratively takes its place. ,35 If I 
wish it to be so, then these cards can be merely a part of something bigger which 
remains hidden from sight, conversely, I can decide that this correspondence perhaps 
never even existed. My desire, then, is responsible for my reading. Derrida admits 
that these envois have been edited. As already stated, this editing could be the result 
of a "recently destroyed correspondence", so that what I am reading here are but the 
'remainders' .36 No matter, somehow, a selection process decided which envois were 
to be archived. 
Some passages have "disappeared" - Derrida does not tell us where they have gone -
and these passages are, according to Derrida, illustrated within the text. They are 
'indicated, at the very place of their incineration, by a blank of 52 signs and a 
contract insists that this stretch of destroyed surface remain forever indeterminable' .37 
Throughout these 'postcards' are inscribed a series of blank or 'mute' spaces. These 
blanks - which represent destroyed archive material - could be said to reveal 'the 
secret of reproduction ,38 within a text. These spaces represent that which cannot be 
posted to me or read by me. So that I have t.hat which cann.ot be read opposed to a 
post-carded structure which relies upon a stereotyping - a culture of copying which is 
immanent in all our archives. Derrida is intent upon exposing the sham of the 
confession by denouncing those who demand that these stories be written. These 
bibliophiles are ~onsistently described in terms which conjure up police forces, 
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private detectives or spies who hunt the subject who is necessarily 'on the run' from 
some terrible secret which must be confessed and exposed within a narrative. Derrida 
establishes a subplot where he is in hiding from a posse who pursue him detennined 
to discover the "secrets" of his private life: 
I got there by car (always looking in the rearview mirror to make S\ll'e no one was following 
me). [ ... ] I began by tearing them [letters] up on the banks of the Seine but it would have 
taken me twenty-four hours and the people passing and the fragments that could have been 
put back together, all those cops always on my path as if obsessed about my private life of 
which they know nothing.39 
Parallel to this idea of mute spaces within the text Derrida writes of a "dead letter": a 
letter sent to the wrong address and returned unopened.40 This 'forgotten' letter, 
which Derrida refuses to open, resists the archiving process when Derrida refuses to 
consign it either to his house or to his person. In refusing domiciliation this 'dead' 
envois thwarts those who seek 'truth' in the circulating word of the 'open' letter. 
Derrida continues with the theme of detection. 'Private detectives' are hounding him, 
intent on sniffing out details of his private life: 'The "correspondence" will be 
destroyed better if we pretend to save several laughable fragments of it, several 
snapshots good enough to put in everyone's hands. ,41 
Autobiographical writing can then, says Derrida, be used to side-track readers away 
from the 'truth' about one's identity. For example, one can give false 'evidence' or 
even confuse readers by bombarding them with an excess of infonnation: 
Not a single trace, an absolute camouflaging by means of too much evidence: cards on the 
table, they wont see anything else. They will throw themselves onto unintelligible 
remainders, [ ... ]. The Secret of what we will have destroyed will be even more thoroughly 
destroyed or, amounting to the same thing, by all the evidence, with all its self~evidence 
more thoroughly preserved.42 
Derrida's Post Card is a hugely playful text enacting a game where the stakes are 
high: 'And when I say 'je suis', with you, I am playing poker. ,43 Derrida beguiles us 
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with the prospect of a 'hidden' autobiographical text 'behind' this book which merely 
camouflages this hidden text. If his Post Card is merely a collection of "unintelligible 
remainders" prefacing a book about. Freud, then there perhaps exists another book, a 
secret text which Derrida and his 'friend' within the narrative, have destroyed. Then 
there is also the unopened 'dead' letter and the 'mute' spaces within the text which 
point to potential narratives which have been suppressed or secreted by the author but 
which might afford the opportunity for 'other lines of enquiry'. These secreted stories 
offer the chance for discovering the 'truth' about Derrida and he p~rsistently lures the 
reader with this possibility, as if he were in charge of what remains and what is 
destroyed and as if he was not constantly writing against the possibility of finding any 
key to identity in the written or spoken word. The process of selection and control is 
a ruse: 'What will we bum, what will we keep?,44 
Derrida's game is at least twofold. He is revealing the sham at the heart of any belief 
in the truth of the archive: 
In several places I will leave all kinds of references, names of persons and of places, 
authentiflable dates, identiflable events, they will rush in with eyes closed, fmally believing 
to be there and to fmd us there when by means of a switch point I will send them elsewhere 
to see if we are there.4S 
I can read this in relation to Rousseau's Confessions, when he re-writes the time he 
spent at Les Charmettes and sends the reader 'elsewhere' in an alternative chronology 
of events, and in relation to Althusser's re-writing of the farmhouse idyll in his 
Future. Derrida reveals that he is not in control of the archive, not in control' of the 
selection process or the language he chooses. This language is controlled instead by a 
rule that he cannot divulge because it is beyond him. Again, Rousseau is recalled, this 
time in relation to de Man and the 'discovery' of a 'machinal' language preceding 
identity. Copies are all we have with autobiography, not so much because of 
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Derrrida's choice, but because of the linguistic framework which controls and 
determines the archive. Language itself selects over Derrida's conscious intentions, 
or, if you wish, presence to one's self has been preceded by language. Marion 
Hobson discusses Derrida's attempts to demystify a process of writing which: 
allows the idea of selecting and preserving information through time to be thought without 
implying intention or purpose, and without separating writer and written-on, or agent and 
acted-on ... 6 
So that Derrida is teasing the reader with the promise of a 'hidden' text, with the 
secrets of the 'dead' letter and with the 52 'mute' spaces. The only real secret is this 
machinallanguage at the heart of avowal. In other words, this text, The Post Card, 
writes in opposition to Derrida's own desire for a living speech, presence, proximity, 
and all those things that the mediation of language necessarily forbids. He has 
'necessarily written upside-down - and in order to surrender to Necessity' .47 
Hobson, agreeing with Derrida that subjectivity arises out of language, nevertheless 
refuses to render the language user totally passive. For her, the subject "hovers" 
between a passivity and an activity in a type of 'textual reflexivity,48 which I note here 
in Derrida's intertextual - sotto voce - citations of Rousseau, de Man and Althusser. 
This 'hovering' could perhaps be better seen as an affirmation o~ play: Derrida, like 
., 
these other writers, is moving beyond an epoch of humanism defined by a nostalgic 
search for origin, the 'authentic', and the 'true', towards the formulation of texts 
which play or oscillate between this desire for origin and the recognition and 
simultaneous renunciation of this desire. 
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6.2. Circumfessions 
Making the truth 
Derrida's Circumfessions reprises S1. Augustine's question: 'Cur confitemur Deo 
scienti?' If God knows all things in advance, why do we confess to him? That is, . 
what is the function of the confession? The implications of the title - circum-fessions 
- are manifold. Where the con-fession must tell all, the circum-fession admits that it 
speaks around something: 
[ .. ] and for years I have been going around in circles, trying to take as a witness not to see 
myself being seen but to re-member myself around a single event, I have been accumulating 
in my attic, my 'sublime', documents, iconography, notes, learned ones and naive ones, 
dream narratives or philosophical dissertations [ ... ] about circumcisions[ ... ] with a view to 
my circumcision alone.49 
A confession testifies to the singular and to this extent it resembles circumcision: 
'One time alone: circumcision takes place but once.'so Similarly, a circumcision, 
despite its claim to uniqueness, repeats this so-called singular event, thus generating a 
genre and a tradition of ritual. Derrida, then, in the very title of this text, has chosen 
that his autobiography should openly admit to a place within this tradition of 
repetition: within a tradition constituted as repetition. 
In choosing to cite S1. Augustine's Confessions, Derrida chooses to write in the trace 
of St. Augustine. Derrida's confession then, has nothing to do with his 'truth', in so 
far as it belongs to literature and to a tradition of confessional texts. Circumfessioni 
also 'traces' other autobiographies. Most interestingly for this thesis, it cites 
Rousseau's Confessions, at the point when Rousseau narrates the theft of the ribbon: 
'I have followed the confessions of theft at the heart of autobiography [ ... ] 
Rousseau's ribbon' .51 
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Similarly, Derrida evokes the 'trace' of Augustine in Rousseau's Confessions at the 
point where Augustine writes of the pleasure of accusing an 'other' of a crime: 
It was a joy to my pride to be set apart from culpability, and, when I had done some evil 
thing, not to confess that I had done it [ ... ] but I loved rather to excuse myself and accuse 
some other. 52 . 
To this extent, Derrida's Circumfessions does not confess himself: it repeats other 
confessions. I recall de Man's discussion of a confession as the repetition of another 
confession. De Man noted that Rousseau's confession of theft and slander in his 
Confessions is repeated in his Fourth Reverie. The same confession, in a different 
[con]text is, in the Reveries, written as fiction. The Reveries are a fictional work and 
therefore, within this literary context, a lie or slander can be a fiction because it is 
'without consequence for anyone' .53 
De Man goes on to reveal the fictional status of Rousseau's frrst confession: 
It will be objected that the fiction in the Reveries and the denunciation of Marion are miles 
apart in that the former is without consequence whereas the latter results in considerable 
damage to others. 54 
But it is the falsely referential reading of the first confession in· Confessions which is 
at fault. The reader should have understood that the utterance of the name "Marion" 
as an instance of grammar, was a fiction and, therefore, . essentially without 
significance. If a confession is always this repetition of another confession and hence 
a reference to another text rather than to a 'flesh and blood' person, the confessional 
text must be fictional. I here unite Rousseau, de Man, Althusser and Derrida. 
Back on trial 
I have already placed autobiographical writing within a legal context: a confession 
always seeks pardon for 'crimes'. But what are the implications for the 'truth' of 
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autobiographical writing if these crimes are not 'owned' by the accused. This point, 
made throughout Circumjessions, recalls de Man in Allegories, especially when he 
writes: 
In fact, a far-reaching modification of the organising principle of truth occurs [ ... there is] the 
truth in whose name the excuse has to be stated, [ ... which is] not structured like the truth 
principle that governs confessions.5s 
The truth principle governing the confession relies on the possibility of 'presenting' 
oneself, whereas the truth of the excuse relies on the believability of a fiction: it must 
convince. The confession, then, is guided by a literary principle. Robert Smith, 
writing about the impossibility of some individual 'owning' a crime, writes that, in 
his Confessions, St. Augustine. does not possess the event which would make him 
singular: 
Stin too much and not enough is owned by St. Augustine. The naughtiness of stealing the 
pears, for example, for all the delayed shame it brings in confessing it, abides with Augustine 
himself and no-one else, he feels sure. The shame brands on the face this marque of private 
ownership. Mea culpa: like "my chance": the sin and the story of it are mine and no-one 
else's. But are they? The prime means of authenticating confession might be to foreground 
the unique[ ... ]the chanciness, the erroneous and wayward determinism so lefthandedly 
governing one's life. And the literality of things sets this chanciness simultaneously out of 
reach of the one who would own it.56 
In making the crime of theft into a narrative which is then repeatable, the crime is 
fictionalised and it's name can be shared. The crime of theft belongs not to St. 
Augustine and the pears, not to Rousseau and the ribbon, nor to Althusser's 
shoplifting. Far from presenting them to us, these moments of citation absent them. 
Derrida, rewriting St. Augustine's Confessions by re-tracing moments which ought to 
be unique to Augustine, withdraws the poss~bility of an originary presence only to 
replace it with writing: 'Once the assurance of self-presence is disturbed [ ... ] it is 
writing which will be disclosed.'S? It is this: 
possibility of extraction and citational grafting which belongs to every mark, spoken or 
written, which constitutes every mark as writing [, .. ] cut off from its 'original' meaning and 
from its belonging to a saturable and constraining context. Every sign [ ... ] can be cited, put 
between quotation marks; thereby it can break with every given context, and engender 
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infmitely new contexts. [ ... ] This citationality, duplication, or duplicity, this iterability of the 
mark is not an accident or an anomaly [ ... ] What would a mark be that one could not cite? 
And whose origin could not be lost on the way?S8 
To this extent it is impossible to discern authorial intention within a text. As Derrida 
writes, 'it is impossible to follow my trace' or to 'calculate the itinerary of texts' .59 
Robert Smith, discussing Derrida's Circumjessions, writes that 'autobiography is a 
space of re-reading,.60 Rousseau re-reads St. Augustine, Althusser re-reads Rousseau, 
de Man re-reads Rousseau and re-reads Rousseau's re-reading of himself in The 
Reveries. Finally, Derrida re-reads them all understanding that his circum-fession 
circulates prior confessions and reads around their narratives, enabling a different 
context to generate new meanings: 
Autobiography would be neither necessary nor possible if the name could be owned. In it's 
suicidal initiative autobiography - which mourns only through a name [ ... ]-rounds on itself in 
jealousy for the name under which it is instituted but which name, so as to let it be instituted, 
must be given up into the shared space of a people.61 
Indeed, as Geoffrey Bennington so rightly points out when he writes on Derrida's 
Circumjessions: 'For another book, J. D.' s "life" would, in the end, have been quite 
different.,62 I can think here of the 'different' Althusser's portrayed in his two 
autobiographies, The Future Lasts a Long Time and The Facts, I can also think of the 
differences between the Rousseau's Confessions and The Reveries. 
Avowal 
I am left pondering the possibilities for autobiography if it is always constrained by 
the limited matrix of a grammatical repetition. As Derrida says: 'I wonder what I am 
looking for with this machine avowal. ,63 
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Derrida is looking for the chance to live without needing to write anymore. Like 
Rousseau and Althusser, who both wrote in response to a public demand for a story 
about them, Derrida recognises the urgent call to autobiography and the desire to have 
done with it by writing the definitive statement about who he is.64 Derrida is 
compelled to 'seek [himself] in a sentence' .65 Above all, in a "new" sentence and a 
new language, in the absence of which, this book will be doomed to failure.66 Yet he 
can only ever fail in his attempt to 'gather' himself, to become finally, once and for 
all 'this cauterized name,67 through the building of a successful archive in response to 
a god or law which demands the confession: 'I only know how to deceive, deceive 
myself, deceive you, and you, and you again. ,68 
The result of his failure, what he calls his "machine" avowal, is due to this inability to 
invent this new language: a non-grammatical syntax. Instead, he feels as if he is a 
man trying to explain a long voyage abroad using only the simple tools of a primitive. 
This description of a "machine" avowal recalls de Man's own description in 
Allegories of the 'machine-like quality of the text of the lie' .69 Rousseau called this 
automatic quality of grammar "l\~ffet machinal" of words70 and pointed to a radical 
irresponsibility at the heart of language which makes it 'free with. regard to referential 
-. 
meaning [and able to] posit whatever its grammar allows it to say' .71 
6.3. Monolingualism: cultural identities 
Our question is still identity.72 
This text 'presents' Derrida to us in 'parody'.73 It discusses, beyond Derrida's 
identity, national identities in a world where one language is meant to work for 
everybody: 
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What happens when someone resorts to describing an allegedly Wlcommon "situation", mine, 
for example, by testifying to it in tenns that go beyond it, in a language, whose generality 
takes on a value that is in some way structural, Wliversal, transcendental, or ontological? 
When anybody who happens by infers the following: "What holds for me, irreplaceably, also 
applies to all. Substitution is in progress; it has already taken effect. Everyone can say the 
same thing for themselves and of themselves. It suffices to hear me; I am the Wliversal 
hostage.74 
Derrida, denouncing a language which is 'raving mad' joins forces with de man's own 
indictment of a 'delirious' language.75 It is, moreover, this radical irresponsibility of 
language which concerns this thesis. This grammatical structure defines my 
responsibility - I am called to respond in language - yet this structure is irresponsible. 
So just how should I interpret a society that depends upon and sustains the re-
inscription of the structure of a universal law upon the body of an irreplaceable 
singularity? 
In its common concept, autobiographical anamnesis presupposes identification. And 
precisely not identity. No, an identity is never given, received, or attained; only the 
intenninable and indefmitely.phantasmatic process of identification endures. Whatever the 
story of a return to oneself or to one's home [cheZ-SOIl, into the "hut" [casa]of one's home 
[chez is the casal no matter what an odyssey or bildungsroman it might be, in whatever 
manner one invents the story of a construction of the self, the autos, or the ipse, it is always 
imagined that the one who writes should know how to say 1.76 
But this I can never be independent of language and, moreover, this I will be uttered 
in different ways depending on the language used. So that the self depends upon 
language and context and is at least twice removed from origin. 
6.4.Conclusions 
To be boWld better and better but to be read less and less well over almost twenty years.77 
I have hoped not only to read these three Derrida texts together to stress their 
interconnectedness, but also to connect these three texts through their strong re-
reading of those other texts which I have discussed here in relation to autobiography -
namely, Rousseau's Confessions,- de Man's Allegories and Althusser's Future. This 
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[inter]textual "reflexivity", noted by Hobson in her discussion of Derrida's 
Dissemination, is the defining feature of autobiography as fe-reading. It is in these re-
readings that the possibility of discovering a unique 'trace', a unique 'story' about 
someone or a unique itinerary is erased. To this extent, all these books have been, on 
one level at least, written against those who, as I have noted, seek within the text 
some 'evidence' of the author which might be used, at some point, to denounce that 
same author's life or thoughts. 
In Circumfessions Derrida embarks on a discussion of the very 'real' denunciation of 
his 'name' by a lecturer, Serge Doubrovsky, at a lecture in Montreal. This 
Doubrovsky was reported to have said: 'Do you know that Jacques Derrida is in 
analysis?' 78 What, wonders Derrida, gives this man the right to say this, and in the 
context of a lecture about Derrida's work? 
The big deal here, what truly fascinates me in this story is not the stupefying assurance with 
which they invent and drag out the sham, it's above all that they do not resist the desire to 
gain an advantageous effect from it (revelation, denunciation, triumph, enclosing, I don't 
know, in any event something that suddenly gets bigger from the fact that the other is 
"inanalysis" [SiCJ.79 . 
The 'rumour' becomes legitimate only because people desire it to be true: 'One 
cannot do without truth, but it's not the one they think they're confessing, they still 
haven't' understood anything about it. ,80 For some people it is "necessary" that 
Derrida be in analysis and Derrida asks why this might be so: 
Who am I and what have I done so that this might be the truth of their desire? [ ... J, This is 
what we have not fmished meditating on, and is what by far goes beyond my own caSe.81 
Because Derrida does not believe in the possibility of 'disinterestedness' ,82 these 
'cases' - his and other unspecified instances - have motivated him to: 
publish under my name things that are inconceivable, and above all unlivable, for me, thus 
abusing the 'editorial' credit that I have been laboriously accumulating for years, with this 
sole aim in mind.83 
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In an attempt debunk the truth status of autobiography, Derrida has been writing 
'autobiographies' which are obviously fictional insofar as he could have not lived the 
life that theses texts depict. Such ~ autobiography is a guilty text only in so far as it 
is gUilty of fiction. To this extent, the crime becomes the crime of writing, rather than 
writing about a crime which might have happened. This type of autobiography can 
offer evidence of a guilty author only if we are willing to accept that all authors are 
gUilty: 
One always asks for pardon when one writes, so as to leave suspended the question of 
knowing if one is fmally asking pardon in writing for some earlier crime, blasphemy or 
perjury, or if one is asking pardon for the crime [ ... ] in which consists presently the act of 
writing, [ ... ].84 
One could say that Derrida's oeuvre has been written, at some level, to vindicate all 
those victims of literary biographers. Derrida has attempted to reveal to the reader, at 
every possible moment, through his re-readings of Rousseau, Althusser and de Man, 
how these three author-victims, and indeed how he himself, have been unfairly 
judged: 
No longer even the right to make them admit the violence by which they still try to extort 
writing, to confess to "confess me", pretending to believe in order, in truth, in reconciliation, 
in repentance or expiation, in short in this justice that is panting and fmally appeased by guilt 
assumed, exposed, shouted out, before them, or before God, "ah, if at least he'd owned up!, 
as though this economy were not to my eyes the worst, shameless forgetting of the fault [ ... ] 
as though someone had the right to deliver me [ ... ] through some judgement, taking 
knowledge or taking note of my crimes.as 
In conclusion, throughout this thesis, I have agreed that the desire for a truth or story 
about some other one is 'natural' and, to this extent, will always exist. What matters, 
above all, is that this story is recognised by those who read it, not as a truth which 
, ' 
might offer some guarantee about the moral character of the person delineated, but as 
an ever more complex story about what we need to hear or have heard about that 
person. So that the literary critics who write against Rousseau, de Man, Althusser and 
Derrida created a truth about these authors and confessed their stories, not in order to 
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deliver justice but in order to preserve a status quo which they perceived in opposition 
to the texts of these controversial thinkers. 
Whilst it is true that all literary critics must, in the act of reading its~lf, impose an 
interpretation on a text and thus, to some extent, involve themselves in concepts of 
intention and meaning, I feel that the debates that I have located represent a co-
ordinated attempt to censor texts. In a perverse type of literary detective work, the 
determination of authorial intention becomes the sole premise of their criticism rather 
than a small part of a larger, much more rigorous, textual analysis. For Rousseau, de 
Man, Althusser and Derrida, language itself is deficient. The critics who have 
established themselves in opposition to these philosophers have all been keen to 
transfer the flaws associated with language onto the men themselves in shabby, ad 
hominem attacks which allow them to dismiss an entire oeuvre in a media-friendly 
because scandalous manner. 
Hopefully, I have complicated these naIve psycho-biographical approaches by 
pointing to their failure to account for the graphic aspect of autobiography. I blur the 
boundaries that traditionally separate autobiography and fiction. Ultimately, the 
thesis has shared Derrida's constant amazement faced with what seems to be a 
widespread determination to discredit deconstruction. A hostility towards 
deconstruction recalls a prior hostility towards the texts of Rousseau and Althusser, in 
whose work we have traced the major concerns of deconstruction. So that, like 
Derrida, I have only ever been asking "why?": 
Why the accusation of irrationalism as soon as someone asks a question concerning reason, 
its forms, its history, its mutations, of anti-humanism as soon as a question is raised 
concerning the essence of man and the construction of the concept 'man'? I could multiply 
examples of this sort, be it a matter of language, of literature, of philosophy, of technique, of 
democracy, of all institutions in general etc.. In short, what are they afraid of? Who are they 
trying to frighten?86 . 
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